Obama’s General May Resign If Not Given Enough Troops To Win

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Now this is a new wrinkle:

Adding to the frustration, according to officials in Kabul and Washington, are White House and Pentagon directives made over the last six weeks that Army Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the top U.S. military commander in Afghanistan, not submit his request for as many as 45,000 additional troops because the administration isn’t ready for it.

In the last two weeks, top administration leaders have suggested that more American troops will be sent to Afghanistan, and then called that suggestion “premature.” Earlier this month, Adm. Michael Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said that “time is not on our side”; on Thursday, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates urged the public “to take a deep breath.”

~~~

In Kabul, some members of McChrystal’s staff said they don’t understand why Obama called Afghanistan a “war of necessity” but still hasn’t given them the resources they need to turn things around quickly.

Three officers at the Pentagon and in Kabul told McClatchy that the McChrystal they know would resign before he’d stand behind a faltering policy that he thought would endanger his forces or the strategy.

Granted, this is a report from Mclatchey AND it only repeats what some of his senior staff believed he would do if not given the resources to win the war….but even so, this is just more proof that Obama and company doesn’t care about winning. They care about how they look. How they are perceived.

One of the great qualities in George Bush was he could give a damn how he looked, how the polls were turning. He knew we HAD to win and gave the experts what they needed to accomplish that….polls be damned.

We have the exact polar opposite in the White House now.

Bill Roggio:

The entire process followed by the military in implementing a change of course in Afghanistan is far different, and bizarrely so, from the process it followed in changing strategy in Iraq.

For Afghanistan, the process to decide on a course change began in March of this year, when Bruce Reidel was tasked to assess the situation. This produced the much-heralded yet vague “AfPak” assessment. Then, in May, General David McKiernan was fired and replaced by General McChrystal, who took command in June. General McChrystal’s assessment hit President Obama’s desk at the end of August, almost three months after he took command. And yet now in the last half of September, the decision on additional forces has yet to be submitted to the administration.

Contrast this with Iraq in the fall of 2006. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was fired just one day after the elections in early November. The Keane-Kagan plan for Iraq was submitted to President Bush shortly afterward, and encompassed both the assessment of the situation and the recommended course of action, including the recommended number of troops to be deployed to deal with the situation. General David Petraeus replaced General George Casey in early February 2007, and hit the ground running; the surge strategy was in place, troops were being mustered to deploy to Iraq, and commanders on the ground were preparing for and executing the new orders. The first of the surge units began to arrive in Iraq only weeks later, in March.

Today, the military is perceiving that the administration is punting the question of a troop increase in Afghanistan, and the military is even questioning the administration’s commitment to succeed in Afghanistan.

In Obama’s world he succeeds if the world loves him and his cult of personality….he won’t change course. He will replace McChrystal with someone else, and then another and another until he finds the lackey he desires, and in the process we will lose Afghanistan and our world will become a much more dangerous place then it is now.

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These morons are actually floating the idea that we should “accept” the Taliban in Afghanistan, but keep fighting Al-Q via Spec-Ops and unmanned aircraft.

Here is Bill Roggio’s take:

The entire process followed by the military in implementing a change of course in Afghanistan is far different, and bizarrely so, from the process it followed in changing strategy in Iraq.

For Afghanistan, the process to decide on a course change began in March of this year, when Bruce Reidel was tasked to assess the situation. This produced the much-heralded yet vague “AfPak” assessment. Then, in May, General David McKiernan was fired and replaced by General McChrystal, who took command in June. General McChrystal’s assessment hit President Obama’s desk at the end of August, almost three months after he took command. And yet now in the last half of September, the decision on additional forces has yet to be submitted to the administration.

Contrast this with Iraq in the fall of 2006. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was fired just one day after the elections in early November. The Keane-Kagan plan for Iraq was submitted to President Bush shortly afterward, and encompassed both the assessment of the situation and the recommended course of action, including the recommended number of troops to be deployed to deal with the situation. General David Petraeus replaced General George Casey in early February 2007, and hit the ground running; the surge strategy was in place, troops were being mustered to deploy to Iraq, and commanders on the ground were preparing for and executing the new orders. The first of the surge units began to arrive in Iraq only weeks later, in March.

Today, the military is perceiving that the administration is punting the question of a troop increase in Afghanistan, and the military is even questioning the administration’s commitment to succeed in Afghanistan. The leaking of the assessment and the report that McChrystal would resign if he is not given what is needed to succeed constitute some very public pushback against the administration’s waffling on Afghanistan.

Read more: http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2009/09/mcchrystal_to_resign_if_not_gi.php#ixzz0RqtIlwUN

Hasn’t obama said that we need to refocus our strategy on al qaeda and osama? Well, I can just see it now. The ROE for our troops will be to send in someone carrying a white flag to a site suspected of harboring fighters, and the guy carrying the flag willl have to ask if they are taliban or al qaeda before we can attack – of course, the messeneger will be killed no matter what. The taliban will be asked by obama to not aid and abet al qaeda in their actions or be perceived as “misbehaving”, and the administration will threaten the withholding of an aid package (similar to hamas’ $900 million) to the taliban. Does he want to lose this war? YES. Has every country out there told him “no” on just about any and all proposals he has made to them on just about any topic? YES. Mr personality better get a grip soon and quit runnning for world office….but that will never happen, will it?

His marxist aim is to destroy this country. To de-develop the strongest country in the world. For these marxists, war is nothing more but population control and saving the environment. Obama does not care for the brave American soldier fighting Islamic Jihadists. He does not care about their lives…Mr. Obama, you are a fiasco!

