Obama’s Inauguration Speech Fails Utterly

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Much has been said about President Obama through his recent years of perpetual Presidential campaign. One thing that cannot be denied is his speaking ability. The highlight of the man’s accomplishments is not his skill in battle, an accomplishment in diplomacy, economic brilliance, or leadership in times of crisis. No, his greatest ability is to give a speech, and so it was that the nation and the world tuned in today to see a moment in history-a moment defined by a soundbite. Billions of people watched with baited breath to hear, “I have a dream!’ People who have lost their jobs and are suffering economically waited to be told once again that, “The only thing we have to fear is….fear itself!” Given the days, months, and years of comparing Obama to Lincoln, it was common to expect a 21st century Gettysburg address (as even Keith Olberman baited before Obama took the podium).

Yes, the President’s speech was nice. He delivered it well. After eight years of President Bush, it was a warm bath of smooth teleprompter reading. Still, he fell short.

He fell short in three areas. First, it was not at all a historic speech on the same level as something from Lincoln, King, Kennedy, or FDR, and thus is was not a marker in the history books any more than his skin color or the number next to him on the list of Presidents. Second, he failed to meet his expectations; it was average or slightly above average. Third-and most importantly, his speech was just words; it did not incite.

President Obama’s speech was about the character of the American people when united. He presented a list of challenges, goals, and repeatedly pushed for unity, bi-partisanship, and an end to the divisive politics of old.

On this day, we come to proclaim an end to the petty grievances and false promises, the recriminations and worn out dogmas, that for far too long have strangled our politics.

Obama’s speech was an utter failure because it was moot. No one was moved by his calls to end partisan attacks and come together as a country; to unite and solve rather than divide for division’s sake. Instead, before and after Obama spoke his first words as President, his strongest advocates and supporters ignored him. They brought their signs calling for the arrest and impeachment of President Bush and Vice President Cheney. They boo’ed and hissed.

They sang ‘Na-na na na, na-na na na, Goodbye!” and did so with the opposite of best wishes. No, that crowd embraced partisanship, showed no class, mocked and dismissed the support that millions of Americans still have for President Bush, and they did not support their new President. They didn’t oppose him…just ignored him

In the year of America’s birth, in the coldest of months, a small band of patriots huddled by dying campfires on the shores of an icy river. The capital was abandoned. The enemy was advancing. The snow was stained with blood. At a moment when the outcome of our revolution was most in doubt, the father of our nation ordered these words be read to the people:

“Let it be told to the future world…that in the depth of winter, when nothing but hope and virtue could survive…that the city and the country, alarmed at one common danger, came forth to meet [it].”

America. In the face of our common dangers, in this winter of our hardship, let us remember these timeless words. With hope and virtue, let us brave once more the icy currents, and endure what storms may come. Let it be said by our children’s children that when we were tested we refused to let this journey end, that we did not turn back nor did we falter; and with eyes fixed on the horizon and God’s grace upon us, we carried forth that great gift of freedom and delivered it safely to future generations.

How ironic that these words from President Obama were not inspiring enough unite, to end partisan hate, and to bring about unity in support of his policies-many of which are policies started by President Bush. Yes, the crowd applauded, and they even cheered Obama’s words, but the irony is just how close those words were to ones spoken by the man they hate.

We will not tire, we will not falter and we will not fail.

President Washington, Bush, Obama…all talk about unity, and the great things that Americans can accomplish when we hold each other up and face threats together. All talk about getting tired, and faltering, and the risks of failure. All three make those comments at moments of incredible popularity. Yet, while Washington’s words clearly led to success in battle and war, and while Bush’s words at least led to support and conviction at the time….only the allegedly inspiring President Obama could present the same old American challenge, and fail to inspire the crowd to follow his lead.

We must HOPE he can CHANGE his partisan supporters lest they boo the nation to oblivion.

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@Scott:

Judge Harold Baer blames Iraq for 9/11 too.

Just sayin’

Mata,

We are getting to the going around and around phase of the argument. I’ll just respond to two of your points, and then I’ll let you have the last word, if you wish.

Mata: When Clinton left, Pakistan was a nuke armed enemy, Iraq was under Saddam, Afghanistan was under the Taliban, and Libya had a WMD programme in the works. North Korea had already broken their agreement with Albright-Clinton and was building weapons under their nose.

Every one of the above situations has changed. Why? President George W. Bush.

Pakistan is still nuke-armed and the percentage of the Pakistani populace which absolutely hates the guts of the USA has increased markedly. And it is getting worse, as there is now a growing network of fundamentalist Islamic madrassas, to indoctrinate the next generation. By shelling out huge amounts of money, the government of Pakistan was bought off, temporarily, but the USA never had anything to fear from the Pakistani government. It is individuals, many within the military and within Pakistan’s nuclear program. You may recall the “father of the Pakistani bomb” transferring secrets and technology (this occurred during the Bush Presidency). Here’s another example:

http://www.forbes.com/finance/feeds/afx/2006/03/28/afx2629000.html

This is why it’s a bad thing to piss off individuals, while buying off their government. You may recall that we had the support of the Iranian government (the Shah) but not of the Iranian people, who threw off their US-supported government and installed the present nettlesome regime.

North Korea is not exactly in the bag. And whatever progress we’ve made with N Korea has nothing at all to do with Iraq, which is what the present discussion was about. I’m not a global Bush hater, who maintains that the administration never did anything right. The one great fiasco, however, was Iraq, for which it gets the full responsibility and for which it will be entitled to the full credit, in the very unlikely event that any credit should ever be due.

Libya may perhaps be claimed as an Iraq dividend, although experts have maintained that Libya’s improved behavior was owing to (pre-existing) sanctions, rather than to some fear that they’d be next on the Bush invasion list.

Afghanistan is an interesting case. No one criticized Bush for invading Afghanistan — not even I. In retrospect, however, I think it was a very bad idea (again, no criticism, simply retrospective analysis). Two different Westerners infiltrated Al Qaeda; the American actually met Bin Laden. Arguably, we could have infiltrated Al Qaeda in Afghanistan without getting involved in an Asia land war without end. Fallout has been the re-emergence of a huge opium crop (tightly controlled under the Taliban), which is allegedly paying for, among other things, Jihadist activities, such as weapons procurement. The Afghan invasion also destabilized Pakistan. We traded an accessible Afghan “sanctuary” for an inaccessible Pakistan “sanctuary” and radicalized Western Pakistan in the process.

I don’t accept the premise that getting rid of Saddam solved more problems than it created.

If I understand your current argument correctly, you are claiming that Iraq was a success because it allowed the Islamic world to see that Jihadists were equally willing to kill Muslims as to kill Infidels? The net benefit of this is highly questionable.

I stand by my previous statements and opinions.

– Larry Weisenthal/Huntington Beach, CA

Larry W.: Pakistan is still nuke-armed and the percentage of the Pakistani populace which absolutely hates the guts of the USA has increased markedly.

As opposed to the past Clinton era when they so loved us??

You may recall the “father of the Pakistani bomb” transferring secrets and technology (this occurred during the Bush Presidency).

Larry… ouch on your history, guy. Shall we talk of A.Q. Khan first, who you not so subtly suggest became a bad guy under Bush’s nose?? Here’s more indepth history for you instead.

During the 1990s, there were intermittent clues from intelligence that AQ Khan was discussing the sale of nuclear technology to countries of concern. By early 2000, intelligence revealed that these were not isolated incidents. It became clear that Khan was at the centre of an international proliferation network. By April 2000, the UK Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) was noting that there was an evolving, and as yet incomplete, picture of the supply of uranium enrichment equipment to at least one customer in the Middle East, thought to be Libya, and evidence linking this activity to Khan.

[Mata note: Bush was not elected until Nov of 2000]

A.Q. Khan’s official career came to an abrupt end in March 2001, when he was suddenly was forced out as director of the nuclear lab by order of President Pervez Musharraf. Though Kahn was made a special adviser to the government, the reason for his dismissal reportedly coincided with concerns about financial improprieties at the lab as well as general warnings from the United States to the Musharraf about Khan’s proliferation activities. Musharraf’s restraint in dealing with A.Q. Khan has been said to have resulted from the lack of incontrovertible evidence of proliferation activities.

