The third series in the Scott/James debate on the ties between al-Qaeda and Saddam. For the low down on this debate please check out the original post here. The first debate round-up gives a good rundown. The second part can be found here..
To begin this one James had argued that the only time Saddam attacked us after Desert Storm was in defense of his country :
I only recall defensive actions when US planes violated Iraqi airspace.
I replied back:
Really? You seem to have forgotten the cease fire Saddam agreed to in which no fly zones were established. If he didn’t want them he should not have agreed to the cease fire and then we would have taken him out in 1992 instead of 2003.
James:
Anyway you’re point about the “cease-fire” agreement and no-fly zones is easily refuted.
1.) The Safwan Accord was an informal cease-fire between the US and Iraqi military forces that arranged for such things as the exchange of prisoners, setting boundary lines etc. It was never written down and never codified.
2.) The subsequent UN Security Council Resolutions formed the formal, legally binding basis for a cease-fire, but did not include the enforcement of no-fly zones.
3.) The no-fly zones were conducted tri-laterally (and later bi-laterally after France pulled out) by the US, France, and Great Britain. It was never an issue taken up by the Security Council, and never one the Iraqi regime agreed to. The excuse given for the no-fly zones was to enforce a non-binding SC resolution against Iraq
Scott:
Ok, I’ll seek to address these in order:
1) The Safwan accord was informal at the end of February 1991, BUT on March 2, 1991, the UN passed resolution 686 which ordered the cessation of hostilities, Iraq accepted UN686 the next day, and in April (I think the 4th) the UN passed 687/Iraq accepted 687 which detailed the terms of the ceasefire and specifically stated that earlier resolutions-including the authorization of force-were still in effect until the terms of 687 were met. That’s why President Bush and the Coalition invaded under 687 and 678 rather than 1441.
2) The no-fly-zones (and I’d enjoy debating those) were perfectly legal as every UN re Iraq resolution subsequent to 678 which authorized the use of force included the caveat that previous resolutions regarding Iraq were still recognized and in effect.
3) You’re correct on who carried out the no-fly-zones, but missing the point completely. I’ll reiterate it again later…
James:
1) You are correct that UNSCR 686 was the codified cease-fire that Iraq agreed to and UNSCR 687 set up the inspections regime for Iraqi WMD. However there is a big divergence in the language each of these resolutions utilizes regarding the use of force, which is only authorized under UNSCR 678.
UNSCR 686, Paragraph 4:
“Recognizes that during the period required for Iraq to comply with paragraphs 2 and 3 above, the provision of paragraph 2 of resolution 678 (1990) remains valid.”
Paragraphs 2 and 3 of UNSCR 686 dealt with the mundane aspects of ending the war, borders, land mines, POWs, etc.
UNSCR 687 has no such provision for the use of force. Even if Iraq violated the terms of 686 that violation had to be agreed upon by the entire Security Council and codified in a new resolution; neither 1441, 686, or 687 gives the US the right to use force against Iraq without another resolution specifically authorizing force.
2)This is incorrect, as nothing in any UN resolution says anything about no-fly zones. The no-fly zones were set up as a response to UNSCR 688 which asked member states to provide assistance to humanitarian relief efforts inside Iraq.
Scott:
1) Great comments, but you’re still missing the point (I hope accidentally or through the confusion of international diplomatic phrasing and not deliberately as a parsing tactic). Your own citations above show that the cessation of hostilities authorized in 678 is dependent upon the time frame needed to fulfill the terms of the cease-fire in para 2 and 3, but those terms were never met =” the provision of paragraph 2 of resolution 678 (1990) remains valid.” And that provision is the authorization to use force.
As I said, the US didn’t invade or hold enforce the no-fly-zones without authorization because almost all the subsequent Iraq resolutions included caveats reaffirming that 678 was still in effect. That’s why the US waged war citing 678.
Now, the idea that a NEW resolution is required before taking action is interesting. I’d heard it before, and the reason I dismiss it-aside from the fact that 678 was repeatedly said to still be in effect-is because a new resolution would only be required if Safwan was a peace agreement or treaty or full on closure to hostilities. Instead it was a cease-fire, and cease-fires are temporary agreements to cease fire until conditions for peace are met. When they are violated they are no longer valid. Ya can’t have one side break a cease fire then head to the UN to debate a new resolution.
2) You’re right. They don’t say anything about no-fly-zones specifically, but they do authorize the use of force per 678 which was still in effect, and since 686, 688, and so forth all include the caveats that recognize 678 was still in effect (ie that force was authorized until the terms of the cease fire were met which they never were).
For example, a lot of people say the no-fly-zones were in support of 688, but that since 688 is an article 2 resolution and not an article 7, that it doesn’t authorize force (ignoring for the moment that later in your post you suggest the no-fly-zones were “Not exactly a serious threat to the regime.”). I say that they were valid under UN 686 which specifically says the authorization to use force (including the no-fly-zones) continued and was authorized because 686:
Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter: 1) Affirms that all twelve resolutions noted above continue to have full force and effect
That tells me that the authorization to use force was still in effect, and the no-fly-zones were an example of that authorization. Now, were the no-fly-zones a response to 688? Sure, but they were authorized under a different resolution. These caveats affirming that all previous resolutions are still in effect (including the authorization to use force) are in most of the Iraq resolutions.