Finally, a General Officer who understands the powerful statement a well-timed resignation can make. McChrystal is one of those rare ones who know how to respectfully disagree with their Commander-In-Chief (not insubordination) and stick to his beliefs. I, personally, have lost hope in most G.O.s because they always wait until they are safely retired before they start talking about how they WOULD have done something different, etc.

This guy has the intestinal fortitude to tell it how it is and if he gets relieved, oh well. How many more stars was he planning on gunning for?

Anthony Cordesman has a comprehensive report on where we stand, and where we need to be standing…

Info here

(Sorry ’bout re-posting Bill Roggio on ya, Curt.)

Patvann, Thanks for the very informative link. Cordesman is credible and the article is well written.

Unfortunately Team Obama considers their Domestic Destruction of America to have higher priority than winning a War that truly matters more that His Personal Agenda. He placed Hillary Clinton in charge of the Dept. of State that got her out of the Senate, on the Team, subordinate to Him and out of his way on Domestic issues.

He has nothing at stake in the Stans. His priority is Socializing America regardless of winning or losing in the Stans. He has effectively Nationalized the Banks, taken over the Auto Industry, is hell bent on killing MEDICARE and Social Security and is willing to let the Military make sacrifices that He was never willing to do for anything larger than himself. Obama cannot conceive of Anything larger than Himself. It does appear that way to me and sadly so.

If the good General chooses to RETIRE, not resign, that is his prerogative. No Officer resigns his Commission. He retires and picks up Life on Retired Status.

…but even so, this is just more proof that Obama and company doesn’t care about winning. They care about how they look. How they are perceived.

Not so.

There are varied complexities for continuing a counterinsurgency in Afghanistan (more accurately Af-Pak), and they certainly trump how “Obama and company … are perceived” and his “cult of personality”, and you have ignored the complexities.

The present debate about Afghanistan has now raised reasons to question the almost general doctrine — that Afghanistan must not be allowed to again become a haven for terrorist groups, especially al-Qaeda.

However, 1) AQ has essentially left Afgh. for Pakistan; 2) terrorists intent on establishing a base can choose any of several unstable countries besides Afghanistan, and 3) the U.S cannot secure them all.

Those are the hard facts.

Additionally, this other complexity in the debate also overshadows Obama’s “ego” question: How important to terrorist groups is any physical haven or base, or more exactly: How much does a haven/base actually affect a terrorist attack against our interests, and especially the U.S itself? George Will has recently stated, along with several others, including military, that the answer to the latter question has more unstated assumptions underlying it than the current debate seems to suppose. When terrorists have a base/haven, they use it for such purposes as basic training of recruits. However, the operations most important to future terrorist attacks on U.S soil do not need such a home, and few recruits are required for such an attack on the U.S. … For example, preparations most important to the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks took place not in training camps in Afghanistan but, rather, in apartments and hotels in Germany, Spain and our own flight schools in the U.S.

AQ’s threat to the U.S many now reasonably believe isn’t their physical presence in a cold remote mountain in Pak., but their intentions in exploiting terrorism using information technology.

Therefore, the debate today isn’t about disrupting an AQ that existed 8 years ago … or even whether a haven in Afghanistan would be of any use to a terrorist group (it would, — but would it be a threat to the U.S?). —The issue now is whether preventing some haven in the Middle East would specifically reduce the terrorist threat to the U. S enough to offset the required and realistic cost of lots of blood and money.

Finally, a last consideration on the troop increase (that further eclipses Obama’s ‘cult of personality) is this question: Can the public truly, realistically, undergo another even larger and longer “Iraq” in Afghanistan (more accurately, Af-Pak), working with ineffective, corrupt and even unsupportive regimes?

Therefore, in the end, it’s not about Obama’s ego, it’s about the facts.

They, the feckless administration and whores in congress lost the right to debate this when they committed troops to combat. They either give them what they need to win or pull them out. After all these are the same gutless wonders who were screaming about this being the war we needed to win and that Iraq was a distraction, blah, blah, blah. So the question becomes, do we stand by and allow another 59,000 GI’s to be sacrificed for politics or do we hold this administration and congress accountable to its word and OATH?

One of the great qualities in George Bush was he could give a damn how he looked, how the polls were turning. He knew we HAD to win and gave the experts what they needed to accomplish that….polls be damned.

In 2003, Gen. Shinseki, as well as the initial DoD plan, repeatedly estimated that up to 500,000 troops would be needed for the Iraq operations. Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz (under Bush, obviously) claimed these unpopular numbers were “outlandish” and “wildly off the mark”. In 2006, Gen. Abizaid publicly stated that Shinseki’s predictions were correct in hindsight. In return for his life-long services and prescience, no senior civilians attended Shinseki’s retirement ceremony – a historical first.

The constitution makes an explicit distinction between civilian and military control (anecdotally, think of famous world leaders who were also military men). Picking and choosing instances where the president chose one expert over another to make a partisan point is partisan laziness and it doesn’t suit you.

One of the great qualities in George Bush was he could give a damn how he looked, how the polls were turning. He knew we HAD to win and gave the experts what they needed to accomplish that….polls be damned.

One could make the argument that instead of Bush being concerned about the polls what he did instead was to try to discourage information about his policies ever reaching the public in order to help shift the polls in his favor via a closed government.

The idea is not as outlandish as it sounds:

# Bush increased the number of federal agencies authorized to designate information as secret and exempt them from public disclosure.

# The Department of Homeland Security removed the agency’s entire classification of information process from public scrutiny. The secretaries’ of Health and Human Services and Agriculture and the administrator of the EPA, were granted the right to classify information “for purposes of national security and national defense.”