Nonetheless, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, in an article which appeared in the Financial Times on 01 June 2001, expressed concern that, “people who were employed by the nuclear agency and have retired” may be assisting North Korea with its nuclear program.

That kills a couple birds with one stone. Khan was actively involved in his nefarious deeds prior to the Bush admin, and when Pakistan was still not a US ally. Secondly, it was suspected that the Pak retirees were assisting NK and it’s nuke program… that they were not supposed to have. Again, all prior to Bush’s election win in Nov 2000.

Are this situations perfect today, and is Pakistan the ideal ally? Hang no. But they are a better ally today than as an enemy in the past. And NK is now monitored and not carrying on with illegal WMD activities under the administration’s nose.

And of course the US had nothing to fear from the prior Pakistani regimes. However Pakistan is not a nation guided by their Parliament, but by the power of their Pak Army. The trick is to get as many of the leadership of the Parliament and military working on the counterintelligence cooperation. Thus the reason Musharraf had ten times the value of the neutered negotiators, Zardari/Bhutto and Nawaz (who have a history of failed truces with terrorists). I was sorry Musharraf decided to relinquish his command of the military and carry on only with the Presidency in his final days… lesser choice between the two, IMHO.

But since it’s not perfect, you think we’ve made no progress? That’s nothing but a partisan opinion bent on refusing to give any credit to President Bush for his accomplishments. And if you’re expecting perfection out of any Muslim ally? My suggestion is, don’t hold your breath. We will never be cultural friends with similiar goals. But we can be allies against jihad.

Larry W: North Korea is not exactly in the bag. And whatever progress we’ve made with N Korea has nothing at all to do with Iraq, which is what the present discussion was about.

Incorrect. You’re moving the goal posts again. This has never been just about Iraq. This is about progress in “hearts and minds”… as we started with your comment #5. Then go to your comment #12:

With respect to President Bush “gifting” things to Obama (speaking to Mata, here), this also includes an emboldened Iran, to go along with the illiterate seekers of martyrdom who are now burdened with pee in their pants.

You then ignored the accomplishments list and widened the criticism to include Iran.

Iran has always been somewhat emboldened thru history, and became more so with the election of Ahmadinejad. To assume they only became that way under a Bush administration is to naively dodge history. All of which then led to your comment that To those who say: “Bush kept us safe after 9/11,” I reply “Clinton kept us safe after 2/26.”

Then, of course, that “safe” bit had limits… they could only be attacks on US soil, and not US interests. Shifting goal posts….

Again, all of this is nothing more than a dodge by you… stubbornly refusing to admit that anything good came from the Bush Presidency. When I point out the Muslim nations that are now Arab democracies in their infancy, and those that were formerly enemies and now allies… you say it’s not good enough. Even Libya… who coincidently yielded their WMD program in the wake of Saddam’s desposition, you want to credit “sanctions”.

Desperate, Larry. That you can be that partisan to shun such historical events and obvious improvements over what was happening a decade ago is truly frightening.

Larry W: If I understand your current argument correctly, you are claiming that Iraq was a success because it allowed the Islamic world to see that Jihadists were equally willing to kill Muslims as to kill Infidels? The net benefit of this is highly questionable.

Is reading a lost art anymore??? Nowhere did I claim Iraq was a success *BECAUSE* it allowed the jihad movements to show their true colors. Iraq is an evolving success because they are becoming an Arab democracy, and a western ally, located smack dab in the heart of the jihad Caliphate.

A side benefit of that conflict – and by no doing on the part of the Iraqis or the US coalition – is that the jihad movements… in tandem with the disgruntled Ba’athist and Saddam loyalists losers … became so desperate as to cause a bloodbath amongs fellow Muslims in order to stimulate a civil war.

Instead, it backfired, and they shot themselves in the foot for public relations in the Muslim world. This was not part of US/Pentagon military strategy. However, had the Muslim on Muslim bloodbath in Iraq not happened, the Muslim world’s support for jihad would likely still be what it was after Afghanistan, if not higher. It is a benefit that we owe solely to the ineptitude and desperation of the jihad movements.

Scott;

Thanks for the link to the ABC transcript. I simply refused to view any of the immaculate inaug proceedings (as a matter of principle).

But from the transcript, have to agree. Totally long-winded, bland, boring, unenlightening, and even insincere. Reading it brought to mind the Alice In Wonderland Carpenter and Walrus story, where the Walrus’ monologue on “Cabbages and Kings” served only to distract the attention of the poor little oysters as they were consumed until none were left to be outraged. As disingenuous a piece as that could only have been penned by Axelrod. Certainly not likely to be gracing any monuments as the lib-dems might have hoped, or to even have a hope of being pointed to and quoted at some future date. Not a single stirring inspirational line anywhere within.

Got a laugh from the mention of how America did not merely sit by when the world was faced with fascism and communism, considering liberal America has done just that in the face of his socialist propagandizing. I doubt anything he actually said resonated or even made sense to a single groupie in attendance listening to his speech.

We the People have remained faithful to the ideals of our forbearers, and true to our founding documents.

[DELETED BY CURT FOR OBAMA BIRTH CERTIFICATE CONSPIRACY CONTENT]

On this day, we come to proclaim an end to the petty grievances and false promises…

Like the “Na-na-na-na, hey hey good-bye” insult to Bush? I suppose the end to “false promises” means now that you have taken office, making them is no longer necessary?

the God-given promise that all are equal, all are free, and all deserve a chance to pursue their full measure of happiness.

Sorry, have trouble swallowing this in relation to your taxation plans. You may want to tax freely, but certainly not equally, and I suppose “a chance to pursue their full measure of happiness”, means via entitlement programs and redistribution of wealth?

In reaffirming the greatness of our nation, we understand that greatness is never a given. It must be earned. Our journey has never been one of short-cuts or settling for less. It has not been the path for the faint-hearted – for those who prefer leisure over work, or seek only the pleasures of riches and fame. Rather, it has been the risk-takers, the doers, the makers of things – some celebrated but more often men and women obscure in their labor, who have carried us up the long, rugged path towards prosperity and freedom.

Yet you would take the money from the “risk-takers, the doers, the makers of things” and hand it over to those who have not “earned”, who seek “short-cuts”, and “who prefer leisure over work”.

To the Muslim world, we seek a new way forward, based on mutual interest and mutual respect.

Please tell us how you would “move forward” with the fundamentalist Islamic terrorist elements and supporters whose “mutual interest” is only in jihad and whom “respect” no laws of man?

To those who cling to power through corruption and deceit and the silencing of dissent, know that you are on the wrong side of history; but that we will extend a hand if you are willing to unclench your fist.

Had to love that one, only decent line of the whole speech. As it seemed to so aptly describe our own liberal/socialist underground movement, their protesters, DNC, MSM, etceteras. My oh my… I can’t count the number of times I’ve seen a liberal extend their hand to shake the hand of a conservative (and yes the sarcasm light is “O-N” position).

To the people of poor nations, we pledge to work alongside you to make your farms flourish and let clean waters flow; to nourish starved bodies and feed hungry minds.

Yeah, increased ethanol production will go a long way towards feeding the world’s hungry.

As we consider the road that unfolds before us, we remember with humble gratitude those brave Americans who, at this very hour, patrol far-off deserts and distant mountains. They have something to tell us today, just as the fallen heroes who lie in Arlington whisper through the ages.

I sincerely doubt Obama would want to hear what they would be whispering.

Our challenges may be new. The instruments with which we meet them may be new. But those values upon which our success depends – hard work and honesty, courage and fair play, tolerance and curiosity, loyalty and patriotism – these things are old. These things are true.

As the saying goes; “Out with the old and in with the new” right Barry?

why a man whose father less than sixty years ago might not have been served at a local restaurant can now stand before you to take a most sacred oath.