James:
1) But the authorization of force would only be valid if Iraq was shown (proven) to have violated the terms of the cease-fire, usually by the entire Security Council. The inspection regime was not covered under the cease-fire hence the Iraqis could not be invaded on that premise alone. Paragraph 1 of 687 stated that Iraq only had to “agree in principle” to reparations to Kuwait but not actually pay them.
As I said, the US didn’t invade or hold enforce the no-fly-zones without authorization because almost all the subsequent Iraq resolutions included caveats reaffirming that 678 was still in effect. That’s why the US waged war citing 678.
Only operative clauses of UN Security Council Resolutions are enforceable; they can recall has many Resolutions that they want but they can only be enforced by a specific action of the Security Council detailing that force; hence 678 was needed because 660 was insufficient. 678 was specific to the situation between Iraq and Kuwait; as in if Iraq invaded Kuwait again force would be legitimate; but no-fly zones were never authorized under any cease fire agreement. They were designed to give humanitarian assistance to the Kurds and later Shiites, hence the reason that they started several months after the cease-fire agreement as the links I provided you show.
2)
“You’re right. They don’t say anything about no-fly-zones specifically, but they do authorize the use of force per 678 which was still in effect, and since 686, 688, and so forth all include the caveats that recognize 678 was still in effect (ie that force was authorized until the terms of the cease fire were met which they never were)”.
Except that the no-fly zones were not justified under 678 but under 688 as the links I provide show you. UNSCR 688 is a chapter VI and not a Chapter VII resolution; I don’t know where you are getting “article” from.
A new Resolution was needed because 678 was insufficient to re-kindle a war over any issue except for Iraqi violations of Kuwaiti sovereignty. A “cease-fire” exists between North Korea and the UN (the only other time besides 1990 Iraq when the use of force was legitimized under international law), yet even with North Korea’s repeated violations of it (abducting South Korean citizens, USS Pueblo) a war between the UN and North Korea will not occur unless a Security Council Resolution authorizes it.
Scott:
1)
“Only operative clauses of UN Security Council Resolutions are enforceable; they can recall has many Resolutions that they want but they can only be enforced by a specific action of the Security Council detailing that force; hence 678 was needed because 660 was insufficient. 678 was specific to the situation between Iraq and Kuwait; as in if Iraq invaded Kuwait again force would be legitimate; but no-fly zones were never authorized under any cease fire agreement. They were designed to give humanitarian assistance to the Kurds and later Shiites, hence the reason that they started several months after the cease-fire agreement as the links I provided you show.”
Great! Then please read the operative clause of (for example) 686 which says it’s conditional upon the terms of 678 being met first. Ie, if those terms are not met, then 678 is still in effect. I’m gonna cut to the chase here and reiterate the question that seems most important: were the no-fly-zones and bi-annual bombing campaigns important enough for Saddam to see them as a threat, or were they effectively irrelevant? You’ve argued well for both sides of this question without determining WHICH one it is…whether this constant 12yrs of bombing was important or not. All other denials that 678 was still in effect (as stated in almost all subsequent Iraq resolutions) is just denial and finger pointing at the US for apparently actions that were no big deal…action Saddam supposedly saw as no threat and actions that had no effect on UBL’s decision to reform AQ and start killing Americans.
No-fly-zones: if they were threatening, the debate about legality is worthy, if they were no threat and irrelevant, then it’s just baseless finger pointing.
2)
“A new Resolution was needed because 678 was insufficient to re-kindle a war over any issue except for Iraqi violations of Kuwaiti sovereignty. A ?cease-fire? exists between North Korea and the UN (the only other time besides 1990 Iraq when the use of force was legitimized under international law), yet even with North Korea?s repeated violations of it (abducting South Korean citizens, USS Pueblo) a war between the UN and North Korea will not occur unless a Security Council Resolution authorizes it.”
If Iraq launched a SCUD at Saudi a year after the cease-fire was in effect, and Saudi hadn’t done anything (except allow non-threatening no-fly-zones to launch from Saudi), then would the war be back on, or would it be time to debate and haggle, and negotiate the terms of re-opening 678 which was already left open until the cease-fire terms were met (as quoted in earlier post-note, I’m not just talking about that “recalling blah blah blah stuff either”). Or if Saddam started firing missiles at neighbors, does that mean the cease-fire is off? No way do troops in the field have to sit and take hits while the UN debates whether or not a temporary cease-fire has been broken. There is a difference between a cease-fire and a peace agreement.
“Except that the no-fly zones were not justified under 678 but under 688 as the links I provide show you. UNSCR 688 is a chapter VI and not a Chapter VII resolution; I don?t know where you are getting ?article? from.”