# The Defense Department adopted a new policy that imposes strict limits on discussion of all its “critical research” from the “idea phase” onward.

# Bush placed his own papers, and those of his father, the former president, “outside the public eye and empowered himself to keep Congress in the dark about intelligence matters.”

# Bush increased the authority of the Central Intelligence Agency to empower its director to block declassification of CIA information unless disclosure is authorized by the president.

# Bush extended time that information can be kept classified from 10 to 25 years.

http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=8763

Many Bush initiatives reversed the presumption of open government over the years. The covert governance obviously logically extended to hiding those things to the public that would have been damaging to the Administration.

Finally, even if one dismisses the theme of a ‘closed government’ of the Bush Administration one cannot ignore that while Bush “could give a damn how he looked, how the polls were turning”, the rest of his staff did and so did the GOP — they walked on white hot coals of pain and trepidation during his period of public neglect. …and it ultimately led to his his party’s major collapse and division.

@herman:

The idea is not as outlandish as it sounds:

# Bush increased the number of federal agencies authorized to designate information as secret and exempt them from public disclosure.

# The Department of Homeland Security removed the agency’s entire classification of information process from public scrutiny. The secretaries’ of Health and Human Services and Agriculture and the administrator of the EPA, were granted the right to classify information “for purposes of national security and national defense.”

# The Defense Department adopted a new policy that imposes strict limits on discussion of all its “critical research” from the “idea phase” onward.

# Bush placed his own papers, and those of his father, the former president, “outside the public eye and empowered himself to keep Congress in the dark about intelligence matters.”

# Bush increased the authority of the Central Intelligence Agency to empower its director to block declassification of CIA information unless disclosure is authorized by the president.

# Bush extended time that information can be kept classified from 10 to 25 years.

Sources please.

A little something from Ralph Peters re: the Stans

http://www.nypost.com/p/news/opinion/opedcolumnists/afghan_agony_more_troops_won_help_DILbepkOZbQIHAyOXRocAM

Afghan agony: More troops won’t help
*************************************************************
It is all speculation at this point but Peters furnishes his opinion.

@herman:

I think you’re missing an important point on Afghanistan. “What is it?”, you ask. It’s simple. Just hold a finger up in front of your face. We’ll keep this civil, so you can pick whichever one you like but paint it purple and imagine that you’ve just cast a vote in a place where democracy still has a fighting chance.

I know there is corruption in Afghan politics. There’s corruption in Chicago too but I’m not ready to cede it to the Taliban or AQ. Democracy has a foothold in Afghanistan and it should be protected. We can keep running all over the face of the Earth killing an Indonesian bomber here, a Somali warlord there, or truckloads of terrorists at a time on some dusty compound in Waziristan, and we should whenever the opportunity arises but unless you have reconciled yourself with the idea that this will never end, you need to start thinking about providing an alternative for self-rule in Muslim nations. Religious fanaticism thrives in places like Pakistan, Egypt, and Afghanistan, because those directly promoting it also provides limited services and schooling (madrases) where the government cannot, no matter how repressive they behave. Often times people are caught between two forces they have no loyalty to but also no alternative. People living in countries like Pakistan and Afghanistan simply try to survive while organizations like al Qaeda, the Taliban, or Lashkar-e-Taiba, use these places to train, organize, rest, and recruit.

Abandoning Afghanistan would be a defeat for the United States in that it would be perceived as a victory for the Taliban and AQ. Walking away from the fight and abandoning an allied nation would undercut future diplomatic and military relationships by scaring away countries that have begun to see us as undependable. It would leave nuclear Pakistan more vulnerable than before. Iran would work harder than ever to fill the vacuum if Pakistan cannot. Heroin would continue to fund international terror operations as well as local “projects” for the Taliban itself. The momentum would shift and whatever initiative we have would be lost.

So herman, here is my finger and I vote to stay and give people a chance to find alternatives to living under the thumb of al Qaeda and the Taliban.

I think you’re missing an important point on Afghanistan.

No I’m not.

@herman:

Cleanup on Aisle 11.

More here on Bush’s lack of government disclosure in today’s WP:

The Obama administration will announce a new policy Wednesday making it much more difficult for the government to claim that it is protecting state secrets when it hides details of sensitive national security strategies such as rendition and warrantless eavesdropping, according to two senior Justice Department officials.

The new policy requires agencies, including the intelligence community and the military, to convince the attorney general and a team of Justice Department lawyers that the release of sensitive information would present significant harm to “national defense or foreign relations.” In the past, the claim that state secrets were at risk could be invoked with the approval of one official and by meeting a lower standard of proof that disclosure would be harmful.

That claim was asserted dozens of times during the Bush administration, legal scholars said.

The shift could have a broad effect on many lawsuits, including those filed by alleged victims of torture and electronic surveillance. Authorities have frequently argued that judges should dismiss those cases at the outset to avoid the release of information that could compromise national security.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/22/AR2009092204295_pf.html

Certainly, there is a causal relationship between concealment and negative perceptions; if you attempt to conceal negative information from the public, then it is harder for the public to frame a negative perception of your actions: it’s a sound reason for Bush making attempts to keep his poll numbers up.

@Aye Chihuahua:

Herman appears to be OT and lost today, doubt he can find aisle 11.

