The IAEA is useless. It failed to stop Saddam from pursuing nuclear weapons, and in 1981 the Israelis had to strike the Osirik reactor facility to prevent him from becoming a nuclear power with the world’s 4th largest military as well. From 1981-1991, the IAEA effectively did nothing to stop Saddam’s nuclear ambitions. After Operation Desert Storm, the IAEA was on the verge of declaring that Saddam’s nuclear program had been destroyed in the war, but the defection of regime leaders revealed that Saddam had successfully hidden his program and even built a bomb (which only lacked enriched weapons grade uranium to be complete). Many of the facilities were subsequently destroyed, but in the summer of 2002 satellite imagery showed that buildings at Saddam’s nuclear facilities had been rebuilt. Inspectors went back into
This entity also failed to detect the Pakistani nuclear program, the Indian nuclear program, the AQ Khan nuclear black market network, the Libyan nuclear program, the Syrian nuclear program, and the North Korean nuclear program. It failed to stop any of those programs. It also failed to detect or stop the Iranian nuclear program (peaceful or belligerent, it went undetected by the IAEA).
So I ask, what relevance does this group have given the history of seeing no evil, hearing no evil, and doing nothing against evil (though it has been consistent in chastising those who take action against nuclear programs run by rogue, terrorist-supporting, dictatorial regimes)?
Britain’s ambassador to the IAEA, Simon Smith, said the material presented to the board of governors on Monday contained information about possible weapons work beyond that date.
“Certainly some of the dates that we were talking about, or that the secretariat was presenting in there, went beyond 2003,” Smith said…
Diplomats attending the briefing said the material presented to the board of governors had infuriated Iranian ambassador Ali Asghar Soltanieh…
The board was presented with material “from multiple sources” suggesting “detailed work put into the designing of the warhead, studying how that warhead would perform, how it would be detonated and how it would be fitted to a Shahab-3 missile,” Smith said.
The material was “serious and substantial,” the ambassador continued.
And it underlined the IAEA secretariat’s concern that the deficit of confidence in Iran, rather than being reduced, “if anything, is getting deeper,” he said.
sm-THANK YOU CAPTAIN OBVIOUS