Some say pointed to 688 as the reason, but myself and others point to them as enforcement tools for 678. Under that resolution they were legal (though irrelevant if they were no threat to Saddam and meant nothing to AQ).
James:
1.)
” Great! Then please read the operative clause of (for example) 686 which says it’s conditional upon the terms of 678 being met first. Ie, if those terms are not met, then 678 is still in effect. I’m gonna cut to the chase here and reiterate the question that seems most important: were the no-fly-zones and bi-annual bombing campaigns important enough for Saddam to see them as a threat, or were they effectively irrelevant? You’ve argued well for both sides of this question without determining WHICH one it is…whether this constant 12yrs of bombing was important or not. All other denials that 678 was still in effect (as stated in almost all subsequent Iraq resolutions) is just denial and finger pointing at the US for apparently actions that were no big deal…action Saddam supposedly saw as no threat and actions that had no effect on UBL’s decision to reform AQ and start killing Americans.
No-fly-zones: if they were threatening, the debate about legality is worthy, if they were no threat and irrelevant, then it’s just baseless finger pointing.”
Obviously the no-fly zones were not threatening to Iraq. I am merely pointing out the rationale the Iraqis used to justify their actions against US planes. They had a legitimate concern over the legality of US and British warplanes flying overhead in sovereign Iraqi territory. That they chose to react violently doesn’t legitimize the no-fly zones, and doesn’t constitute a violation of any UN Resolution by Iraq.
2.)
“If Iraq launched a SCUD at Saudi a year after the cease-fire was in effect, and Saudi hadn’t done anything (except allow non-threatening no-fly-zones to launch from Saudi), then would the war be back on, or would it be time to debate and haggle, and negotiate the terms of re-opening 678 which was already left open until the cease-fire terms were met (as quoted in earlier post-note, I’m not just talking about that “recalling blah blah blah stuff either”). Or if Saddam started firing missiles at neighbors, does that mean the cease-fire is off? No way do troops in the field have to sit and take hits while the UN debates whether or not a temporary cease-fire has been broken”
You would still need another resolution though Iraq’s intent would be clearer, since SCUDS were illegal under 687, also Saudi Arabia could invoke Article 52 the right of self-defense, etc. But the question was Iraq’s firing at US and UK planes a violation of the cease-fire; it wasn’t because the no-fly zones were not covered under any cease-fire agreement, and they were merely defensive actions, so Iraq could also invoke Article xxx.
3.)
“Some say pointed to 688 as the reason, but myself and others point to them as enforcement tools for 678. Under that resolution they were legal (though irrelevant if they were no threat to Saddam and meant nothing to AQ).”
Well you can point to what you want, the US government stated they based the no-fly zones on 688 (Operation Provide Comfort), and they started in August 1991, not April when they would be expected to if they were a part of the cease-fire.
Scott:
2)
“Obviously the no-fly zones were not threatening to Iraq. I am merely pointing out the rationale the Iraqis used to justify their actions against US planes. They had a legitimate concern over the legality of US and British warplanes flying overhead in sovereign Iraqi territory. That they chose to react violently doesn?t legitimize the no-fly zones, and doesn’t constitute a violation of any UN Resolution by Iraq.”
This “legitimate concern” seems to benign to me. I believe that if nations were shooting down my planes and conducting major bombing campaigns (btw, those campaigns were outside the no-fly-zone’s pretext), then it seems a lot more than “legitimate concern.” It would seem like acts of war-the same acts of war Saddam repeatedly reiterated and claimed. Again, the idea of Saddam the forgiving, or Saddam the peaceful, or Saddam the nonchalant just is out of character in every sense. The man believed he was at war with the US, stated so almost daily, and just didn’t think the US was actually gonna have the balls to invade until the last minute.
2)
“You would still need another resolution though Iraq?s intent would be clearer, since SCUDS were illegal under 687, also Saudi Arabia could invoke Article 52 the right of self-defense, etc. But the question was Iraq’s firing at US and UK planes a violation of the cease-fire; it wasn’t because the no-fly zones were not covered under any cease-fire agreement, and they were merely defensive actions, so Iraq could also invoke Article xxx.”
And yet, in January 1993…Iraq fired an illegal SCUD at Saudi Arabia. Perfectly legal to fire illegal weapons and to break the cease-fire agreement?
No. There is a difference between a cease-fire and a peace agreement. A cease-fire is temporary and conditional. Once those conditions are met, it’s a peace agreement, if the cease-fire is broken (as it was just 16 days after it was agreed to) it can be moot.
3)
“Well you can point to what you want, the US government stated they based the no-fly zones on 688 (Operation Provide Comfort), and they started in August 1991, not April when they would be expected to if they were a part of the cease-fire.
I disagree as to when the no-fly-zones were declared. I have OSW as August 92 per the US State Dept website, and ONW as April 6-again US State Dept. Now, what of the cease-fire violations from March to April? Those are ok? Legal? No consequence?
Is there a difference between cease-fire agreements and peace agreements?
James:
1.)