@Missy:

Oh, he knows right where Aisle 11 is…..he’s just avoiding it. 🙂

@herman:

Bush isn’t president anymore, Obama is and he’s doing a piss poor job at that. Maybe you have the luxury of playing politics with Obama not being able to walk and chew gum at the same time, but, I’ve got a nephew with two kids and a wife that’s heading over there in the very near future. It’s unfortunate for our warriors that they have a CIC that puts their well being on hold because he wants to focus on the domestic mess he created.

Everyday we find he has told more lies, what confidence could they possibly have in him as their leader as they struggle to stay alive under his PC ROE’s and his lack of obvious concern for their situation, think they aren’t paying attention to what’s happening with General McCrystal? Think again.

@trizzlor #9:

In 2003, Gen. Shinseki, as well as the initial DoD plan, repeatedly estimated that up to 500,000 troops would be needed for the Iraq operations. Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz (under Bush, obviously) claimed these unpopular numbers were “outlandish” and “wildly off the mark”. In 2006, Gen. Abizaid publicly stated that Shinseki’s predictions were correct in hindsight. In return for his life-long services and prescience, no senior civilians attended Shinseki’s retirement ceremony – a historical first.

We’ve been “down this road before, trizzlor.

Hah….we’ve been down this road before, blast. I guess neither of our opinions have evolved much since.

Here’s a previous comment I made:

Here’s how I understand it from Feith’s account: Rumsfeld was willing to give General Franks and Abizaid all the troops they needed. Generals unhappy with troop numbers (especially those in 20/20 hindsight, and those who were did not take part in war planning and are therefore not privy to the back-and-forth discussions) didn’t fail to convince Rumsfeld; they failed to convince Abizaid or Franks for requesting more troops. The issue and possibility of more troops might have been mentioned, but no one at the time seems to have pressed for it.

Here’s what Shinseki, the Army Chief of Staff you brought up and who is cited by the “gotcha” critics, said last month on CNN’s Situation Room with Blitzer:

WOLF BLITZER: …he gets a lot of praise from critics of the Iraq war for standing up to Defense, supposedly standing up to Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld.

JAMIE MCINTYRE: That’s right, Wolf. The story that’s going up around General Shinseki is that he spoke truth to power and was punished for it. But the facts suggest a slightly different, perhaps a little less complementary narrative. For better or worse, General Eric Shinseki’s distinguished 38-year Army career has been largely reduced to these 29 words uttered in a Senate committee almost six years ago.

[Flashback Feb 25, 2003]

GENERAL ERIC SHINSEKI: I would say that what’s been mobilized, to this point, something on the order of several hundred thousand soldiers are probably, you know, a figure that would be required.

[/end flashback]

MCINTYRE: That off-the-cuff guesstimate just a month before the invasion of how many U.S. troops it would take to secure Iraq turned Shinseki into a poster boy for Bush administration critics. For years, they have argued the General’s sage advice for a larger ground force was ignored by his civilian bosses. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and his Deputy Paul Wolfowitz, who famously dismissed the high-end estimate. In naming Shinseki as his pick for Veterans Secretary, President-elect Obama seemed to be subtly rebuking Rumsfeld, calling Shinseki someone who always stood on principle.

[videobyte]

BARACK OBAMA: No one will ever doubt that this former Army chief of staff has the courage to stand up for our troops and our veterans.

[/end videobyte]

MCINTYRE: But Shinseki has his critics, too, who say, in fact, he never stood up to Rumsfeld, never pressed for more troops for Iraq, and, when asked in a private meeting of the Joint Chiefs if he had concerns about the war plans, never said a word, according to two people who were in the room. Asked by Newsweek two years ago to respond to the criticism he didn’t press his concerns, Shinseki e-mailed back: “Probably that’s fair. Not my style.” But nobody disputes General Shinseki has had a distinguished military career, and now that he’s serving a President who wants his advice and counsel, he has the potential to make a difference in the lives of tens of thousands of wounded veterans and their families.

So many things that war critics anticipated happening didn’t come to pass; and that’s in part, due to the planning that we did right. Unfortunately, much of the successes get overshadowed by the failures and things that went wrong.

Scott on numbers:

Shinseki said there’d have to be hundreds of thousands of troops to stop an insurgency. Bush sent 30,000 after an insurgency had 4 years to settle, and the 30,000 did what Shinseki said would take almost half a million. Shinseki was wrong. He was wrong about the number needed to stop an insurgency.

This is similar to something Linda Robinson (her book’s still on my reading list) has mentioned in interviews and in this WaPo article:

The extra surge brigades certainly helped, but the number of U.S. troops was far less important than the new ways in which they were used. The most important new tactical move still gets scant Beltway attention: Petraeus’s initiative to reach out to the Sunni insurgency and its base. “We cannot kill our way to victory,” he said.

Another good piece by her.

Petraeus himself recently iterated the same thing in regards to the troop SURGE for Afghanistan:

GEN. DAVID PETRAEUS, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND CMDR: It’s not just the additional numbers, it’s how those numbers are employed.

.

@ trizzlor

Rumsfeld was an a$$ clown and I’m no fan of Wolfowitz either. Snubbing Gen. Shinseki at his retirement ceremony was a total Rumsfeld/Wolfowitz grade school tactic.
However, if I can borrow this from Patvann

Contrast this with Iraq in the fall of 2006. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was fired just one day after the elections in early November. The Keane-Kagan plan for Iraq was submitted to President Bush shortly afterward, and encompassed both the assessment of the situation and the recommended course of action, including the recommended number of troops to be deployed to deal with the situation. General David Petraeus replaced General George Casey in early February 2007, and hit the ground running; the surge strategy was in place, troops were being mustered to deploy to Iraq, and commanders on the ground were preparing for and executing the new orders. The first of the surge units began to arrive in Iraq only weeks later, in March.