Gosh darn it, there you go again Joe, I mean Barry; trying to playing that race card again, may we remind you Barry? That particular “father” wouldn’t have been served in a local restaurant 60 years ago not because of segregation or racism, but because he didn’t live here. He was a product of your Arab grandfather’s harem of 3 wives living in North-East Africa at the time.

mata: Am I “again” blaming 911 on Iraq?? Why don’t you go back and show me where I *ever* blamed 911 on Iraq, blast.

I am sorry, blame is not the operative word here. I guess it would be conflate. Link the two together and make it seem 9/11 made the Iraq invasion inevitable “post 9/11 world” speak.

I have to assume the chain of command has some say in the status of our Naval vessels and their rules of self defense when not at war. Are you saying that the USS Cole was free to disregard standard rules of engagement in times of peace and fire on the vessels, despite their low alert status?

Yes, the chain of command does have something to say about the rules of self defense. I doubt the President sits around with the CNO and decides what is the best course of action for force protection. Career military make those decisions and present them to the president where needed (as it should be). Those who sent the Cole to Aden should have known about the substantial risk and either changed the ROI or manifestly changed the security around the ship.

And yes… I think we all agree that there were mistakes made in the Iraq conflict in the wake of Saddam’s removal. But do I think that we would have gotten all the stockpiles of weaponry, chem and bio supplies quickly enough? Nope. Even with more troops and the best of intentions, they are looking for stockpiles in unknown locations, and the denizens already know where they are. They could get their mitts on them first.

Oh, so the answer is just not protect any of the weapons stockpiles?… no, but I can assure you hundreds of American lives were lost due to not protecting the KNOWN stockpiles. We merely passed them by because we had insufficient troop strength.

Which chain of command issue should accrue more to the CIC? Not sufficient force protection for the Cole or not sufficient troop strength for a planned invasion?

In any case, President Bush did not keep Americans safer since 9/11 since many more died than before 9/11. Oh, and we never got Bin Laden or Zawahiri and they continue to plan to attacks in the USA. All it will take is the lowest common denominator (border guard) to miss a trunk full of explosives. Or much like the pimply punk who killed all those people in Van Maur, a group of armed terrorists walking into any large public place and mowing down our citizens. Nothing has changed since 9/11 in reality, except we are weaker military and economically.

Having fun Mata?

I’ve been pretty slammed under, and will remain that way for awhile. But let me address some of your post, blast.

I am sorry, blame is not the operative word here. I guess it would be conflate. Link the two together and make it seem 9/11 made the Iraq invasion inevitable “post 9/11 world” speak.

If you are suggesting that I consider Iraq a legitimate theatre in the battle against the global Islamic jihad movement, yes. I believed that when the debate was on about removing Saddam. And I believe it more firmly today when the Harmony/ISG documents confirmed Saddam’s relationship with terrorist cells for use as an unofficial state weapon. If I remember rightly, I believe you said you also supporter in the beginning, but… using hindsight… now oppose it.

For me, it was the cockroach theory. They scatter in Afghanistan, but have to go somewhere. Pakistan’s mountainous regions make for a lousy homebase. Just as Zarqawi returned to Iraq for medical care in Saddam’s hospitals, the jihad movements knew that Saddam turned a deliberate blind eye to their presence in exchange for quid pro quo. Iraq would have been an appealing region, with it’s geographical advantage, it’s history in the Caliphate, and it’s natural resources and wealth, for the jihad movement to move a large portion of their operations.

Those who sent the Cole to Aden should have known about the substantial risk and either changed the ROI or manifestly changed the security around the ship.

If you want to persist in blaming the naval commanders for the Cole, that’s up to you. It’s a free country. However this is a nation that was not in war status (in our point of view anyway… the World Islamic Front had declared war on us three years prior). Under Bush, that “police enforcement” attitude towards terrorism changed to the offensive and a war status. And now, under Obama, who is steadily severing all Bush’s military stance of being on the offense, we will return to the Clinton era of being sitting ducks yet again.

Oh, so the answer is just not protect any of the weapons stockpiles?… no, but I can assure you hundreds of American lives were lost due to not protecting the KNOWN stockpiles. We merely passed them by because we had insufficient troop strength.

You sure demonstrate a lot of venom for errors and deficiencies, blast. Interesting with your own background as a veteran. You should know, better than most, that there is no perfect plan for war and that strategy morphs as you encounter reality.

However your assumption that is was all just ignoring the ammo stockpiles because of lack of troops is not entirely correct. They anticipated finding these, and had sequence of events to destroy and control. What they did not anticipate was the scope and volume of these ammo dumps.