“This “legitimate concern” seems to benign to me. I believe that if nations were shooting down my planes and conducting major bombing campaigns (btw, those campaigns were outside the no-fly-zone’s pretext), then it seems a lot more than “legitimate concern.” It would seem like acts of war-the same acts of war Saddam repeatedly reiterated and claimed. Again, the idea of Saddam the forgiving, or Saddam the peaceful, or Saddam the nonchalant just is out of character in every sense. The man believed he was at war with the US, stated so almost daily, and just didn’t think the US was actually gonna have the balls to invade until the last minute.
And yet, in January 1993…Iraq fired an illegal SCUD at Saudi Arabia. Perfectly legal to fire illegal weapons and to break the cease-fire agreement?
No. There is a difference between a cease-fire and a peace agreement. A cease-fire is temporary and conditional. Once those conditions are met, it’s a peace agreement, if the cease-fire is broken (as it was just 16 days after it was agreed to) it can be moot.”
I wasn’t aware of any Iraqi SCUDs fired at Saudi Arabia after the war. The US accused Saddam of moving missiles to the south of Iraq, but all SCUD missiles were accounted for by the ISG:
http://www.globalsecurity.org/
Saddam desired peace or at least the lifting of sanctions; if he believed he was at war with the US why did he destroy his SCUD missiles and WMD? His actions were far different from his words.
2.)
“I disagree as to when the no-fly-zones were declared. I have OSW as August 92 per the US State Dept website, and ONW as April 6-again US State Dept. Now, what of the cease-fire violations from March to April? Those are ok? Legal? No consequence?”
’92 or ‘91? The Iraq war ended in 1991. What cease-fire violations are you referring to in March and April? Remember Iraq had to accept the terms as well, and there may have been some delay in their acceptance.
3.)
“Is there a difference between cease-fire agreements and peace agreements?”
Not anymore, a cease-fire is effectively a peace agreement. This is a cease-fire agreement but it is treated as a peace agreement:
http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Hornet/irin_72299c.html
Scott:
1.) Yeah, Saddam fired a SCUD after the US bombed Iraq in the Jan 93 bombings “legitimate concerns”. Later, Iraq was found in “material breach” of UN resolutions at least 4 times, and clearly many more that were never addressed. He also fired illegal missiles into Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Saudi before the US invaded in 03. FYI, not all the SCUDs were ever accounted for. 24 remain missing to this day, and the ISG (as well as UNMOVIC) still have not been able to answer why Iraq was making fuel that could only be used in SCUDs right up into 2003, and why they were making airframe components, engines (which UNMOVIC turned up in Europe in 2004 or 2005), and more. In fact, I think if you search Global Security hard enough, you might find an interesting pic of a SCUD facility that had airframes around the outside before Powell’s UN address, and then no airframes the next day. The remain unaccounted for. The ISG report lists MOST issues as unresolved.
2.)
“’92 or ‘91? The Iraq war ended in 1991. What cease-fire violations are you referring to in March and April? Remember Iraq had to accept the terms as well, and there may have been some delay in their acceptance.”
Tell ya what, got MS Excel? If so, lemme know in reply to this item, and I’ll post a timeline online where you can see things with a little more clarity ïÂÅ
3.)
Scott: “Is there a difference between cease-fire agreements and peace agreements?”
James:Not anymore, a cease-fire is effectively a peace agreement. This is a cease-fire agreement but it is treated as a peace agreement: http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Hornet/irin_72299c.html
I disagree. Now earlier you cited Wikipedia. Let’s check what they say:
“A ceasefire is a temporary stoppage of a war or any armed conflict, where each side of the conflict agrees with the other to suspend aggressive actions.”
Dictionary.com is a lot more vague as it says it can be a temporary or a permanent thing.
I maintain, that a cease-fire is a temporary agreement upon which permanence depends on conditions being met and maintained. In contrast, a peace agreement is just that, peace. Once a CFV or Cease Fire Violation occurs, the cease fire is broken, null, and void. Besides, as I said earlier subsequent UN resolutions re Iraq constantly reiterated that the resolution which authorized force was still in effect, and the resolution that stipulated the terms of the cease-fire specifically said it was conditions based. Iraq had several CFVs, never met all or even half of the terms of the cease fire agreement, and thus that agreement was null (ie, the use of force still authorized). Further, Saddam clearly believed he was still at war. He said so, and he acted as such.
James:
1.)
“Yeah, Saddam fired a SCUD after the US bombed Iraq in the Jan 93 bombings “legitimate concerns”. Later, Iraq was found in “material breach” of UN resolutions at least 4 times, and clearly many more that were never addressed. He also fired illegal missiles into Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Saudi before the US invaded in 03. FYI, not all the SCUDs were ever accounted for. 24 remain missing to this day, and the ISG (as well as UNMOVIC) still have not been able to answer why Iraq was making fuel that could only be used in SCUDs right up into 2003, and why they were making airframe components, engines (which UNMOVIC turned up in Europe in 2004 or 2005), and more. In fact, I think if you search Global Security hard enough, you might find an interesting pic of a SCUD facility that had airframes around the outside before Powell’s UN address, and then no airframes the next day. The remain unaccounted for. The ISG report lists MOST issues as unresolved.”