“# Bush increased the number of federal agencies authorized to designate information as secret and exempt them from public disclosure.

# The Department of Homeland Security removed the agency’s entire classification of information process from public scrutiny. The secretaries’ of Health and Human Services and Agriculture and the administrator of the EPA, were granted the right to classify information “for purposes of national security and national defense.”

# The Defense Department adopted a new policy that imposes strict limits on discussion of all its “critical research” from the “idea phase” onward.

# Bush placed his own papers, and those of his father, the former president, “outside the public eye and empowered himself to keep Congress in the dark about intelligence matters.”

# Bush increased the authority of the Central Intelligence Agency to empower its director to block declassification of CIA information unless disclosure is authorized by the president.

# Bush extended time that information can be kept classified from 10 to 25 years.

http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=8763

Many Bush initiatives reversed the presumption of open government over the years. The covert governance obviously logically extended to hiding those things to the public that would have been damaging to the Administration.”

Hey Herman,

We have the problem of New York Times splashing on their front page secret CIA intelligence gathering. We have Politicians and their little water boys leaking sensitive information to the public, it becomes a national security issues.

I notice you are lumping “open government policies” and “national security information” at the same level. Open government polices are legitimate concerns and should be publically exposed but lumping national security secrets in to that would disastrous.

No one has ever stolen a nuclear weapon out of the Munitions storage area on a military base. Security measures put in place prevented such actions.

By your assertion that Bush did this and that to conceal information from the public…well of course. Using Operational Security (OPSEC), we prevent classified information and bits and pieces of it being carelessly distributed to people without a “need to know” basis.

One of the Reasons Bush “could” have enacted these extra security measures was partly because of the previous administration who failed to protect our highest nuclear weapon secrets from the RED Chinese. Because of the RED Chinese obtaining TOP SECRET nuclear secrets and sophisticated guidance systems. They can almost pin point a war heard anywhere in the country. Where before, their missiles couldn’t reach the US.
A very bad mistake so the Bush administration took extra precaution to protect sensitive information in an age where information can leak and spread fast via the internet.

So let me ask you this, does the US have the right to protect classified information pertaining national security and keep it concealed from our enemies?

I’m Curious.

How’s that Hopenchage working for you?

@herman:

More here on Bush’s Obama’s lack of government disclosure from the AP:

Justice reconsiders state secrecy

WASHINGTON – The Justice Department will continue Bush administration attempts to block certain lawsuits by claiming they threaten state secrets, but the agency announced Wednesday it will try to curb the use of such claims in the future.

:snip:

The Bush administration argued in those cases — and the Obama administration still argues in a few cases alive in the courts — that the lawsuits must be dismissed because evidence in the case would harm national security.

:snip:

Yet in conducting its review, the Obama administration has continued to assert the privilege in all the current cases.

Meet the new boss….same as the old boss.

What was your point again?

Hey Herman…since you’re avoiding the elephant in the room I’ll go ahead and call you out on it.

Why do you think it’s OK to copy/paste plagiarize/STEAL the copyrighted work of someone else without attribution?




View at EasyCaptures.com

Weren’t you taught not to take things that don’t belong to you?

qualities in George Bush was he could give a damn how he looked

ya well that one of the reasons we got Barry Obama now.

Sunday at the Washington Post
Post Delayed Story on General’s Afghanistan Report
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/22/AR2009092203341.html

Later that Sunday:

“The President went on national television yesterday in a
record 5 appearances. When asked if he would increase
the number of troops in Afghanistan by the interviewers,
he said it was irrelevant, as General McChrystal had not
yet asked for those troops.”
http://oceanaris.wordpress.com/2009/09/21/cia-payback-on-afghanistan/

Was Obama able to lie because the Post delayed its reporting?

Three officers at the Pentagon and in Kabul told McClatchy that the McChrystal they know would resign before he’d stand behind a faltering policy that he thought would endanger his forces or the strategy.

If this were true… it would be great that a General would FINALLY stand up and risk their career and actually RESIGN when they did not agree with the policy of the government. I think if more did that before and during OIF we would not had as much problem in Iraq.

Blast, McChrystal has that kind of character. Damn shame the Pretender in Chief does not. He is over 20 years service and can RETIRE. General Officers do not RESIGN. Only Private Sector or DOD Civilians resign. Or Presidents that are going to be under indictment like the Kenyan will be if the Feds investigate ACORN.

http://www.blackfive.net/main/2009/09/let-me-add-my-two-cents-to-the-mcchrystal-to-resign-chorus.html

@Aqua #21:

Snubbing Gen. Shinseki at his retirement ceremony was a total Rumsfeld/Wolfowitz grade school tactic.

I thought I had read somewhere that this wasn’t an intentional snub, but one perceived as such; but I can’t find the link. Here’s an account from “By his Own Rules” by Bradley Graham (evenhanded book), pg 412:

“Rumsfeld, who was traveling in Europe en route to a NATO meeting, wasn’t in attendance. Nor was Wolfowitz. Their absence was interpreted by many as a snub, but Shinseki had not invited either of them.

After leaving office, Shinseki kept a strict public silence, telling associates that he didn’t want to criticize while soldiers were still fighting and dying in Iraq. In 2008, however, a copy emerged of a memo he had written to Rumsfeld just before leaving. In it, Shinseki offered what he called some “closing thoughts” on several of the controversies that had so roiled relations between the two men. “While our disagreements have been well-chronicled, and sometimes exaggerated, these professional disagreements were never personal, never disrespectful, and never challenged the foundational principle of civilian control of the military in our form of government,” the general wrote. “When the discussions were about the national security, I felt it was my duty to provide my best professional military advice.”