The discovery of these “ammo dumps” was not unexpected. Preparations to deal with captured enemy ammunition (CEA) were part of the initial campaign planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom that started in October 2002. What was not appreciated until much later in 2003 was the scope of the problem. Ground commanders quickly put together plans and manpower in an attempt to secure or destroy the enormous caches of ammunition their units were encountering. These well-intentioned efforts would eventually produce mixed results and, in some instances, amplify the problem.

~~~

Funding was provided to the Corps of Engineers on 28 July 2003 to commence CEA operations. USACE awarded several contracts on 8 Aug. 2003—one to the Parsons Corporation (Pasadena, Calif.) for $80 million (U.S.) to provide the logistical support for the overall effort, and three contracts worth $67 million each to the following unexploded ordnance contractors: Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technologies (Knoxville, Tenn.), Tetra Tech-Foster Wheeler (Pasadena, Calif.), and USA Environmental, Inc. (Tampa, Fla.).

If you read this assessment by George Zahaczewsky, the program manager for USA Environmental’s operations in Iraq in 2003–2004, you may get a handle on the ammo stockpile realities. He oversaw the establishment of two CEA depots and managed the operations of numerous mobile teams that collected or destroyed CEA and UXO.

This is better than you just widely spreading blame on those that plan military strategy. They encountered a more vast stash of ammo than planned, and what they did to accommodate. But they were not blind to their presence. Then again, you plan for what you anticipate in war…. which is almost always not the reality when you get there. As thru all historic wars, it is how well you adapt to the ground situations that is important.

mata:For me, it was the cockroach theory.

I have no problem with that, provided we killed the cockroaches that attacked us on 9/11 and had an effective plan on dealing with others.

mata; If you want to persist in blaming the naval commanders for the Cole, that’s up to you. It’s a free country.

If they were in a harbor in Sidney, London, or somewhere safe, sure, I probably could excuse the lax security for want of enemies. But we knew Aden was an unsafe place, that does change things in my mind.

mata: However your assumption that is was all just ignoring the ammo stockpiles because of lack of troops is not entirely correct.

Ground commanders quickly put together plans and manpower in an attempt to secure or destroy the enormous caches of ammunition their units were encountering. These well-intentioned efforts would eventually produce mixed results and, in some instances, amplify the problem.

I read that was they had not enough manpower. Yes, I know that plans must change was we engage the enemy, of course. But the plan used was flawed. We know some leading military officials (Chief of Staff of the Army) said we needed much higher levels of troops. When you go in with “just enough” to deal with your plan, and you find something else, your ability to react is diminished, options limited, stores of weapons left unguarded… we feed the monster of asymmetrical war with tons of supplies which in turn fed the high level of casualties.

@blast:

mata:For me, it was the cockroach theory.

I have no problem with that, provided we killed the cockroaches that attacked us on 9/11 and had an effective plan on dealing with others.

The administration’s goal in the GWoT wasn’t retaliation and revenge; their aim was in preventing the next terror attack.

Zawahiri and bin Laden are important symbolic figureheads. But the failure to find and capture/kill them shouldn’t be seen as failure in prosecution of the war against Islamic Jihadism nor failure in keeping America safe. Much of the al-Qaeda leadership and original players have been killed/captured.

But the plan used was flawed. We know some leading military officials (Chief of Staff of the Army) said we needed much higher levels of troops.

Interestingly, in Richard Clark’s book, he mentions how military officials sometimes let it filter down the ranks that civilian planners and politicians are to blame for certain war decisions, taking the heat off of themselves for actually making the decisions.

The whole “not enough troops” line is a convoluted mess, as far as I can tell, when you try to cross-reference differing accounts.

Here’s how I understand it from Feith’s account: Rumsfeld was willing to give General Franks and Abizaid all the troops they needed. Generals unhappy with troop numbers (especially those in 20/20 hindsight, and those who were did not take part in war planning and are therefore not privy to the back-and-forth discussions) didn’t fail to convince Rumsfeld; they failed to convince Abizaid or Franks for requesting more troops. The issue and possibility of more troops might have been mentioned, but no one at the time seems to have pressed for it.

Here’s what Shinseki, the Army Chief of Staff you brought up and who is cited by the “gotcha” critics, said last month on CNN’s Situation Room with Blitzer:

WOLF BLITZER: …he gets a lot of praise from critics of the Iraq war for standing up to Defense, supposedly standing up to Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld.

JAMIE MCINTYRE: That’s right, Wolf. The story that’s going up around General Shinseki is that he spoke truth to power and was punished for it. But the facts suggest a slightly different, perhaps a little less complementary narrative. For better or worse, General Eric Shinseki’s distinguished 38-year Army career has been largely reduced to these 29 words uttered in a Senate committee almost six years ago.

[Flashback Feb 25, 2003]

GENERAL ERIC SHINSEKI: I would say that what’s been mobilized, to this point, something on the order of several hundred thousand soldiers are probably, you know, a figure that would be required.

[/end flashback]

MCINTYRE: That off-the-cuff guesstimate just a month before the invasion of how many U.S. troops it would take to secure Iraq turned Shinseki into a poster boy for Bush administration critics. For years, they have argued the General’s sage advice for a larger ground force was ignored by his civilian bosses. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and his Deputy Paul Wolfowitz, who famously dismissed the high-end estimate. In naming Shinseki as his pick for Veterans Secretary, President-elect Obama seemed to be subtly rebuking Rumsfeld, calling Shinseki someone who always stood on principle.

[videobyte]

BARACK OBAMA: No one will ever doubt that this former Army chief of staff has the courage to stand up for our troops and our veterans.

[/end videobyte]

MCINTYRE: But Shinseki has his critics, too, who say, in fact, he never stood up to Rumsfeld, never pressed for more troops for Iraq, and, when asked in a private meeting of the Joint Chiefs if he had concerns about the war plans, never said a word, according to two people who were in the room. Asked by Newsweek two years ago to respond to the criticism he didn’t press his concerns, Shinseki e-mailed back: “Probably that’s fair. Not my style.” But nobody disputes General Shinseki has had a distinguished military career, and now that he’s serving a President who wants his advice and counsel, he has the potential to make a difference in the lives of tens of thousands of wounded veterans and their families.

So many things that war critics anticipated happening didn’t come to pass; and that’s in part, due to the planning that we did right. Unfortunately, much of the successes get overshadowed by the failures and things that went wrong.

When you go in with “just enough” to deal with your plan, and you find something else, your ability to react is diminished, options limited, stores of weapons left unguarded… we feed the monster of asymmetrical war with tons of supplies which in turn fed the high level of casualties.

In the end, looking at it with hindsight clarity, you’re probably right. But consider this as well:

The original idea was indeed “liberation not occupation”, and to model Iraq’s aftermath after Afghanistan and put an Iraqi face to the interim government as soon as possible.

Being the armchair general that I am, I think Rumsfeld’s streamlining of the military was brilliant; one of the hardest things to do is to move a bureaucracy to implement innovative changes and think outside the box. The decision to go in with a streamlined military force and make a sprint to Baghdad probably saved more American lives during major combat operations, with the Regime collapsing after a 3 week war. Recall that Saddam had begun rigging bridges, oil fields, and infrastructure as he had done during the first Gulf War. He was under the impression that he had more time to prepare, not anticipating the start-date of the war. Since the U.S. 4th Infantry Division wasn’t able to launch from Turkey, Saddam didn’t think the U.S. would start the invasion; not until the 4th ID was in place. Franks adapted to the setback, in a manner that Saddam failed to anticipate.

The other criticism often leveled at the Administration in regards to not enough boots on the ground, is in regards to “disbanding the Iraqi Army and police force”.

Bremer (yes, Bush’s man) seems to have unilaterally made that decision, himself. I’m aware of his letter to the NYTimes defending himself, but the accounts are all a convoluted mess to make sense of in regards to who is responsible for that decision.

Originally, for the purposes of liberation and not occupation, the White House and Pentagon did want to keep the Iraqi Army intact for post-war security.

Initial reports from Franks, too, indicates that leaflets were dropped telling personnel to stay in uniform, as the intent was to utilize them; but many didn’t. The Iraq army simply dissolved. Military personnel did come back looking for work and sheikhs also offering security work. Bremer screwed that one up. Of course, there was also the problem of corruption and lack of a real officer’s corp in the Iraq army to build from. There were elements of State and CIA that were never fully on board with the White House and Pentagon planning.

CENTCOM planners and Bill Luti had anticipated and averted almost every possible contingency except for the ones that did occur. I believe it was CIA that felt the police force and army would remain intact to provide security after the fall of the Regime. Didn’t happen. In his book, Franks said on April 10th, they ordered Iraqi troops “to remain in uniform at all times. Maintain unit integrity and good order and discipline in your units.”

