Mahdi Army to become Iraq “social services” organization

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Per a news release from yesterday, Muqtada al-Sadr plans to disarm the Mahdi militia, and change it to a social services organization that focuses on education, religion and social justice… all without weaponry.

Recently, however, the group has been hit by a largely successful Iraqi military crackdown against militia members operating as criminal gangs. At the same time, Mr. Sadr’s popular support is dwindling: Residents who once viewed the Mahdi Army as champions of the poor became alienated by what they saw as its thuggish behavior.

A new brochure, obtained by The Wall Street Journal and confirmed by Mr. Sadr’s chief spokesman, Sheik Salah al-Obeidi, states that the Mahdi Army will now be guided by Shiite spirituality instead of anti-American militancy. The group will focus on education, religion and social justice, according to the brochure, which is aimed at Mr. Sadr’s followers. The brochure also states that it “is not allowed to use arms at all.”

Posters have been put up in some areas of Baghdad saying a new direction for the Mahdi Army will be announced at this Friday’s prayers.

Whatever Sadr’s personal intent, it’s unlikely that the rogue elements contined within the Mahdi militias will comply. Sadr’s been frustrated that not all follow his orders to lay down arms, and ignore the cease file he signed with the Iraqi govt in May. The differences have caused internal strike, with assassinations being carried out on other Mahdi members who support the cease fire.

For Sadr personally, it’s a way back to credibility.

Kenneth Pollack, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, said turning the Mahdi Army into a civic and political organization was a logical step given the weakening of the militia after the crackdown in Basra, Sadr City and Amarah. Indeed, in the long term, it could help legitimize the movement. “If the government fails to deliver on basic services and other needs of the Iraqis, Sadr followers could use their new organization to tell people they should look to them as voice of change,” Mr. Pollack said.

Until recently, the Mahdi Army had enjoyed widespread popular support in areas of Baghdad and in the southern Shiite area of Iraq because it was known to help the poor by giving them money, food and other aid. But its popularity began to wane in the past few months as some members turned increasingly to criminal activity such as taking control of gas stations and extorting money from merchants in exchange for protection.

According to the new brochure, the Mahdi Army will now adhere to the guiding principle of “al-Mumahidoon,” which translates roughly as “those who are paving the way” in Arabic. It’s a reference to people who are awaiting the return of Imam Muhammad al-Mahdi, a revered religious figure in Shia Islam, who Shiites believe will come back to rid the world of evil and injustice.

Of course, Sadr’s not giving up *all* arms… he will keep a few small, special armed cells for limited military operations against U.S. forces. He said specific details about these cells, and how they can be distinguished from rogue Mahdi Army members, will be publicized at a future date.

U.S. military spokesman Col. Jerry O’Hara welcomed the intent, but was careful to say “the proof is always in the actions and not just the words, so we’ll take a wait-and-see approach.” But what is to be eyed warily is the extremist elements of the Mahdi, regrouping in Iran… now estimated to be 5000 strong.

What can be said from this remaking of the Madhi is that the Iraq government has a great success under their belt. No… it’s not a win that forever dampens the Mahdi militia’s effect, and yes… they must remain on guard for the militant elements resurgence.

But the internal strife and Sadr’s will to change the course of the militia as a whole are all developments that weigh in favor of the new Iraq. What remains to be seen is just what that “education” under Sadr’s proposed “social services” organization entails. More jihad? And the Iraq security forces, while enjoying a battle win over the Mahdi militia, must keep their eyes open for the militants return from Iran, to maintain this fragile win.

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This is how Hamas works in Lebanon…

It looks good on paper, but I question their motives. No surprise there, I guess.

This is also the model of Hizzbollah in Lebanon, although now that they are so well-armed they don’t need to pretend any longer.

They really do distribute “social services”, paid for by Iran, who’s happy to buy the allegiance of the poor and ignorant.

WSJ had a follow on editorial to this today:

Good news out of Iraq is becoming almost a daily event: In just the past week, we learned that U.S. combat fatalities (five) dropped in July to a low for the war, that key leaders of al Qaeda in Iraq have fled to the Pakistani hinterland, that troop deployments will soon be cut to 12 months from 15, and that Washington and Baghdad are close to concluding a status-of-forces agreement.

Now this: Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr plans to announce Friday that he will disarm his Mahdi Army, which was raining mortars on Baghdad’s Green Zone as recently as April. Coupled with the near-total defeat of al Qaeda in Iraq, this means the U.S. no longer faces any significant organized military foe in the country. It also marks a major setback for Iran, which had used the Mahdi Army as one of its primary vehicles for extending its influence in Iraq.

The story, broken yesterday by the Journal’s Gina Chon, marks the latest of serial defeats for Mr. Sadr, beginning in February 2007 when he was forced underground (reportedly to Iran) in anticipation of the surge of U.S. troops. More recently, the Mahdi Army was defeated and evicted from Basra and other southern strongholds by an Iraqi-led military offensive. The Mahdi Army capitulated without a fight from its Baghdad enclave of Sadr City. Now the young cleric will focus his group’s efforts on politics and social work, perhaps while he pursues theological studies in Iran. He wouldn’t be the first grad student in history with a tendency toward rabble-rousing.

In many respects, the story of the Mahdi Army’s decline follows the same pattern as al Qaeda’s: Not only was it routed militarily, it also made itself noxious to the very Shiite population it purported to represent and defend. It enforced its heavy-handed religious edicts, coupled with mob-like extortion tactics, wherever it assumed effective control. The overwhelming Shiite rejection of this brand of politics is another piece of good news from Iraq, as it means that Iraqis will not tolerate Iranian-style theocratic rule.

It is also an indication that Iraqi politics is developing in a healthy way. There was considerable anxiety that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, as the leader of the Shiite-dominated Islamic Dawa Party, would practice a sectarian form of politics and toe a pro-Iranian line, particularly since it had long been headquartered in Tehran. Mr. Maliki’s coalition initially included Mr. Sadr’s loyalists, including several cabinet members.

Mr. Maliki had little choice but to make political alliances with Shiite sectarians and seek good relations with Iran, but he has also proven to be more than a sectarian politician and no Iranian pawn. Instead, he has turned out to be a muscular Iraqi nationalist, a stance that enjoys far greater popular support than many Western “experts” on Iraq believed possible. (Remember Senator Joe Biden and others who advised only last year that Iraq had to be divided into three parts?) It’s thus no surprise that the more Mr. Sadr aligned himself with Tehran, the faster his popularity declined.

As with so much in Iraq, Mr. Sadr’s sudden turn to moderation remains reversible. Breakaway factions of the Mahdi Army, aided by Iran, will surely launch fresh attacks on U.S. targets — especially as U.S. and Iraqi elections near. That’s all the more reason to regret the U.S. failure to arrest Mr. Sadr in 2004 for the murder the previous year of Imam Abdul Majid al-Khoei, widely believed to have been undertaken on Mr. Sadr’s orders.

That mistake, like others the U.S. has committed in Iraq, can’t be undone. But our recent and considerable successes can be, which is all the more reason to see our involvement in Iraq through to an irreversible victory. With Mr. Sadr’s “retirement,” we’ve taken another long stride in that direction.