The Left & Their Conspiracies About Iraq

The left has been in a constant state of anxiety recently over their perceived notion that Bush is planning on permanent bases in Iraq.

The White House, responding to what it considers rumors being spread by MoveOn.org, liberal blogs such as DailyKos.com and Democratic lawmakers, this week tried to persuade key lawmakers that President Bush is not attempting to bind his successor to a long-term military presence in Iraq.

Senior White House officials have briefed Sen. Edward M. Kennedy, Massachusetts Democrat, and other congressional lawmakers about their negotiations with the Iraqi government and will continue to meet with other legislators next week.

“The argument that we seek permanent bases is a constant red herring of MoveOn.org and other interest groups who want us to retreat from Iraq, with no regard for our national security interests or the fate of the Iraqi people,” White House press secretary Dana Perino said.

The White House and administration officials say talks between the U.S. and Iraqi governments on a “status of forces agreement,” or SOFA, are preliminary, do not require congressional approval and are not about troop levels.

SOFA’s have never required, nor will they ever require congressional approval. Michael Rubin before the House a few weeks ago on SOFA’s and Treaties:

Typically, they serve to vest the United States with criminal jurisdiction over our forces in a host country. Usually, this entails a commitment to hold our troops and personnel legally responsible for any criminal conduct under the Uniform Code of Military Justice or some such arrangement. Unknown in the case of Iraq would be the status of private security contractors. Many SOFAs also address exemption from inspections and customs duties, travel document requirements, and tax exemptions for the PX. Today, the United States has approximately 100 SOFAs.

Generally, SOFAs constitute agreements rather than treaties. It is a rare occurrence if a SOFA is sent to the Senate for approval. With regard to NATO, Japan, and Korea, security guarantees are covered in separate treaty structures above and beyond the SOFA itself. For example, in 1953, the United States and the Republic of Korea signed a Mutual Defense Treaty, which the Senate ratified in 1954. The Pentagon then negotiated in 1966 a “Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Korea” which came into force on February 9, 1967, with an exchange of letters rather than separate ratification.

To determine whether ratification is necessary, what an agreement is called is less important than its contents. There is a point that an agreement can go so far in obligating the United States to defend another country that the Senate should ratify it. That line is when the obligation to defend another country becomes legally binding under international law. If such language is embedded in an Iraq SOFA, then there is little question that the SOFA should be voted on as a treaty by the U.S. Senate.

What turns the switch is if we are entering into an agreement with a country to protect them from an external threat, like Iran for example. If this were the case then the Senate would have to vote on it as a treaty. But this is not the case.

Brett McGurk in todays USA Today:

The Iraqi government has asked for an agreement with the United States, similar to ones we have with countries around the world, to help remove Iraq from U.N. Security Council oversight and normalize relations between our two countries.

The purpose of this agreement is to provide basic authorities and protections for U.S. military and civilian personnel serving in Iraq beyond Dec. 31, 2008, when our present U.N. authorizations are set to expire, and establish a basic framework for economic, diplomatic and security relations.

Bipartisan commissions on Iraq and leading members of Congress from both political parties have long sought such an accord. The Baker-Hamilton Iraq Study Group advocated a series of longer-term missions (including counterterrorism, training and equipping Iraqi forces, and reassuring the Iraqi government) whose implementation would require a basic agreement with the Iraqi government.

When those missions are completed, Iraq and the United States will benefit. There are key misperceptions about this agreement:

* This agreement will not tie the hands of the next president. It will ensure that the next president has the authorities necessary to exercise every prerogative of the office. Indeed, far from constricting the options available, the agreement will ensure that every policy option remains on the table, including going after al-Qaeda and training Iraqi security forces.

* This agreement will not specify troop levels. It will set the basic parameters for U.S. forces to operate in Iraq, but it will say nothing about the number of U.S. troops remaining in Iraq at any given time.

* It does not establish permanent bases in Iraq. The United States does not need and will not seek permanent bases in Iraq. The agreement will affirm this principle. U.S. forces remain in Iraq only at the request of the Iraqi government — and to support them in a common fight against terrorists and extremists.

But the left, who have never seen a conspiracy they couldn’t believe, is now in an uproar over the latest signing statement issued by the White House. With titles like “Signing statement: Bush asserts right to permanent bases, Iraqi oil” from KOS and “Bush Issues Signing Statement On Defense Act, Waiving Ban On Permanent Bases In Iraq” from Think Progress they have fanned the flames of the tinfoil hat wearing glee club.

