The War in Ukraine Could Last for Years

by SIMPLICIUS THE THINKER

People are wondering why the Russian army continues to idle for so long, not launching their own offensives. And I wanted to use that opportunity to run through the numbers one more time to give a perspective on how long it may be taking Russia to adequately rebuild its ammo stocks.

To give an idea, some Russian sources believe the Russian army might have gone through the majority of its artillery by summer of 2022. Firing 60k shells a day for, let’s say, five months straight would be 60k x (30×5) = 9 million shells. I’ve gone through it all before, and won’t go into extreme detail, but suffice it to say that Russia could have had anywhere from 10-30 million shells in storage. This is based on various intel service reports, research, as well as comparisons to what the U.S. army had in its stockpiles (~20M shells).

Or if you choose to believe they had much more shells stockpiled, then let’s say they ran out by November or later, which is roughly when we have confirmation that Russia truly began firing a fraction of the shells, i.e. 10-20k per day rather than 40-60k.

The point is that, let’s say they want to build up a healthy stockpile for a major offensive or series of offensives. As hinted above in the post about a 10-14 day allocation for an AFU offensive, the way offensives are planned is you allocate the amount of munitions you believe will be required for a mass-sustained high-intensity campaign of a certain X amount of days. So let’s say Russia plans a two month long offensive where they want to be able to fire the 60k+ shells per day which they previously needed to advance on a consistent basis.

That would be 60k per day multiplied by 60 days (two months). This is 3,600,000 shells. Now, Russia produces an estimated 300k shells per month currently, perhaps more, but certainly they hope to ramp it up past that, though we don’t know how much more they can do so, or by when. But taking 300k per month into account, this equals 10k per day. Yet they’re currently said to be firing 10-20k per day. Let’s say hypothetically they are producing more, like 400-500k a month. Either way, this allows them to “save” and stockpile only an additional 100-200k shells per month, while the rest are fired straight from the oven, so to speak.

At 100-200k per month, they would need upwards of a whopping 18 to 36 months just to save up the 3,600,000 shells needed for a high intensity campaign of a mere two months. You see the problem? They’ve already been stockpiling for at least 6 months, since last November. But this has theoretically only given them a surplus of maybe 600k – 1.2M shells.

There could be ways around this problem: for instance, maybe they are producing much more than we know of, although it begins to stretch credulity at the higher end of the scale simply because, were they to be producing let’s say 800k shells per month or more, this would be several orders of magnitude more than the entire rest of the world combined. Sure, Russia is an economic powerhouse but we can’t get too unrealistic about their capabilities. To me, 500-700k per month could be a high realistic limit, but even then they would need many, many months of stockpiling just to gather enough stock for a high-intensity offensive. Of course, we’re only talking about strictly artillery shells here, and Russia is producing much more of other types of systems as well, which will offset the shell hunger.

But this is all just to give a very generalized perspective on why they may be idling their forces for a long time. Recall what Prigozhin said: there is an exact calculation for how much more men are lost when there is a given shell deficit. Half the required shells creates double or triple the losses—something like that. The point being that, for Russia to actively advance without incurring massive losses, they need a healthy amount of shells to be fired to suppress the enemy.

So, how long will Russia sit and stockpile shells? It’s impossible to say for certain as no one knows the exact numbers of what they’re actually producing. But they could very well choose to stockpile until next year, even next summer if need be. I’ve said it before, but they may very well spend this entire year simply attritioning the AFU in this low-intensity, low-risk manner of slow-crawl advances under cover of moderate rates of shelling.

There are many other factors. For instance, Russian artillery units are learning to become more accurate, not only through sheer experience and skill, but the advent of better spotting/fire-correction systems, drone integration, etc. Also, much more guided munitions like Krasnopol shells are being produced (Krasnopol was directly quoted as being a system which has ‘exponentially’ shot up in production numbers). And this obviously allows much less shells to be required as a single Krasnopol can do the job of roughly 50-100 conventional shells, depending on the distance fired and attendant CEP spread.

Of course, Russia may still choose a middle line and launch major offensives earlier with a reduced shell count, if they happen to smell blood. So that’s not to say there won’t be any offensives this year, I was simply giving a generalized explanatory precis. For instance, should the AFU force be devastated to a high degree after launching its “main” big offensive in the near future, Russia my ‘smell blood’ and choose to pounce then, as we’ve discussed here many times before. But I wouldn’t be surprised, either, if they continued this low intensity stockpiling mode until next year, all the while attritioning and breaking the AFU’s morale, infrastructure, etc. None of this is a revelation though, I’ve said it all before in previous reports.

On this topic, some officials in the EU are desperately trying to steer production into a ‘long term’ outlook, due to exactly the reasons I outlined above.