He said his February 2003 testimony estimating the forces required to stabilize postwar Iraq had been misinterpreted. “I didn’t believe there was a ‘right’ answer on the number of forces required to stabilie Iraq until the commander on the ground had the chance to conduct both his mission analysis and a troop to task assessment,” Shinseki wrote. He explained that he had deliberately chosen a high number in an effort to avoid imposing a “force cap” and foreclose options for Rumsfeld and Franks. It was unfortunate, he added, that he hadn’t had the opportunity to explain the rationale before the matter blew up into a public issue, although he noted that neither Rumsfeld nor Wolfowitz had ever discussed the issue with him “despite all the commentary in the press.”


Peter Feaver
makes a nice point regarding leakage into the public arena:

It is not good to have a document like this leaked into the public debate before the President has made his decision. Whether you favor ramping up or ramping down or ramping laterally, as a process matter, the Commander-in-Chief ought to be able to conduct internal deliberations on sensitive matters without it appearing concurrently on the front pages of the Post. I assume the Obama team is very angry about this, and I think they have every right to be.

@ Wordsmith

I’ve read it. I also read how Rumsfeld was with senior officiers. He would make it his mission to humiliate them publicly. You can read about that in Thomas Barnett’s article in Esquire.
In my opinion, the Rumsfeld Doctrine was a failure and the Powell Doctrine should never have been tossed out. I’m sure Old Trooper would be more qualified to speak to this; but in my opinion, when you are dealing with military lives, you should put as much power in place as necessary to make sure that goal is reached. A lighter more mobile military is great if you’re going to fight in Grenada, but knowing what was going to happen in Iraq, that was not the answer. And yes, our military did a fantastic job in Iraq, I just think a more overwhelming force would have brought about a more immediate end to the insurgency.
I’m not saying Rumsfeld didn’t have some good ideas, I just think he was an a$$ clown overall. Especially for the way he treated senior officers.
And lastly, Shinseki says he didn’t invite them. They were his superiors. That is a serious breach of military protocol that I don’t believe a 4-star general would make. Maybe he was trying to save face or just keep the peace. I was honored in two ceremonies while I was in the Air Force. The first invitation that went out was to my commander, the second to my supervisor. The lowliest airman, private and sailor know that’s the deal.

As for you piece by Peter Feaver, I couldn’t agree more. I don’t agree very much with President Obama, but I think that should be the case no matter who is president.

@Aqua:

In my opinion, the Rumsfeld Doctrine was a failure and the Powell Doctrine should never have been tossed out.

How do you define “Rumsfeld Doctrine”?

If one were to apply the entire Powell checklist, it’d probably only apply to WWII; and that’s a recipe for inaction and a more dangerous world. Powell in 1990 opposed a show of force that might have deterred Saddam from invading Kuwait in the first place.

Part of the Powell Doctrine, from my understanding, entails that if ground forces win a battle, you go home (as happened in the Gulf War); the Powell Doctrine doesn’t include occupation duty, which is generally necessary after a big war.

As we all know, hindsight leans 20/20 and it’s easy to criticize after the fact, of all the missteps and what went wrong. You could have all the most insightful planning in the world, and things can still go hell-in-a-handbasket. There were as many things that went right and were anticipated and avoided as went wrong and not foreseen.

A lighter more mobile military is great if you’re going to fight in Grenada,

Yet, the success of Grenada is based upon the Powell Doctrine, using overwhelming force.

Part of the problem with Iraq is that the original idea was to model the post-war operations after Afghanistan, where the reigns of running the country would be handed over to Iraqis right away. The original idea was to liberate and not occupy; we had counted on the Iraqi army and police force to remain intact; didn’t happen. Our intell knowledge of Iraq’s infrastructure was inaccurate; things went wrong, just as they did in planning Operation Overlord. Rumsfeld might be an a-hole, and by his critics’ account, difficult to work with/under. I’m not even sure I’d like him on a personal level, were I to make his acquaintance. But I also think he had some brilliance along with his flaws and weaknesses.

And military officials are not without character and judgment flaws themselves.

Interestingly, in Richard Clarke’s book, he mentions how military officials sometimes let it filter down the ranks that civilian planners and politicians are to blame for certain war decisions, taking the heat off of themselves for actually making the (bad) decisions.

Retrieving this from a previous comment of mine, to save myself time of typing and thinking or researching:

The original idea was indeed “liberation not occupation”, and to model Iraq’s aftermath after Afghanistan and put an Iraqi face to the interim government as soon as possible.

Being the armchair general that I am, I think Rumsfeld’s streamlining of the military was brilliant; one of the hardest things to do is to move a bureaucracy to implement innovative changes and think outside the box. The decision to go in with a streamlined military force and make a sprint to Baghdad probably saved more American lives during major combat operations, with the Regime collapsing after a 3 week war. Recall that Saddam had begun rigging bridges, oil fields, and infrastructure as he had done during the first Gulf War. He was under the impression that he had more time to prepare, not anticipating the start-date of the war. Since the U.S. 4th Infantry Division wasn’t able to launch from Turkey, Saddam didn’t think the U.S. would start the invasion; not until the 4th ID was in place. Franks adapted to the setback, in a manner that Saddam failed to anticipate.

The other criticism often leveled at the Administration in regards to not enough boots on the ground, is in regards to “disbanding the Iraqi Army and police force”.