The signing statement was in response to a few parts of the recent Defense Authorization Act which try to tie the hands of the President by overriding the constitutional power granted to him. Specifically number 1222 of the DAA which says:

No funds appropriated pursuant to an authorization of appropriations in this Act may be obligated or expended for a purpose as follows:

(1) To establish any military installation or base for the purpose of providing for the permanent stationing of United States Armed Forces in Iraq.

(2) To exercise United States control of the oil resources of Iraq.

Dana Perino in response to the Washington Times query:

“It merely protects the constitutional prerogatives of the President and preserves Commander in Chief authorities — for this President and future Presidents.”

Mrs. Perino said that the U.S. policy on bases is that “we don’t need and won’t seek permanent bases in Iraq.”

“There’s nothing to today’s rumor du jour that we have changed our long-standing position and now want permanent bases in Iraq,” Mrs. Perino said. “And the ‘war for oil’ is a tired line and clearly not true based on the past few years experience.”

Mrs. Perino’s statement had this caveat: “And as a reminder, in rare circumstances and for temporary military necessity, the President as Commander-in-Chief must preserve the right to protect or manage a particular resource where combat operations are ongoing (for example, to protect an oil field from control by terrorists) — but we don’t anticipate such a circumstance in Iraq, and preserving inherent constitutional authority has nothing to do with our policy on Iraq’s natural resources.”

The uproar is just the latest attempt by the Democrats to tie Bush’s hands when it comes to Iraq. How in the world they thought it wise to add a caveat that the US could never protect oil fields in Iraq if attacked by terrorists is beyond me.

As for the “permanent” bases, Michael Rubin again:

The differentiation within U.S. discourse between permanent and non-permanent bases is more political than legal. For the United States to establish or lease a base in another country often requires an agreement rather than a treaty. Many of these basing agreements or their renewal agreements involve political and economic commitments. This has been the case, for example, with the Incirlik Air Base in Turkey. Ankara frequently requests economic incentives. During the 2005 renegotiation, the Pentagon sought a “blanket” agreement in which the U.S. military would have full use for the period of the agreement, while some Turkish officials demanded that Ankara be able to approve every flight in order to maintain their leverage over Congressional discussions of the Armenian Genocide Resolution and other issues. Rent was the major subject of U.S.-Kyrgyz base renewal talks in 2006, while expansion of facilities to provide better force protection became the issue dominating discussions to expand Camp Lemonier in Djibouti. Sharing of maintenance costs for U.S. facilities in Japan is the contentious issue in U.S.-Japanese negotiations.

Sometimes host countries wish to receive security guarantees in exchange for hosting a U.S. base or U.S. forces. Again, whether or not the basing agreement should be subject to Senate ratification depends upon the strength of the guarantee. Such demands for assurances are not always stated upfront, and often enter the conversation over years or during renewal discussions.

While some critics of the Bush administration’s Iraq policy suggest that the United States should confine itself to a limited number of forward operating bases or even redeploy its forces “over the horizon” into neighboring countries or Iraqi Kurdistan, such a strategy would hamper our ability to respond and protect the U.S. forces training Iraqi counterparts and providing the space for Iraqi politicians to advance reconciliation efforts. The insurgency spread when U.S. forces were confined to a handful of bases and forward operation bases (FOBs). Part of General Petraeus and General Odierno’s “surge” strategy involved saturating troops throughout their areas of operation. The strategy worked. U.S. and Iraqi negotiators will not be anxious to roll back success by again concentrating Multinational Forces to a few FOBs, but will rather seek to maintain the security regime until political reconciliation can occur. Any language, however, which would commit U.S. forces to defend Iraq in the face of an external threat would transform the agreement into a treaty subject to Senate ratification.

In such a case, not only would the eyes of Tehran and Damascus be on the U.S. Senate, but also observers in Taipei, Jerusalem, and Seoul, for the U.S. willingness to support and defend our allies regardless of where we are in the election cycle is at the heart of our credibility and our relationships not only in Iraq, but the world over.

It’s very simple. If Iraq requests a guarantee that we will protect them from external threats such as Iran then the Senate would have to vote on that. But they are not asking for that, nor is the White House. They are negotiating a SOFA because when January 1st, 2009 rolls around the United Nations Security Council authority in Iraq ends. Which means the US will have no authority to protect our own troops, fight al-Qaeda or even train and equip Iraqi troops.

It’s that simple.

But the left must always have a conspiracy to cling to.

Curt

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