Interesting theory, I could not bring anything up about a SCUD missile attack in 1993 on Google or lexis-nexis. Certainly Saudi Arabia would have raised a stink about it, and Bush I would have reacted strongly to any SCUD missile attack. If you have a source I would like to see it.
3.)
“I disagree. Now earlier you cited Wikipedia. Let’s check what they say:
“A ceasefire is a temporary stoppage of a war or any armed conflict, where each side of the conflict agrees with the other to suspend aggressive actions.”
Dictionary.com is a lot more vague as it says it can be a temporary or a permanent thing.
I maintain, that a cease-fire is a temporary agreement upon which permanence depends on conditions being met and maintained. In contrast, a peace agreement is just that, peace. Once a CFV or Cease Fire Violation occurs, the cease fire is broken, null, and void. Besides, as I said earlier subsequent UN resolutions re Iraq constantly reiterated that the resolution which authorized force was still in effect, and the resolution that stipulated the terms of the cease-fire specifically said it was conditions based. Iraq had several CFVs, never met all or even half of the terms of the cease fire agreement, and thus that agreement was null (ie, the use of force still authorized). Further, Saddam clearly believed he was still at war. He said so, and he acted as such. “
At various times the condition between the US and Iraq post-1991 have been called a cease-fire, a permanent cease-fire, and a peace. Whatever you call it it was still under the auspices of the UN Security Council. Like any permanent cease-fire under international law the victim of any violations would have to present them to the Security Council and the Security Council would have to vote on if it did or did not constitute a violation, and what action would be appropriate. The no-fly zones were a separate matter that Iraq at first complied with and then “defied”. Compliance wasn’t required of Iraq under any SC resolution. I maintain that Saddam did not act as if he were at war with the US as there was minimal “aggression” on the part of Iraq to defend against the no-fly zones. If Saddam truly believed himself at war he wouldn’t have done away with the SCUDs, and WMD, and would have maintained a more aggressive posture toward the US. Anyway we can close this point as well as neither of us will agree with the other.
Scott:
1.) “Interesting theory, I could not bring anything up about a SCUD missile attack in 1993 on Google or lexisnexis. Certainly Saudi Arabia would have raised a stink about it, and Bush I would have reacted strongly to any SCUD missile attack. If you have a source I would like to see it. “
http://www.fas.org/man/crs/98-386.pdf “according to a report not confirmed by the Pentagon, fired a Scud missile at the city of Dhahran in Saudi Arabia (January 18)”
I’ve seen other reports about this as well-not just the one. Never did follow up on it though. Scott Ritter’s book, Endgame mentions it as does UNSCOM Chairman Richard Butler’s, The Greatest Threat. It could be another case of multiple people reporting the same report, but it’s hard to see Ritter and Butler agreeing on much. Remember, the point here is that Iraq and the US were waging war upon each other between ODS and OIF. Whether that was justified via the UNSC is debatable, and semi-argumentative as: — if it were not authorized by the UNSC, then it makes it even more aggressive towards Iraq – if it were authorized by the UNSC, then it confirms that the official war remained.
Again, I can list many many examples of no-fly-zone and/or non-no-fly-zone combat, bombings, cease-fire breaches, etc. Literally thousands.
3.)
“At various times the condition between the US and Iraq post-1991 have been called a cease-fire, a permanent cease-fire, and a peace. Whatever you call it it was still under the auspices of the UN Security Council. Like any permanent cease-fire under international law the victim of any violations would have to present them to the Security Council and the Security Council would have to vote on if it did or did not constitute a violation, and what action would be appropriate. The no-fly zones were a separate matter that Iraq at first complied with and then ?defied?. Compliance wasn?t required of Iraq under any SC resolution. I maintain that Saddam did not act as if he were at war with the US as there was minimal ?aggression? on the part of Iraq to defend against the no-fly zones. If Saddam truly believed himself at war he wouldn?t have done away with the SCUDs, and WMD, and would have maintained a more aggressive posture toward the US. Anyway we can close this point as well as neither of us will agree with the other.”
Your entire argument is dependent upon the unsubstantiated perception that the 1991 Cease fire was a “permanent cease-fire under international law” Can you show an example of that cease fire being described as permanent by the UNSC? As I can list at least 4 UNSC statements of material breach, and many more UNSC statements that 678 was still in effect.
James:
1)
“Remember, the point here is that Iraq and the US were waging war upon each other between ODS and OIF. Whether that was justified via the UNSC is debatable, and semi-argumentative as: — if it were not authorized by the UNSC, then it makes it even more aggressive towards Iraq – if it were authorized by the UNSC, then it confirms that the official war remained.
Again, I can list many many examples of no-fly-zone and/or non-no-fly-zone combat, bombings, cease-fire breaches, etc. Literally thousands.”