“I wanted to see those defeated enemy troops kept in coherent units, commanded by their own officers, and paid in a combination of humanitarian assistance food and cash….[and] put to work for the Coalition on reconstruction.” As for the police, according to Luti, “the CIA told us that all we had to do was lop off the top layer of leadership, but when we did we found that the corruption went so deep that we had to start from scratch. Was that a mistake? You bet. But it was a mistake based on faulty intelligence.”

According to Luti, even though Bremer came to put out an order to disband the Iraqi Army, the Army had all but disbanded itself initially. Millions of leaflets were even dropped and warnings broadcast in Arabic by the Commando Solo aircraft for Iraqi soldiers to lay down their arms but remain in uniform. Instead of entire army units, U.S. troops often found empty uniforms neatly piled, even with rifles. Apparently Iraqi officers ordered their soldiers to simply go home.

Hah! Now that Bush is out of office, maybe he, too, can get his 60 Minutes interview, plugging his tell-all memoir, outing himself? 😀

Wordsmith: The administration’s goal in the GWoT wasn’t retaliation and revenge; their aim was in preventing the next terror attack.

Do you think Saddam was more a risk for a direct attack on CONUS vs. Osama Bin Laden? The purpose of killing or capturing Bin Laden & Company would not only eliminate him (the man behind the terror attacks on the US and our interests), but would serve as a warning to others. By leaving him behind we let him to continue to show the Arab world how impotent we are and allow him to continue to rebuild his organization, which people say is back to pre 9/11 strength.

In the end, looking at it with hindsight clarity, you’re probably right.

No doubt about it, but as you point out Gen Shinseki spoke about it before the invasion. Your quick to praise Rumsfeld:

Being the armchair general that I am, I think Rumsfeld’s streamlining of the military was brilliant; one of the hardest things to do is to move a bureaucracy to implement innovative changes and think outside the box. The decision to go in with a streamlined military force and make a sprint to Baghdad probably saved more American lives during major combat operations, with the Regime collapsing after a 3 week war.

I just flat out disagree that Rumsfeld is to be lauded. I believe he contributed directly to the failure and nearly single handedly destroyed President Bush’s legacy on this matter. Since we are in armchair mode, what if a follow on force had taken up positions to secure the populations and weapon cache’s etc. The main force could have made their fast march into Baghdad and the THOUSANDS of lives lost after the invasion could have been either avoided or mitigated.

Even Abizaid agreed they made a mistake:

In an unusual admission, Abizaid said there should have been more U.S. troops, as well as Iraqi and foreign forces, to stabilize the country immediately after the U.S.-led invasion in March 2003. “General [Eric] Shinseki was right that a greater international force contribution, U.S. force contribution and Iraqi force contribution should have been available immediately after major combat operations,” he said

So much for thinking outside of the box. Maybe if Rumsfeld left some issues in the box, since they worked, we might not have been put into the quagmire created by a lack of troop strength.

The idea that it would take several hundred thousand U.S. forces I think is far off the mark,” Mr. Rumsfeld said. General Shinseki gave his estimate in response to a question at a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on Tuesday: “I would say that what’s been mobilized to this point — something on the order of several hundred thousand soldiers — are probably, you know, a figure that would be required.” He also said that the regional commander, Gen. Tommy R. Franks, would determine the precise figure.

Shinseki was not some low underling. He was the Chief of Staff of the Army, and while we are playing arm chair general, he was playing a real one.

@blast:

Do you think Saddam was more a risk for a direct attack on CONUS vs. Osama Bin Laden?

I don’t think the U.S. was at risk from a direct attack from Saddam. What I believe is that Saddam was openly hostile to the U.S., made no secrets about his love of wmd, was an open sponsor of exported terrorism, and that the status quo of leaving him in power was unacceptable. To not enforce violations of the original cease-fire agreement, to make one meaningless UN resolution after another, made zero sense. Why should Saddam take any threat from the UN or the U.S. seriously? Non-proliferation would be a lost cause. In fact, that apparently is how Saddam thought- that nothing would happen to him; he figured he could weather a few missile attacks as he had from Clinton; he thought he could drag out the endless cat-and-mouse game with UN inspectors, and continue with business as usual: enriching his coffers from oil-for-food program, bribing corrupt UN officials to lift sanctions (at which time he could reconstitute his weapons programs right away), growing ever more dangerous.

The administration made the decision that we could not afford the risk of a leaving a state sponsor of terror in power, who could use terrorists as proxies to deliver a wmd attack on the U.S., or U.S. interests.

To focus narrowly on just al-Qaeda, rather than looking at the Islamic jihad movement as a whole, would not have ended the threat from Islamic terror. If we captured or killed Osama bin Laden, would that end the threat? Would we end up martyring him? If we did the same to al-Qaeda, would it end there? Should we have treated the 9/11 attacks as a law enforcement criminal act rather than an act of war by those who have long felt they were at war with the U.S.?

The purpose of killing or capturing Bin Laden & Company would not only eliminate him (the man behind the terror attacks on the US and our interests), but would serve as a warning to others.

I agree; same thing though, with Saddam: Had we successfully eliminated him without the problems that bogged us down in the aftermath, it would have sent a clear message to others (note that even though Libya indeed was under negotiations with us and Britain to rejoin the free world of nations, it didn’t happen until I believe, December of 2003, and there was reason for that- diplomatic talks in early March; a setback they experienced in October in which a shipment of gas centrifuges used to enrich uranium was seized; then there was the 2007 NIE which indicated that Iran halted a nuclear weapons program in the fall of 2003- set aside for a moment, a belief that this might be based on disinformation from Revolutionary Guard laundering fake info….things that make you go, “Hmmm…”).

By leaving him behind we let him to continue to show the Arab world how impotent we are and allow him to continue to rebuild his organization, which people say is back to pre 9/11 strength.

I’ve also heard it argued that he is impotent now; and that had we made it appear that we sent the entire U.S. military on the hunt for him, that would have looked even more embarrassing- that the world’s strongest military can’t find the needle in the haystack. We’ve never given up looking for him, and it’s better a job left up to special forces, intell, and cooperation with foreign allies. A lot goes on behind the scenes. How many operations have been conducted in Pakistan without public awareness? There were 36 recorded cross-border attacks and attempts in Pakistan during 2008. Do you think there might be a reason for that? Or are we just bombing “aspirin factories” for a meaningless show of teeth? I don’t think we ever gave up the hunt for bin Laden, even if the original bin Laden unit was closed down in 2006; even if on the surface it looked like resources had been diverted and the media no longer covered the search as well as the media not being informed of secret operations.

I will concede that after Afghanistan, 2/3rds of the al-Qaeda leadership had been killed or captured and that they were seriously weakened. According to Lawrence Wright, anyway. They gained new life, at first, thanks to the initial mistakes in 2003 when we became an occupying force. Mostly propaganda and perception, with abu Ghraib almost single-handedly sabatoging our ability to win over hearts and minds.

But that all changed and al-Qaeda was exposed for the murderous cult that they are, THANKS to the war in Iraq (reference Mata’s post).

Even Abizaid agreed they made a mistake:

In an unusual admission, Abizaid said there should have been more U.S. troops, as well as Iraqi and foreign forces, to stabilize the country immediately after the U.S.-led invasion in March 2003. “General [Eric] Shinseki was right that a greater international force contribution, U.S. force contribution and Iraqi force contribution should have been available immediately after major combat operations,” he said

So much for thinking outside of the box. Maybe if Rumsfeld left some issues in the box, since they worked, we might not have been put into the quagmire created by a lack of troop strength.

I don’t see how that “unusual admission” from 2006 “trumps” the interview transcript I put up from last month where Shinseki admits he never stood up to Rumsfeld on the troop issue, that he never pressed for it (“Probably that’s fair. Not my style.”).

My understanding is that generals who might have been concerned about troop levels at the time didn’t fail to convince Rumsfeld; they failed to convince General Franks. Rumsfeld would have given Franks whatever he asked for.

Interestingly, in Richard Clarke’s book, he mentions how military officials sometimes let it filter down the ranks that civilian planners and politicians are to blame for certain war decisions, taking the heat off of themselves for actually making the decisions

I emboldened from your quote, the mention of other force contributions. The original planning did include the use of Iraqi ex-pats. This included the INC and Free Iraqi Forces to provide a security force (10s of thousands of volunteers reportedly pounding on the door to be a part of this) and the Iraqi Leadership Council to help move Iraq from dicatorship to democracy. But for better or for worse (if you’re a critic of Chalabi) that idea was scrapped by CIA and State, mid-stream. General Garner did initially take in a number of senior Baathists to run key government ministries (for better or worse- most likely the latter), until Bremer arrived. Bremer almost single-handedly insured the birth of the insurgency by disenfranchising Iraqis from participating in the direct shaping of their own future. The final nail in the coffin was UNSCR 1483 declaring the U.S. the occupying power on May 22nd. After that, the insurgency only grew.