 

 
However, the outlook remains very foggy, or even bleak. Days ago, a major Swedish ammo factory blew up. Some cite secret Russian sabotage while others (perhaps more accurately) cite these very desperate ‘ramp up’ attempts, which are pushing the soggy European infrastructure past its limits and breaking points.

 

 
Rybar reports:

There was an explosion at the Swedish military factory in Karlsborg yesterday afternoon. According to media reports (https://apnews.com/article/sweden-explosion-munition-factory-88f2a603cb9878a6c7a4a4091aeca923), the accident occurred already at the stage of equipment maintenance, one person was injured.

The plant in Karlsborg is owned by the Norwegian-Finnish defense holding Nammo and is engaged in the production of small-caliber ammunition for various types of small arms.

🔻Nammo, in turn, is interesting in that it is now one of the largest European manufacturers of various types of shells and ammunition for Ukraine.

At the same time, even such a large company does not have enough (https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/09/world/europe/europe-shells-ukraine-ammunition.html) resources and capacities to fulfill the wishes of Kyiv customers, who ask for 250,000 155 mm shells every month.

📌 It is not surprising, Nammo, like many other defense companies, cannot increase production rates overnight, since they have been fulfilling much more modest orders for decades. For example, a recent order from the Norwegian government for 35 thousand 155 mm Nammo shells will be (https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/09/world/europe/europe-shells-ukraine-ammunition.html) carried out for at least three years.

In this regard, the promise of the European Union to provide Ukraine with 1 million shells per year looks unrealistic. However, many companies in pursuit of new orders seek to speed up the process, expand production and increase capacity. It is likely that yesterday’s accident was just the result of such decisions, and similar incidents should be expected at other plants.

🔻Given the current situation, Western officials and the media are broadcasting (https://t.me/rybar/46900) with all their might the thesis that the AFU have received enough weapons, everything that is possible has already been transferred, and it would be time to move on to the offensive. In Kyiv, they do not agree with this and continue to delay the day X: today, Vladimir Zelensky, already in an interview with the BBC, said (https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-65550427) that Ukraine needs more time to wait for new deliveries.

How to reconcile this with the fact that some quarters of the EU are clearly trying to pull the plug? I think there are several camps: some are the die-hard radicals who are being urged by their globalist controllers to escalate without limit, but others see it as a futile gesture.

For instance, Ukraine’s NatSec Danilov stated that Western forces are trying to secretly bring Ukraine to the negotiating table ‘on Moscow’s terms’:

🇷🇺⚔️🇺🇦Oleksiy Danilov, Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine (NSDC) said that they are trying to bring Ukraine to the negotiating table on Moscow’s terms with the help of other countries, which Kiev will never do:

“Now there is just such a escalation of the situation in order to quickly put us at the negotiating table on Russia’s terms. There is a huge campaign going on right now. A lot of offers from different countries. If Zelensky decides to negotiate with the Russian Federation, “it will be only on the terms of our country. No one is going to give up national interests, no matter how much representatives of some countries would like it, which are actively involved in the situation.

After that Danilov gave another statement(not included in the video):

“We are not going to surrender Bakhmut and we will keep as long as the military deems necessary for the tactical and strategic purposes that the military and military-political leadership of our country has.”

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In the meantime, amid various AFU ‘offensive’ talk and false reports, Russia continues striking strategic targets in the AFU’s rear quite viciously. The past few days were rife with new reports of Russian missile strikes, destroying all sorts of depots, equipment, etc.

For instance:

There was information about the heaviest losses of one of the detachments of the MTR of Ukraine. Judging by the reports of the death of at least two figures from the 8th detachment of the MTR (CSSO-UA SOF “West” /8 OP) in the Artemivsk region, we are most likely talking about the 8th detachment of the MTR of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which was ambushed and mostly parts were destroyed.

The Russian air force could wreak havoc on Ukraine’s armor and infantry if Kiev launches its much-anticipated counteroffensive without air cover. The Russians “have an almost overwhelming level of air superiority they have not introduced into the war yet,” Dale Buckner, a retired US Army officer. #share

It is becoming increasingly difficult for the Ukrainian military to accumulate reserves and equipment on the right bank of the Dnieper, and the price of presence in the region is constantly increasing.

What happened?
On May 10, footage of the use of guided planning bombs UPAB-1500B in the industrial zone in Beryslav, Kherson region, appeared. The strike destroyed several hangars for storing military equipment, equipment and the location of the AFU personnel on the territory of the Berislavsky Machine-building Plant. According to preliminary data, five BMP-1 and BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicles, seven Dingo ATF armored vehicles, at least six YPR-765 armored personnel carriers, three Kozak-7 armored cars and about 45 personnel were destroyed during the airstrike at three warehouses.

Presumably, the equipment was intended for crossing the Dnieper River by units of the 11th Brigade of the National Guard of Ukraine, the 126th Territorial Defense Brigade and parts of the 37th Marine Brigade after conducting an amphibious operation and directing crossings.