The SCUD report is still an unconfirmed report. No doubt the SCUD failed to reach its target if it ever was fired, so either the SCUD was never fired or it disintegrated into the air. It cannot be proven either way, bur I would tend to stay away from “unconfirmed reports”.
Also go ahead and list the cease-fire “breaches” so I have a clearer understanding of what you are talking about; Iraq was held in material breach seven times by the Security Council and none since 1993. None of these breaches were considered serious enough to warrant a second resolution authorizing force, and the no-fly zone infractions were immaterial to the UNSC, and not relevant to the cease-fire/peace.
2)
“Your entire argument is dependent upon the unsubstantiated perception that the 1991 Cease fire was a “permanent cease-fire under international law” Can you show an example of that cease fire being described as permanent by the UNSC? As I can list at least 4 UNSC statements of material breach, and many more UNSC statements that 678 was still in effect.”
By its nature it was permanent codified into law by the very Resolutions you claim Iraq violated. There were 7 material breaches en total yet none of them were a justification for the resumption of hostilities as the Security Council as a whole has to vote on the correct response. The US cannot just say “a ha Iraq was/is in material breach, UNSCR 678 is still in effect bombs away” even though that is what the US did. 678 was specific to the situation between Iraq and Kuwait, i.e. Iraq invading Kuwait, the same way UNSCR 82 was specific to the situation between North and South Korea, i.e. North Korea invading South Korea…even though North Korea has violated the cease-fire multiple times, South Korea and/or the US are not justified under international law to attack North Korea under UNSCR 82 even though they are technically in a “cease-fire”.
Scott:
“The SCUD report is still an unconfirmed report. No doubt the SCUD failed to reach its target if it ever was fired, so either the SCUD was never fired or it disintegrated into the air. It cannot be proven either way, bur I would tend to stay away from "unconfirmed reports “
For me, if an unconfirmed report is corroborated (as I demonstrated), then it’s better to keep it in mind than dismiss it. The SCUD is but one of the many cease-fire violations (CFVs) listed in that pdf I linked to earlier.
“Also go ahead and list the cease-fire "breaches" so I have a clearer understanding of what you are talking about; Iraq was held in material breach seven times by the Security Council and none since 1993. None of these breaches were considered serious enough to warrant a second resolution authorizing force, and the no-fly zone infractions were immaterial to the UNSC, and not relevant to the cease-fire/peace.”
“warrant a second resolution authorizing force” The reason no second resolution was needed was because a second resolution wasn’t needed, and instead the subsequent resolutions in response to the CFVs/material breaches all reiterated the original authorization. Why reiterate instead of offer a new one…because the cease fire was not a peace treaty, but a temporary agreement that once broken becomes invalid. If a soldier walks across the line in the sand with a white flag, and no one shoots at him, it’s a cease fire…not the kinda thing that requires a UN affirmation. If enemy forces-paused by a cease-fire agreement-suddenly invade (be it Kuwait or South Korea or whatever) there is no time to go back to the UN, get everyone together, write up a second resolution to basically reiterate the legitimacy and reauthorize the first authorization of force, and then tell commanders on the other side of the globe it’s ok to respond. No. If there’s no need for a second resolution to re-say what the authorization said, then all that needs be done is to reaffirm that the first authorization is still valid, and that’s exactly what the UN did-reaffirmed that 678 was still valid….again, and again, and again, and again. It’s easy to take a dozen resolution post 678 and cite sections of resolutions that reaffirm 678 was still active, but it’s impossible to find a single UN resolution ending the 1991 Gulf War that is not conditional. If it’s conditional, then when those conditions aren’t met, the resolution is not met/not in effect.
2.
“By its nature it was permanent codified into law by the very Resolutions you claim Iraq violated. There were 7 material breaches en total yet none of them were a justification for the resumption of hostilities as the Security Council as a whole has to vote on the correct response. The US cannot just say "a ha Iraq was/is in material breach, UNSCR 678 is still in effect bombs away" even though that is what the US did. 678 was specific to the situation between Iraq and Kuwait, i.e. Iraq invading Kuwait, the same way UNSCR 82 was specific to the situation between North and South Korea, i.e. North Korea invading South Korea even though North Korea has violated the cease-fire multiple times, South Korea and/or the US are not justified under international law to attack North Korea under UNSCR 82 even though they are technically in a "cease-fire”
Again, please show me something that says the 1991 war was over, and that Iraq was free to break the cease fire agreement as long as it wanted, as many times as it wanted, as grievously as it wanted until someone decided to get a second resolution?
It’s like this, you say a cease-fire is permanent. The minute a soldier walks across with a white flag, and the shooting stops, then there’s peace (until the UNSC decides to pass a new resolution).
I say that a cease-fire is temporary, that its permanence is dependent upon the conditions it contains, and that the reason it is temporary is to get one side or the other to comply with those conditions as fast as possible (12yrs?). Thus, if a cease-fire is temporary, and conditions based, if those conditions are not met, or if it is broken, then the fighting can resume at any time, and there is no need for a second resolution of authorization to just reaffirm the first. Reaffirming that the first authorization was in effect happens several times in the subsequent resolutions, and there is nothing in any of them that says a new resolution must be given to authorize force again.