We assembled a Coalition Force as best we could; we hardly acted unilaterally; but America’s seeming “unilateralism”, as Jean Francois-Revel puts it in his book, Anti-Americanism, is due to the fact that it’s the rest of the world that has failed us, in securing our collective global security.

I get it, that you’re not too fond of Rummy. But how does that make me “quick to praise him”? Makes about as much sense as me accusing you of being “quick to condemn him”.

Here’s something interesting: The “Parade of Horribles” memo:

* The United States might fail to win support from the United Nations and from important other countries, which could make it harder to get international cooperation on Iraq and other issues in the future. We might fail here by not properly answering the question: If the United States preempts in one country, will it do so in other countries, too?

* The war could trigger problems throughout the region: It could widen into an Arab-Israeli war; Syria and Iran could help our enemies in Iraq; Turkey could intervene on its own; friendly governments in the region could become destabilized.

* The United States could become so absorbed in its Iraq effort that we pay inadequate attention to other serious problems—including other proliferation and terrorism problems. Other countries in the Middle East and elsewhere might try to exploit our preoccupation to do things harmful to us and our friends.

* The war could cause more harm and entail greater costs than expected, including possibly a disruption in oil supplies to world markets.

* Post-Saddam stabilization and reconstruction efforts by the United States could take not two to four years, but eight to ten years, absorbing U.S. leadership, military, and financial resources.

* Terrorist networks could improve their recruiting and fund-raising as a result of our being depicted as anti-Muslim.

* Iraq could experience ethnic strife among Kurds, Sunnis, and Shia. . . .

In addition, the memo included these three notable items:

* “US could fail to find WMD on the ground in Iraq and be unpersuasive to the world.”

* “World reaction against preemption or ‘anticipatory self-defense’ could inhibit US ability to engage [in cooperation with other countries] in the future.”

* “US could fail to manage post-Saddam Hussein Iraq successfully, with the result that it could fracture into two or three pieces, to the detriment of the Middle East . . . .”

This was a serious and disturbing memo. The concerns it listed included military, diplomatic, and economic matters. The list was more wide-ranging and hard-hitting than any warning I saw from State or the CIA—even though their leaders are widely viewed as the Administration’s voices of caution on the war. (pp. 332-3)

If Rumsfeld had been a war critic, or if Shinseki was the one who jotted down the “Parade of Horribles”, is it right to point and say, “There it is! This man predicted that “US could fail to find WMD on the ground in Iraq”, but no one listened!”

Shinseki was not some low underling. He was the Chief of Staff of the Army, and while we are playing arm chair general, he was playing a real one.

In hindsight, you have the luxury of making that call.

I’ll highlight the relevant passage for you, (a passage I’ve seen cited numerous times by the Rum critics):

The idea that it would take several hundred thousand U.S. forces I think is far off the mark,” Mr. Rumsfeld said. General Shinseki gave his estimate in response to a question at a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on Tuesday: “I would say that what’s been mobilized to this point — something on the order of several hundred thousand soldiers — are probably, you know, a figure that would be required.” He also said that the regional commander, Gen. Tommy R. Franks, would determine the precise figure.

Again, Franks didn’t ask for more troops, because no one convinced him of it.

Think of all the predictions of things that could go wrong that didn’t come to pass. Do we get to say, “HAHA, told ya so”?

Is it really a matter of poor planning? Or is it hindsight partisan extraction of the one caveat out of the consensus view?

@openid.aol.com/runnswim:

it’s absurd to think that any administration (Bush’s or Gore’s) would have proceeded with the Iraq invasion, had today’s outcome been understood in advance.

Unfortunately, we don’t have the benefit of knowing what would have happened had Saddam remained in power. al-Qaeda fighters fled the battlefield of Afghanistan into Iraq, sanctions- which we, not Saddam, were being blamed for as causing the deaths of Iraqi children, were eroding, not working; the oil for food scam set in place to alleviate the suffering was a sham….Saddam retained intent and capabilities to restart wmd programs at a moment’s notice once sanctions were lifted….

When you say, “had today’s outcome been understood in advance”….how about saying it again 30 years from now, when maybe the “outcome” paints a very different picture than the one you have today, Larry?

The price for “inaction” (for that’s what “more diplomacy” would have amounted to being)…what if that avenue ultimately would have led to a several million deaths? How would the war-cost in lives/treasure look then, balanced against the lives lost because of the decision to finally remove Saddam?

There was, additionally, no imminent crisis forcing a war before the intelligence and planning were solid.

Since when is the business of intell, by its very nature, ever “solid”? As for planning, it’s endlessly debatable. President Bush did not say Iraq was an “imminent crisis”. His suggestion was that we had to act before the situation became imminent.

I think it’s absurd that after 12 years and 16+1 UNSCRs later, diplomacy and the burden of proof remained squarely on our shoulders and not on Saddam. To think that peace at any cost meant doing the same thing we’ve been doing, expecting different and desirable results to occur.

This precisely parallels the late Lt. General William Odom’s assertion that the ultimate outcome in Iraq would be the same, whether the US left in 2005 or 2015.

But at what price, Larry? Had we withdrawn from Iraq in 2005, what would the cost in innocent lives and strategic interests have been? What would the humanitarian suffering have been like? If you think America’s standing in the world was harmed by the decision to invade Iraq, what of our standing had we abandoned Iraq to the wolves, irresponsibly and callously?

Odom (NSA Director under Reagan) accurately predicted in 2004 that the Sunnis would be the ones to kick foreign (i.e. “Al Qaeda” type) terrorists out of Iraq, once it was no longer in the interests of the Sunnis to have them as allies. This is precisely what happened and, coupled with the Al Sadr cease fire), this — more than “the surge” — was responsible for the temporarily improved security situation in Iraq.

I disagree that “this is precisely what happened”. That narrative isn’t accurate. I think Linda Robinson offers the most apolitical/nonpartisan account:

He Came, He Cut Deals, He (May) Conquer

By Linda Robinson
Sunday, September 14, 2008; B01

Iraq still divides Democrats and Republicans like no other issue, as the campaign rhetoric of both parties makes abundantly clear. Liberals and conservatives can now more or less agree that Iraq is a much, much safer country than it was 18 months ago. But each side is peddling its own story about Iraq’s extraordinary turnaround — and both are wrong.

Many conservatives believe that the 2007 “surge” in U.S. troop levels directly produced the decline in Iraqi violence. Meanwhile, liberals argue that Iraq’s warring Shiites and Sunnis spontaneously decided — for their own internal reasons, unrelated to the surge — to stop fighting. As is so often true of Washington debates, these arguments bear little relation to the reality of how Iraq actually pulled out of its death spiral, which is far more interesting than either partisan yarn. There was no single silver bullet, but rather a multifaceted strategy crafted and carried out by those in Baghdad — not, despite recent claims, in Washington.

I came to this conclusion after reporting in Iraq for a total of 10 months since 2003 and after extensive interviews with Iraqi and U.S. leaders, as well as with troops in the most violent neighborhoods of greater Baghdad, the epicenter of the conflict. My biggest question was my simplest: How did Gen. David H. Petraeus do it?

My answer? Bottom line, for the first time since the war began, a U.S. leader decided to address the political motivations of the Iraqi combatants. Petraeus convened a study group that shrewdly analyzed the raging sectarian conflict, then came up with what he called “the Anaconda strategy” to address the underlying dynamic.

Petraeus and his diplomatic partner, Ambassador Ryan Crocker, realized that the first disastrous steps taken by the U.S. occupation authority led by L. Paul Bremer — disbanding Saddam Hussein’s Baath Party and the old regime’s security services — had helped create the Sunni insurgency. They produced a critical mass of angry men worried that the Sunnis who had run the old Iraq would wind up on the bottom in the new one. Those fears were soon realized: Bremer’s occupation government pushed for a sequence of poorly planned elections that wound up entrenching the power of a Shiite-dominated coalition, which began a “sectarian cleansing” campaign against Iraq’s minority Sunnis — and tilted the country into a full-on civil war.

While policymakers back in Washington continued to be duped by sectarian-minded Shiite politicians, Petraeus and Crocker set about using all available levers — including thinking about Iraqi politics — to rectify the earlier, catastrophic U.S. blunders.

The extra surge brigades certainly helped, but the number of U.S. troops was far less important than the new ways in which they were used. The most important new tactical move still gets scant Beltway attention: Petraeus’s initiative to reach out to the Sunni insurgency and its base. “We cannot kill our way to victory,” he said.

On June 2, 2007, Petraeus gathered his commanders and told them to engage with influential Sunnis and insurgents and persuade them to stop fighting. “Tribal engagement and local reconciliation work!” he said. “Encourage it!”