A message sent from a Ukrainian soldier to his friend made the rounds, stating that the entire elite unit in question no longer exists, and was completely wiped out, likely in one of such strikes:

 

 
Another one:

According to information received from a source in Kherson, an artillery strike on an ammunition depot of one of the units of the 124th Territorial Defense Brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine was carried out in an industrial zone in Kherson last night.
Ammunition such as rockets for the Olkha MLRS, 2A65 Msta-B howitzers, shells for firing 122 mm D-30 howitzers, and mortar shells were destroyed.
As a result of the fire damage, the AFU unit suffered losses: 18 servicemen were eliminated, 12 were injured and 7 vehicles were disabled.

And popular correspondent Starshe Edda reports:

Older than the Edda: “More about the enemy’s movements. It is not true that on the paths of movement and concentration of Ukrainians Russia does not strike. Yes, the strikes are not enough now, the bridges and roads that are under the control of the enemy are [still] working properly, but only over the past 2 weeks, strikes on the identified concentrations of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the rear, even quite deep, have [destroyed] several hundred people and several dozen units of military equipment. And by the way, the hum of warplanes over the LPR some time ago suggests that FABs with UMPK, rockets and other things that fit in the bomb bay will soon mow down the next “lucky ones”from the Zbroyny forces.”

As many here have likely heard, there’s even rumor that Ukrainian supreme commander Zaluzhny, and ground forces commander Syrsky were both liquidated in Russian strikes. Neither has been seen in public or video, nor has been heard from, and crucially, Zaluzhny mysteriously did not appear at a recent NATO summit, not even by video call, reportedly being ‘too busy’.

Some believe Ukraine is trying to hide their deaths. Whether that’s true or not, it does highlight the fact that Russia did recently strike another top level meeting:

Regarding the rumors about the death of Zaluzhny.

1. Yes, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation covered one of the headquarters with high-ranking officers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the Donbass. This is official information. The Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation did not report the death of specific officers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. If they knew for sure that everyone was Zaluzhny, they would certainly have been informed.

2. Who exactly was there – is unknown, in the public field there is no reliable information about the participants in the meeting. The fact that the Ukrainian generals periodically visit the Donbass is not a secret. In addition to Zaluzhny, Syrky or the same Tantsyura periodically flashed there.

3. Ukraine denies the death of Zaluzhny, but due to the fact that he has not been in the public field for a long time, this gives rise to rumors that he could have suffered from such a blow, especially if he was tracked.

4. Exactly the same story with General Tantsyura, who, according to Prigozhin, could have been in the destroyed off-road vehicle near Chasov Yar, but the Armed Forces of Ukraine denied this, claiming that Tantsyura and “everyone else” (about which Prigozhin did not speak at all) are alive. Who they are is not clear. The dance is still not shown.

Therefore, we are waiting – they will show Zaluzhny or not. The long public absence of Zaluzhny will naturally multiply rumors that he could be killed or wounded. But so far this has not been verified.

This is further confirmation that Russia has been increasingly striking command centers, which once again flies in the face of the narrative some are trying to propagate.

One thing this brings me to mention. Due to Putin’s soft-handed approach, some have erroneously begun to believe that Russia doesn’t have the capability to take out Ukrainian leadership, or pinpoint high-value targets the way that U.S. has often done to high level Al-Qaeda leaders, etc.

But clearly those people have never heard of the famous Dzhokhar Dudayev. Dudayev was the president of the warring Chechen Republic of Ichkeria during Russia’s first Chechen War. Do you know what happened to him? I’ll give you a clue. Here’s his famous final photo:

 

 
For those that still can’t figure it out, from wiki:

On 21 April 1996, while using a satellite phone, Dudayev was assassinated by two laser-guided missiles, after his location was detected by a Russian reconnaissance aircraft, which intercepted his phone call. At the time, Dudayev was reportedly talking to a liberal deputy of the Duma in Moscow, supposedly Konstantin Borovoy. Additional aircraft were dispatched (a Su-24MR and a Su-25) to locate Dudayev and fire a guided missile. Exact details of this operation were never released by the Russian government. Russian reconnaissance planes in the area had been monitoring satellite communications for some time trying to match Dudayev’s voice signature to the existing samples of his speech. It was claimed Dudayev was killed by a combination of an airstrike and a booby trap. He was 52 years old.

You read that right. Russia tracked him by his phone, and eliminated him with precision laser-guided missiles—he even appears to be on his phone in the photo. And that was in 1996. Almost 30 years ago, at a time when Russia was at its weakest militarily, probably in history. What do you imagine their capabilities are now? Do you really think for a second, if they didn’t want some of these guys gone, they wouldn’t already be long underground?

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