Bremer (yes, Bush’s man) seems to have unilaterally made that decision, himself. I’m aware of his letter to the NYTimes defending himself, but the accounts are all a convoluted mess to make sense of in regards to who is responsible for that decision.

Originally, for the purposes of liberation and not occupation, the White House and Pentagon did want to keep the Iraqi Army intact for post-war security.

Initial reports from Franks, too, indicates that leaflets were dropped telling personnel to stay in uniform, as the intent was to utilize them; but many didn’t. The Iraq army simply dissolved. Military personnel did come back looking for work and sheikhs also offering security work. Bremer screwed that one up. Of course, there was also the problem of corruption and lack of a real officer’s corp in the Iraq army to build from. There were elements of State and CIA that were never fully on board with the White House and Pentagon planning.

CENTCOM planners and Bill Luti had anticipated and averted almost every possible contingency except for the ones that did occur. I believe it was CIA that felt the police force and army would remain intact to provide security after the fall of the Regime. Didn’t happen. In his book, Franks said on April 10th, they ordered Iraqi troops “to remain in uniform at all times. Maintain unit integrity and good order and discipline in your units.”

“I wanted to see those defeated enemy troops kept in coherent units, commanded by their own officers, and paid in a combination of humanitarian assistance food and cash….[and] put to work for the Coalition on reconstruction.” As for the police, according to Luti, “the CIA told us that all we had to do was lop off the top layer of leadership, but when we did we found that the corruption went so deep that we had to start from scratch. Was that a mistake? You bet. But it was a mistake based on faulty intelligence.”

According to Luti, even though Bremer came to put out an order to disband the Iraqi Army, the Army had all but disbanded itself initially. Millions of leaflets were even dropped and warnings broadcast in Arabic by the Commando Solo aircraft for Iraqi soldiers to lay down their arms but remain in uniform. Instead of entire army units, U.S. troops often found empty uniforms neatly piled, even with rifles. Apparently Iraqi officers ordered their soldiers to simply go home.

@ Wordsmith
Sweet Jeebus, I know why they call your Wordsmith now.

How do you define “Rumsfeld Doctrine”?

I define the Rumsfeld Doctrine as the use of a streamlined, fast moving force. There is nothing wrong with that. The military uses it all the time, even in WWII. The problem I have with it, is there is no one behind you.

I am aware of the Powell Doctrine as it relates to the decision to go to war; that’s not what I’m talking about. It isn’t up to military leaders to decide that issue. When I refer to the Powell Doctrine, I’m refering to the use of overwhelming force. Even in Gulf War I, there was still a mad dash. Our troops ran through the Iraqis like a hot knife through butter. But there were a lot more people in theatre.
As for Grenada, I was in Grenada. Well, that’s not really accurate, I was on the beach drinking beer in Barbados while the A-10’s I worked on were in Grenada. The Powell Doctrine of overwhelming force wasn’t used in Grenada. It was primarily Special Forces and a butt load of Marines. My squadron literally deployed 48 hours prior to the start of shooting.
And again, as for occupation duty, not the call of a military officer. But the military knows how to do it.

The original idea was to liberate and not occupy; we had counted on the Iraqi army and police force to remain intact; didn’t happen. Our intell knowledge of Iraq’s infrastructure was inaccurate; things went wrong, just as they did in planning Operation Overlord.

First, that’s Jimmeh Carter’s fault. We now rely on electronic intelligence far too much. We have no choice because Jimmeh gutted the CIA. Regardless, it’s Rumsfeld’s fault. You always, always plan for the worse and hope for the best. That’s not Rumsfeld’s policy. His policy is to work with what you have. That’s why he got in trouble for jumping that soldier in Iraq that said he’d like more armored vehicles. If he had pushed the light calvary through with full divisions bringing up the rear, our guys would have been in much better position to deal with the aftermath.
And I agree with you, there is a lot of brilliance in Rumsfeld’s work, but he should have had heavy reserves in the rear.
And I didn’t know this, but I love it:

for Iraqi soldiers to lay down their arms but remain in uniform. Instead of entire army units, U.S. troops often found empty uniforms neatly piled, even with rifles. Apparently Iraqi officers ordered their soldiers to simply go home.

Now, I’m an Iraqi soldier. I’m facing imminent defeat and I get one of these leaflets. The want me to lay down my arms, but remain in uniform. Should I also stamp STOOPID on my forehead? The first thought that would have gone through my head would have been, “they’re going to arrest us and try us or worse.”
I was and remain a strong proponent of the War in Iraq. Probably for different reasons. One being the very problem we’re facing in Afghanistan. Dating back to that military genius, Sun Tsu, it’s always better to pick the battlefield. If you’ve never read it, just Google Sun Tsu Terrain.

NYT:


The general denied that he had discussed — or even considered — resigning his command, as had been whispered about at the Pentagon, saying that he was committed to carrying out whatever mission Mr. Obama approved.

“I believe success is achievable,” he said. “I can tell you unequivocally that I have not considered resigning at all.”

Max Boot describes Grenada and Panama as places where the Weinberger/Powell Doctrine were applied. I suppose military historians can get things wrong, too. How was the beer?

His policy is to work with what you have.

I still feel his off-the-cuff remark is twisted in meaning. He often speaks bluntly without weight and consideration to how it might be taken. Maybe he is insensitive; but the real question is how much he can be faulted for sending troops into battle, ill-prepared; how much he can be held accountable for mismanagement (of course, the buck ultimately stops at the top, all the way up to President Bush, who’s responsible for keeping Rumsfeld on the team- so you might as well also blame Bush for “working with what he has- CIA, Pentagon, State- and not the Depts he wished he had”).