The policy was carried out on the battalion level, using troops deployed in U.S. outposts and in joint security stations alongside freshly trained Iraqi forces. “Don’t let our bureaucracy stop you, and don’t let the Iraqi government stop you,” Petraeus urged his young lieutenant colonels, whom he often invited to join him for five-mile fitness — and advice-dispensing — runs around Camp Victory, the main U.S. base.

He was right to turn to his battalion commanders. Baghdad was being engulfed in growing mayhem: ever-larger car bombs, lethal copper projectiles, homemade explosives packed into sewer pipes that burned U.S. soldiers alive. But the U.S. troops persisted. Over the summer of 2007, the Sunnis responded en masse to the new approach: By September, according to U.S. officials and my own reporting, 15,000 Sunnis had signed up to become checkpoint guards and neighborhood watchmen, paid and monitored by the U.S. battalions that were being so carefully coached by Petraeus. The Shiite government was not amused; the last thing it wanted was its former Sunni foes back inside the fold. Still, by year’s end, 70,000 Sunnis — comprising the vast majority of the insurgents and their support base — had joined the new U.S.-backed effort. This policy — battled by bureaucrats both in Baghdad and inside the Beltway — changed the tide of the war.

As the Sunni insurgents switched sides, they passed vital intelligence to their U.S. partners and paymasters, which enabled Petraeus’s forces to target Sunni holdouts, including diehards affiliated with al-Qaeda in Iraq. U.S. soldiers also employed new techniques to control the Iraqi population and provide for its safety and to identify fighters hidden among the civilians. For the first time since the war began in 2003, a shareable, computerized biometric registry of military-age males was created. This led to the detention of fewer innocents and more bad guys. Meanwhile, car bombings fell off dramatically after U.S. forces erected concrete barrier walls along sectarian fault lines, including the markets that had been the scenes of some of the ghastliest atrocities.

Why were so many Sunnis — insurgents and civilians alike — ready to respond to the U.S. overture? Because they were getting desperate and saw Petraeus’s outstretched hand as their best chance of surviving a campaign of sectarian violence and ethnic cleansing led by the Shiites and fueled by neighboring Iran. The secular Sunnis’ alliance with the jihadist insurgents had always been an uneasy marriage of convenience, and it broke up when Petraeus made a better offer.

Another major change over the past 18 months is also poorly understood: the decision of the Mahdi Army, the radical Shiite militia led by Moqtada al-Sadr, to largely stop fighting. Sadr, a young firebrand Islamist cleric, raised a militia of poor youths to take on U.S. troops, even as he backed his fellow Shiite, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, through political channels. Then last August, Sadr abruptly declared a ceasefire.

That move has been widely misinterpreted as a spontaneous, unilateral gesture; in fact, it came after months of military and political pressure. Iraqi special operations forces, backed by elite U.S. combat advisers, conducted near-nightly raids against the most extreme elements of the Mahdi Army. In March 2007, according to Petraeus’s staff, the special ops units captured Qais Khazali, a member of the radical Lebanese militia Hezbollah and a Sadrist militia leader. Khazali, U.S. military officials said, provided details of extensive Iranian assistance to Khazali’s henchmen. This information, together with two assassinations of provincial governors by Sadrist forces, rattled Maliki — and began to turn him against Sadr, a fellow Shiite who had helped put the prime minister in office.

The final straw came on Aug. 27, when Sadr’s militiamen attacked guards at the main Shiite shrine in Karbala as a million worshipers arrived in the city to mark a holy day. An apoplectic Maliki rushed to Karbala, and the resulting confrontation led Sadr (then in Iran) to back down and issue his ceasefire declaration. Maliki then launched an offensive in Basra this spring to break Sadrists’ control of the city, the port and oil pumping station. The wedge between Maliki and Sadr widened when massive arms caches of recent Iranian manufacture were discovered, despite Iran’s 2007 pledge to desist stoking Iraq’s nascent civil war.

That said, the intra-Shiite competition for power will persist for years; the trick is to channel it into politics, not violence — and to continue to make use of the competition between Maliki and Sadr.

Iranian influence in Iraq is also destined to continue, but it’s a double-edged sword. Iraqi Shiite groups are wary of appearing to be Iranian puppets, which would hamstring their popularity with Iraqis. Nor do many Iraqi Shiites fancy a Tehran-style theocracy. As Sadr’s militia has loosened its control over many Shiite neighborhoods, ordinary Shiites have sighed with relief, glad to be rid of the thuggish behavior and the religious strictures imposed by some militia leaders.

Another key factor in Iraq’s turnaround has been Petraeus’s willingness to use his leverage with Iraqi leaders. Behind closed doors, the U.S. commander has frequently gone to the mat with Maliki as part of a “good cop, bad cop” routine that he and the unflappable Crocker have perfected. The veteran ambassador provided diplomatic sangfroid and insight into the region’s historical animosities; Petraeus provided the raw muscle to maneuver the Iraqi government into making concessions.

Petraeus waded deeper into the political mire than most other U.S. generals would have. In one of my interviews with him last year, he confessed to me that he had shown the “full range of emotions” and had even feigned anger in order to move Maliki away from sectarianism. On his first tour in Iraq, in Mosul, the general had learned that it was sometimes necessary to bang tables and twist arms.

Getting basic services to Sunni areas was one key effort that required constant browbeating. When Petraeus was told that an Iraqi ministry official had refused to visit Dora, one of many Sunni regions still without electricity, trash removal and other basic services, I heard him bark, “Tell him if he wants a blue badge for the Green Zone, he’d better get down here.” Petraeus also pushed the Iraqi parliament to pass de-Baathification reforms and other crucial legislation earlier this year. And not least, the general repeatedly bucked pressure from his civilian and military superiors at the Pentagon to declare “Mission Accomplished” before he felt that it was.

Petraeus’s willingness to grapple with Iraqi politics made all the difference. His replacements’ tasks will be more than ever political, not military. The former Sunni insurgency hasn’t yet been woven into the political, economic and security life of the country, and the extraordinary success of the past 18 months is likely to unravel if Petraeus’s and Crocker’s successors — as well as the next U.S. president — do not finish that crucial undertaking.

No, the Iraqis can’t finish the job on their own now; at the same time, no, we don’t need 100,000 U.S. troops to stay in Iraq and do it for them. It would be heartening if we could understand the real record of Iraq’s turnaround — and talk about its future like grown-ups.

The Awakening broke out with some tribes in Anbar who came over to the American side; but where the war was most intense was in the middle of the country; and the conversion of Sunnis there did not come until the Surge.

I listened to Linda Robinson on the radio and her book’s on my wish list.

The USA could have gotten rid of Saddam without invading Iraq, were that determined to be in our national interest.

Um….how? That’s the approach CIA/State most desired.

What part of diplomacy hadn’t been tried yet? Don’t tell me you’d fall for the “let inspectors in, cat-and-mouse, then kick ’em out” charade again, followed by more meaningless resolutions?

Scott;
I know he put a stop to the tribunals, but my understanding was it may have only been the equivalent of a “temporary restraining order” until the matter is examined more fully. I haven’t had access to anything other than the limited media coverage our MSM devoted to it for the last few weeks between their praise for “the one”, so forgive me if there is something I’ve missed in the interim.

Wordsmith;
The only thing I would take issue with is what seemed an opening concession to blast that Saddam was no direct threat to the US vis-avis;

“I don’t think the U.S. was at risk from a direct attack from Saddam.”

One of the things that has troubled me with the standard; “Saddam’s possession of WMDs posed no threat to America, her national interests, or NATO in general.” argument, was the recent revelation that he was seeking unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) technology at the time. Pundits have mocked and mostly set this aside by claiming that such UAVs certainly couldn’t have reached American soil, so therefore, they should have been disregarded as any real threat and just another reason why going in was unnecessary/an over-reaction.

I may concede UAVs wouldn’t have had that kind of reach, yet, they wouldn’t have to hit our homeland to do serious damage. During the years Saddam was thumbing his nose at the UN, the only constant and continually successful campaign that was being waged was the NATO enforcement of the no-fly zone over Iraq. From a strategic point of view, having a constant adversarial presence controlling his country’s airspace made life difficult for him. He had to constantly concern himself with recon aircraft revealing the aces he was trying to hide up his sleeves; such as cross boarder movements of items via Syria and other nearby rogue elements, such as his underground dealings to terrorist agencies.

So while I agree UAVs might have been useless in a direct attack on say; America’s Bible Belt, nevertheless, they certainly could have been used against NATO forces housed in “tent cities” engaged in OPERATIONS: NORTHERN & SOUTHERN WATCH. I would consider such direct attacks against our young men & women in our armed forces as a direct attack on America itself. Just as assuredly as the attack on Pearl Harbor was considered a direct attack on America. Perhaps our readers might recall; at the time, Hawaii was certainly not part of what is now termed “CONUS”. It was only a protectorate. Our forces there were not at war. America had no desire at the time in involving themselves in what we viewed as solely a “European thing”. Truthfully, Hitler’s Germans preferred it that way and was quite happy that America was so hands-off up to then in their Axis’ plans for socialist world domination.