Re North Korea, I’d say that if DPRK invaded S Korea (via their invasion tunnels for example), they could be in Seoul in an hour or two. They could kill a million or two in Seoul with arty alone within a few days. Should the UN assemble, right up a new resolution, debate it, vote, and THEN respond? Nah. I don’t think so. I think the right and depth to respond to cease-fire violations is in the hands of those who have been violated. If they want the war to restart, they can do it after being violated.
I went back and actually re-read the resolutions, and the State Dept claim that 678 was still active. I think where the confusion rests (as with almost all the debate on pre-war intelligence does) with the fact that no one stance, no conclusive point is made. There is no specific claim in any of the resolutions that a second resolution authorizing force would be needed as opposed to a reiteration of the first.
James:
1.)
“Re North Korea, I’d say that if DPRK invaded S Korea (via their invasion tunnels for example), they could be in Seoul in an hour or two. They could kill a million or two in Seoul with arty alone within a few days. Should the UN assemble, right up a new resolution, debate it, vote, and THEN respond? Nah. I don’t think so. I think the right and depth to respond to cease-fire violations is in the hands of those who have been violated. If they want the war to restart, they can do it after being violated.
I went back and actually re-read the resolutions, and the State Dept claim that 678 was still active. I think where the confusion rests (as with almost all the debate on pre-war intelligence does) with the fact that no one stance, no conclusive point is made. There is no specific claim in any of the resolutions that a second resolution authorizing force would be needed as opposed to a reiteration of the first.”
RE: Iraq SCUD. If UNSCOM had evidence that Iraq had fired a SCUD at Saudi Arabia, they had ample time to present that evidence to the Security Council, likewise for the US and Saudi Arabia. That they didn’t suggests that the “unconfirmed” report is unconfirmed for a reason. As for Ritter and Rolf, both proved to be wrong about WMD (though Ritter later corrected himself), so if they want to wax on eloquently in their books about evidence of an Iraqi SCUD that they never produced they can go right ahead
RE: North Korea, It’s quite a different situation though as South Korea could invoke Article 51 if it were invaded by North Korea; if North Korea though say captures a US warship in international waters, and accuses the crew of spying and keeps the ship; then the US/South Korea would need additional authorization for the use of force.
There is some confusion regarding the need for a second resolution, most every international law expert agrees that a second resolution was needed and 678 did not carry over past the 1990 mandate. This is my stance as well. The State Department sees things differently, mostly because they are advocating a particular policy, and are carrying out the wishes of policy-makers. In the first of these articles Richard Perle states that he think the Iraq war was probably illegal under international law but still morally justified, and in the second article the authors outline why 678 was not applicable to the current situation.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,1089158,00.html
http://www.globelaw.com/Iraq/Preventive_war_after_iraq.htm#_Toc41379597
687 is completely different from 678, and no automatic trigger for war existed within its structure. The entire Security Council had to “remain seized” of the matter, meaning that only they could decide as a whole if a violation of 687 took place and if so what the punishment should be. 687 only referred to the sanctions regime, and Iraq’s compliance with 687 would mean sanctions would be lifted, Iraq’s non-compliance means that sanctions would stay in place. So my evidence that the 1991 “cease-fire” was permanent is as follows.
1.) The United Nations deemed the matter of 1990/1991 settled as the Security Council did not pass any resolution that authorized force against Iraq, nor did the UN offer its good offices to mediate a peace between the US and Iraq.
2.) The US was never put on a war footing with Iraq during the 1990s. President Clinton said some mean things about Saddam, and may not have liked him, but he never declared that we are still at war with Iraq, and never prepared the nation for any such war.
3.) Iraq was also never really on a war footing with the US. Sure Saddam said some things and he had AAA fire away at a few US planes (that were far out of range), but his priority was still on lifting sanctions, and not war with the US.
Scott:
1.) “RE: Iraq SCUD. If UNSCOM had evidence that Iraq had fired a SCUD at Saudi Arabia, they had ample time to present that evidence to the Security Council, likewise for the US and Saudi Arabia. That they didn’t suggests that the “unconfirmed” report is unconfirmed for a reason. As for Ritter and Rolf, both proved to be wrong about WMD (though Ritter later corrected himself), so if they want to wax on eloquently in their books about evidence of an Iraqi SCUD that they never produced they can go right ahead”
You can’t possibly be suggesting that Iraq accounted for all its SCUDs.
“RE: North Korea, It’s quite a different situation though as South Korea could invoke Article 51 if it were invaded by North Korea; if North Korea though say captures a US warship in international waters, and accuses the crew of spying and keeps the ship; then the US/South Korea would need additional authorization for the use of force.”