IEDs are kind of a recent phenomenon, are they not? Not saying roadside bombs are new- they’re not; just their usage as a primary choice of weaponry (along with homicide bombers), with around 2/3rds of American soldiers killed by IEDs in Iraq (first one set off March 29, 2003; WaPo did a series on IEDs, I believe). Should this have been anticipated? Should Bush/Rumsfeld be blamed for the “lack of body armor” criticism (anymore than deserving credit for pro-activism)? Political, legitimate attack, or both?

Back at the time, Curt linked to the following:

“So, ignoring this new bit of information for the moment, what is the exact situation with Humvee armor production?

There are two actual armor programs for Humvees, the up-armor HMMWV or XM1114, which is a standard variant of the basic design, and add-on kits. The up-armored version includes an air-conditioned cab and modifications to vehicle suspension to handle the added weight, whereas the kits are simply attached to existing vehicles.

To put it in hard numbers, of 8,105 up-armored Humvees initially requested, more than 5,900 have so far been produced. The rest are expected to be ready by March 2005. These are the vehicles most widely discussed and are those supplied by Armor Holdings. Additionally, to date 9,146 armor kits have been installed of 9,776 produced.

According to DoD, Humvees that lack armor are carried into Iraq atop flatbed trucks and, once there, are used only inside the relative safety of U.S. bases.

Concerns regarding Humvee armor are justified given the enemy?s tactic of choice and the widespread perception of a shortfall in armor. But I don?t believe that Rumsfeld?s ?go to war with the Army you have? comment was inappropriate or ill considered.

First of all, he was correct. We have never gone into battle with the Army we wanted. Since World War II, we have entered conflicts with woefully unprepared, poorly equipped and undermanned armies. It is also fair to say that big-ticket items like new aircraft, missiles and warships have pretty consistently faired better in the appropriations process than the equally important, but much less politically sexy items like ammunition, training and gear. Indeed, Soldiers for the Truth was originally formed in an attempt to ameliorate this age-old problem.

During the late 1980s and into the 1990s the defense budget underwent drastic cuts in (I believe premature) reaction to the ?collapse? of the Soviet Union. President George H.W. Bush cut our active duty Army to eighteen divisions. At the time, I felt that was too low. Then Bill Clinton came along and reduced it to a mere ten. While reducing defense spending to hollow force levels, Clinton expanded the military mission abroad, pushing us to the snapping point. If one didnt?t know better, one might be tempted to call it deliberate sabotage.

So the Bush II administration came into office saddled with the disastrous consequences of Bill Clinton?s eight years. I am not making excuses for Rumsfeld, but one cannot look at our current situation honestly without taking this fact into account.”

The Pentagon’s spent billions trying to figure out ways and means to defeating the IED. What did the insurgents do in the face of improved armoring? They adapted and upped the explosives with a charge powerful enough to blast through improved armored vehicles and tanks. Simply “armoring up”, wouldn’t solve the dilemma.

Should Rumsfeld be blamed for an enemy that adapts? For not foreseeing the potential for such situations? Or perhaps seeing the potential, yet rolling the dice, anyway.

Should we have waited longer before restarting the war? More preparation? More planning? Hindsight vision suggests we had the time to do so; but then, wasn’t time also on the side of Saddam?

If we only went to war with the army we wished we had, we’d never go to war. Because the army I wished we had would be one straight out of science fiction where phasers could be set to stun and no lives on either side would be lost. But we don’t have the luxury of waiting another 300 years, let alone another 12 years and 17 UN Resolutions more. Well….actually we could have waited another decade; but then, what would the cost have been then? What has the cost been to us and the world for not having finished the job in ’91? We’re living that consequence, now.

@ Wordsmith

Max Boot describes Grenada and Panama as places where the Weinberger/Powell Doctrine were applied. I suppose military historians can get things wrong, too. How was the beer?

If they were there, I didn’t see them. As far as I know, everyone out-processed at Rosie Roads. I saw Rangers and Snake-Eaters, including PJ’s from the AF and SeALs. There were a bunch of Marines, I was told they were all Force Recon guys.
The beer was fine. Great scenery on the beach too. A few months after Grenada, we held joint exercises in St. Lucia just in case another Grenada popped up. Same group of people for the most part. Except the hotel we stayed at in St. Lucia was nicer and the beaches were full of topless Europeans. They only had Heineken and Guiness. Our Chief had a pallet of Budweiser flown in. The didn’t have Bud Light back then.

IEDs are kind of a recent phenomenon, are they not?

A guy that works with me was in the Navy during Gulf War I. He was in a Hummer sitting between two Marines when they ran over a mine in the road. Improvised or not, explosives have always been used as a way to disable convoys. And you’re right and Curt’s post is right. I wasn’t saying the lack of armored Hummer’s was Rumsfeld’s part, it’s just his attitude on things. He’ll that may even be a direct quote from Rummy.

We have never gone into battle with the Army we wanted.

Only I think his quote was; “you don’t go to battle with the Army you want, you go with what you have.” And you’re right that the Bush Administration was left with a scaled down military thanks to Clinton, at least equipment-wise. Rumsfeld actually wanted to cut the Army down more than it was.
I just didn’t like the way Rumsfeld handled the war. But, much like you, I’m just being a Monday morning General. I like reading books on war and strategy. But I have no idea what resource issues or logistics issues they faced. If they had the resources and the logistics in place to provide heavy armored back-up and personnel bringing up the rear, I think they should have used it. There is nothing more intimidating that a tank coming down the road. And an M1A1 Abrams would not have held up traffic, unless they wanted it to. 🙂