Granted some minor mistakes in judgment may have been made looking back on everything in 20/20 hindsight. Yet, historically America is one of the few countries known to learn from it’s past mistakes. We study the situation, innovate, re-strategize, and come up with better plans on how to do things better. Read the Koran. The goal of Islamic Fundamentalism is little different than the goals of the Nazi Party; A single socialized one world government, only this one would be under an oppressive Muslim Theocracy. If the peace-niks had their way and GWB handled it in a Mahatma Ghandi style; there certainly would have been more 9/11 type events. As Mata aptly points out; under the Bush administration; that did not happen. And there were several instances where similar plans were discovered and foiled. So did Dubya do his job? Yes. What blast might have done in those shoes is irrelevant and just more BDS BS. The more he posts here on the issue the more clearly his BDS syndrome shows through. There is nothing that can be said to deter blast from that opinion.

Iraq went the way it went, and it’s a done deal. That is that. It’s over. History. IMO the Bush Admin did the best they could with the tools they had to work with. And that under an adversarial Congress and Media. Every argument one can come up with is moot. He and his admin would not and should not be indicted on trumped up war crimes. If the world thinks differently, then that is a matter for the UN to make allegations and pursue Geneva Convention charges. Certainly not for partisans of our own government and it’s citizenry. Yet I fail to see anything he did that warrants such an action. What’s more there is no legal precedent for trying our CoC, merely because those of the other party would have second-guessed him in 20/20 hindsight and managed things differently knowing now what nobody knew then. It also butts up against executive privilege and the SC is not likely to allow it.

IMO that appetizer was long ago served and consumed. There are other more important dishes boiling away that need tending to and I’m more concerned what Obama will do now that the master chef hat has been handed over to him. In Hamas, Iran, the Gaza Strip, and other places, we have the equivalent of terrorist would-be Ghengis Kahns with their hordes of Mongols armed with shoulder launched missiles, suicide bombers, and other modern-age technologies waging Old Testament age battles against world civilization. How will our bleeding-heart Dems answer these challenges NOW? Obama has stated he would rather play the diplomat and meet with these idiots unconditionally. Well, history proved when leaders would send messengers of peace to negotiate with such outrageous entities, those messengers often returned dead being dragged by their steeds. So pray tell what would he do next? Institute a draft to get more forces? As blast, BHO seem to think more troops are the answer. Would he also go back to the 1600’s way of warfare and send several battalions of troops wearing brightly colored uniforms, marching into battle in strictly regimented rank and file as easier targets for urban guerrillas?

BTW, UAVs also could have been used to preemptively attack cross-border staging areas in any future actions. And that too we well knew was surely just a matter of time. And had he been able to develop such an industry, he certainly would have had the ability to export supplies of such equipment to the international terrorist agencies he was courting, with potentially devastating scenarios surely to follow. All the more reason to nip Iraq in the bud and act when and how we did.

Another quick “drive by” comment…. believe me, I’d rather be indulging in blogging than continued ed… LOL Hopefully I’ll be returning by the end of the week as less than a shadow of my blogging self.

You are correct, Rocky. The EO that BHO signed was a 120 day stay of execution for tribunals for 120 days. Mostly it was a put-it-on-hold-until-my-legal-team-can-figure-out-what-to-do type scenario for public relations. They may revert back to tribunals similar to what Bush had planned (but meeting the “stamp of affirmative action” approval for Obama by the public), or…creating a completely new shadow court system, or… creating an Article III legislative court system.

Everything is TBD, of course… to be determined.

Mostly this was a symbolic photo op to allow places like PolitiFact to play the “promises kept/reneged game. Allowing a “close Gitmo in a year” order, that can… of course… be altered by another EO. This was sheer public relations for the fawning media. The lesser informed American citizens will chalk this up as a “promise kept”. That it actually happens, and how, remains to be seen.

INRE Politifact, to give them some credit for not being complete fools, you will note that that they are keeping Gitmo in the “in the works” column because of the timeline to sort out the TBD details. There’s more than a few of us majorly concerned as to how Obama and his bank of lawyers think they are going to accomplish closing Gitmo, and maintain both control over our national security, plus not allowing terrorists who have never been on US soil the ability to abuse the US judicial system to their financial advantage with legal recourse in the event of being released as “innocent”. ala al-Shihri plus one other Club Gitmo released prisoner back in action in Yemen.

BTW, you’ll be happy to know that Yemen is anxiously awaiting 94 of their own to repatriate…. just like Shihri and his bud who appeared in the same AQ video last week. Both, of course, were likely to be found “innocent” in the US judicial system. At least, in this instance, they couldn’t sue for damages for unnecessary incarceration, and refunnel that cash back into their jihad cause. You will also note, of course, that Shihri fully admitted he was a part of jihad prior to his Gitmo vacation. But the amount of evidence has everything to do with the US judicial system. I would hope that most would be dispersed instead of being allowed access to our system, and it’s perks.

Hopefully, next time we encounter them in the field of battle, we’ll just shoot ’em.

To get back to Politifact before I digressed, you’ll also note that Politifact called “ending the war in Iraq” an Obama “promise kept”, when in actuality, it was the Iraq/Bush admin SOFA agreement that dictated the withdrawal of troops over time now that the security has improved since 2006. Chalked up as an Obama “accomplishment”, tho it was all determined prior to his reign of power.

@MataHarley:

To get back to Politifact before I digressed, you’ll also note that Politifact called “ending the war in Iraq” an Obama “promise kept”, when in actuality, it was the Iraq/Bush admin SOFA agreement that dictated the withdrawal of troops over time now that the security has improved since 2006. Chalked up as an Obama “accomplishment”, tho it was all determined prior to his reign of power.

I get so giddy when I’m on the same page as my hero, Mata. (Last comment on the page).

Careful now, Word… many will think we are the same person… and a vain one at that! LOL

Thanks for clearing that up for me Mata.

When Scott mentioned the tribunals were stopped, It suggested some perminance, so I thought perhaps it might have been just another of the mirade of things the media doesn’t tell us about (as they sing out their praise for anything Lib-Dems do while vilifying anything that has Repub or Conservative support).

I had heard via the media the freeze on tribunals was 120 days. But I see in the EO… which I had posted on a couple of days later with the Saudis arrest of yet more Gitmo grads… that is says 180. So it’s more likely 180 days (or less…).

Mata, I think it’s 120, but it is temporary. That’s the point I should have made more clear.

Apologies all
🙂

Well… there’s the media figure, Scott… and then there’s what’s in the 2nd EO INRE Gitmo, the Review of Detention Policy, where he sets up a special task force to “identify lawful options for the disposition of individuals captured or apprehended in connection with armed conflicts and counterterrorism operations.” They are to report back in 180 days.

This 2nd EO expands on Section 4 of his first EO, the Closure of Guantanamo Detention Facilities, where he mentions that there is to be an “Immediate Review of All Guantánamo Detentions.”

Call me wacky, call me zany, but I would assume if they are “reviewing” the detentions, and identifying the processes to go foward in 180 days, that they would not be conducting any tribunals during that time. No?

So yes, all is temporary, but I believe that temporary period revolves around the time the Special Task Force takes to “identify lawful options of disposition”… per the EO, 180 days.

So other than the media (barf..) where are you getting the 120 days from?

Totally by media rpt

Mata, all of the tribunal processes are halted by the Executive Order

Sec. 7. Military Commissions. The Secretary of Defense shall immediately take steps sufficient to ensure that during the pendency of the Review described in section 4 of this order, no charges are sworn, or referred to a military commission under the Military Commissions Act of 2006 and the Rules for Military Commissions, and that all proceedings of such military commissions to which charges have been referred but in which no judgment has been rendered, and all proceedings pending in the United States Court of Military Commission Review, are halted.

180 days

(g) Report. The Special Task Force shall provide a report to the President, through the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and the Counsel to the President, on the matters set forth in subsection (d) within 180 days of the date of this order unless the Co-Chairs determine that an extension is necessary, and shall provide periodic preliminary reports during those 180 days.

Uh… isn’t that what I said, blast? Per EO, halted until the Task Force weighs in. If they decide that tribunals are the “lawful” process in which to proceed, that “halt” will “unhalt”….

I don’t think Scott and I were dickering on whether this was a forever halt… just the length of time for this temporary freeze.

Sorry Mata, I was just siting directly the info on the discussion, 180 days, you know for the dickering part. 🙂

Thank heavens… I thought my keyboard got tongue-tied, blast! LOL

Welp… back to continued ed. Enuf dickering for fun.