By the time South Korea could even invoke article 51, Seoul could have fallen, and the government seized. The point of a cease-fire is temporary. Everyone agrees that technically DPRK and ROK are still at war. Or are you trying to say that the Korean War was ended by a permanent cease-fire and the nations are not at war? This scenario is very much like the one between Iraq and the world though simpler. imo
There is some confusion regarding the need for a second resolution, most every international law expert agrees that a second resolution was needed and 678 did not carry over past the 1990 mandate. This is my stance as well. The State Department sees things differently, mostly because they are advocating a particular policy, and are carrying out the wishes of policy-makers. In the first of these articles Richard Perle states that he think the Iraq war was probably illegal under international law but still morally justified, and in the second article the authors outline why 678 was not applicable to the current situation.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,1089158,00.html
http://www.globelaw.com/Iraq/Preventive_war_after_iraq.htm#_Toc41379597
“most every international law expert agrees”….oh come on. There are no international law experts at the State Department? This “most every” comment is pure speculation and distortion aimed to bolster an argument that is oxymoronic at its core. To suggest or say that removing a dictator is immoral isn’t just incorrect, it’s an oxymoron for leaving one in power is what’s immoral (to say nothing of boosting them or directly putting them in power). I’m sure you can find international law experts who will say it was immoral, but I am equally confident of three things. First, the State Department probably has international law experts too. Second, 678 DID carry over past the 1990 mandate (particularly since Desert Storm took place in 1991 not 1990, and because most of the 17 subsequent resolutions reiterate 678 the authorization to use force). To be specific, the authorization to use force (“paragraph 2 resolution 678 (1990)”) was reaffirmed (see also UN949 October 15, 1994 for just one example: “reaffirming resolutions 678 (1990) of 29 November 1990, … and in particular paragraph 2 of resolution 678 (1990)”, [ie. Again specifically reaffirming the authorization to use force]). To reaffirm is to say it is still in effect. Lastly, cease-fires are temporary, and while they can be permanent if both sides maintain them, they are not inherently permanent.
“687 is completely different from 678, and no automatic trigger for war existed within its structure. The entire Security Council had to “remain seized” of the matter, meaning that only they could decide as a whole if a violation of 687 took place and if so what the punishment should be.”
You’re speculating. As there is no stated trigger for resumption of hostilities, there is also no stated need for a re-authorization. Instead, reiteration of the original authorization is repeated in the subsequent resolutions.
“687 only referred to the sanctions regime, and Iraq’s compliance with 687 would mean sanctions would be lifted, Iraq’s non-compliance means that sanctions would stay in place. So my evidence that the 1991 “cease-fire” was permanent is as follows. 1) The United Nations deemed the matter of 1990/1991 settled as the Security Council did not pass any resolution that authorized force against Iraq, nor did the UN offer its good offices to mediate a peace between the US and Iraq.”
Complete speculation as the war was between the UN and Iraq not the US and Iraq
The US was never put on a war footing with Iraq during the 1990s. President Clinton said some mean things about Saddam, and may not have liked him, but he never declared that we are still at war with Iraq, and never prepared the nation for any such war.
Sure it was. It was on a constant war footing. When Shia and Kurds rose up from 1991-1993, Iraq was certainly at a war footing as well as past that. There was never a peaceful stand down of Iraqi forces, and I’d love to see an example of a non-martial Saddam society. The conflict between the UN/US and Iraq was far from just “saying things” as I listed the hostile, combat actions and acts of war in the chronology link many posts earlier. Clinton certainly DID prepare the nation for war with Iraq on 4 different occasions. How exactly does that work…
Clinton bombs Iraq in 1993, addresses nation, says he bombed Iraq for violation of cease fire, but bombing isn’t an act of war?
Clinton sends brigades to Kuwait in 1994 because Iraq re-invaded Kuwait and ran away before UN could even pull a Monty Python, “Stop! Or I’ll say, ‘Stop!’ again”, tells press corps that Iraq isn’t complying with cease fire, gets nation ready to accept resumption of straight up open war, and it isn’t an act of war?
Clinton bombs Iraq in 1995, addresses nation, says he bombed Iraq for violation of cease fire, but bombing isn’t an act of war?
Clinton bombs Iraq in 1997, addresses nation, says he bombed Iraq for violation of cease fire, but bombing isn’t an act of war?
Clinton bombs Iraq in Spring 1998, addresses nation, says he bombed Iraq for violation of cease fire, but bombing isn’t an act of war?
Clinton threatens to bomb Iraq in November1998, addresses nation, recalled bombers while in flight, but somehow didn’t give the nation the impression to be ready for all out hostilities again?
Clinton bombs Iraq in December 1998, addresses nation, says he bombed Iraq for violation of cease fire, but bombing isn’t an act of war? (recall that this is what set the 911 plot in motion specifically carrying it from campfire brainstorm and rant to active, authorized plot per 911 Commission)
Iraq was also never really on a war footing with the US. Sure Saddam said some things and he had AAA fire away at a few US planes (that were far out of range), but his priority was still on lifting sanctions, and not war with the US.
I agree and have said that he had learned his lesson and was waging a conventional war with the US. To have done so would have been insane as defined by trying the same thing over and over and getting the same results while expecting different ones.
At this point James disappears.
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