Please note that it shows that both BHO and JSM misrepresented the genesis of the Sunni Awakening.

BHO by suggesting the sheiks were motivated by fear of an imminent US withdrawal, when in fact Col McFarland indicates it was just the opposite.

JSM by suggesting the Awakening was a creature of the Surge, when in fact it substantially predated it. [Col McFarland dates the birth of the Awakening in September 2006]

. . .Colonel McFarlane [phonetic] was contacted by one of the major Sunni sheiks. Because of the surge we were able to go out and protect that sheik and others. And *it began the Anbar awakening.* I mean, that’s just a matter of history.

Depressing.

We also took a different IO tack with the sheiks. Instead of telling them that we would leave soon and they must assume responsibility for their own security, we told them that we would stay as long as necessary to defeat the terrorists. That was the message they had been waiting to hear. As long as they perceived us as mere interlopers, they dared not throw in their lot with ours. When they began to think of us as reliable partners, their attitudes began to change. Still, we had to prove that we meant what we were saying.

Clearly, a combination of factors, some of which we may not yet fully understand, contributed to this pivotal success. As mentioned before, the enemy overplayed its hand and the people were tired of Al-Qaeda. A series of assassinations had elevated younger, more aggressive tribal leaders to positions of influence. A growing concern that the U.S. would leave Iraq and leave the Sunnis defenseless against Al-Qaeda and Iranian-supported militias made these younger leaders open to our overtures. Our willingness to adapt our plans based on the advice of the sheiks, our staunch and timely support for them in times of danger and need, and our ability to deliver on our promises convinced them that they could do business with us. Our forward presence kept them reassured. We operated aggressively across all lines of operation, kinetic and non-kinetic, to bring every weapon and asset at our disposal to bear against the enemy. We conducted detailed intelligence fusion and targeting meetings and operated seamlessly with special operations forces, aviation, close air support, and riverine units. We have now seen this model followed by other BCTs in other parts of Iraq, and it has proved effective. Indeed, the level of sophistication has only improved since the Ready First departed in February 2007. Although, perhaps groundbreaking at the time, most of our tactics, techniques, and procedures are now familiar to any unit operating in Iraq today.

The Big 0 was, at most only partially correct in his assessment of the situation … and had his views been implemented as policy, the Awakening would have died in its infancy.

Here are more lessons the Big 0 needs to learn:

The most enduring lessons of Ramadi are ones that are most easily lost in technical and tactical discussions, the least tangible ones. The most important lessons we learned were —

Accept risk in order to achieve results.
(As opposed to leave now?)

Once you gain the initiative, never give the enemy respite or refuge.
(As opposed to leaving before the free people of Iraq can independently carry on in this?)

Never stop looking for another way to attack the enemy.
(Or is that, “withdraw from the enemy”?)

The tribes represent the people of Iraq, and the populace represents the “key terrain” of the conflict. The force that supports the population by taking the moral high ground has as sure an advantage in COIN as a maneuver commander who occupies dominant terrain in a conventional battle. (As opposed to the “non-judgmentalism” that treats dictator and democrat with the same deference, as seen in the UN and much of our own State Department?)

And a lesson for all those who think that “brown people” are incapable of forming a civil society, and therefore tell us that a strongman is necessary for “peace” in Iraq …

No matter how imperfect the tribal system appeared to us, it was capable of providing social order and control through culturally appropriate means where governmental control was weak.

http://www.americanthinker.com/2008/07/the_complex_success_of_the_sur.html

I insist my name be attached to this plan if implemented.

Sorry Gregory… with Obama busy taking credit for everyone else’s tenacity… i.e. the Surge results and Iraq progress… I doubt a President Obama would give you the time of day, let alone a lick of credit!

And speaking of “credit”…. LOL… Mike’s A sez

How many times have I said that once the surge was shown to be working Dems would try and claim credit?

Too many times to count, my friend. Too many times to count. And when you’re right, your right. Expect if you’re BHO. In his case, when he’s wrong, he still thinks he’s right.

How many times have I said that once the surge was shown to be working Dems would try and claim credit?

Me mentioning my plan:
Me mentioning the advisor plan, back with 20,000-26,000 of them, in Dec. 2007:
floppingaces.net/2007/12/28/news-flash-to-osama-your-credi/
I also come up with 50,000 troops in the same link.

Me mentioning the advisor plan in March:
floppingaces.net/2008/03/22/execution-concept-of-the-iraq-war/

Me listing, back in May, 20,000 advisors staying till 2015
floppingaces.net/2008/05/03/the-fight-in-iraq/

Those are just links to this site.

Maliki and Bush have agreed NOT to set a timetable for a withdrawal of troops from Iraq

No agreement yet, but they’re headed for a conditions based general time horizon with the aspirational goal of withdrawing the last troops in 2010…

Actually Maliki’s probably going to go with a provisional agreement now anyway. He’ll hold out to negotiate with the next POTUS.