What we have to do is to begin a phased redeployment to send a clear signal to the Iraqi government that we are not going to be there in perpetuity. Now, it will — we should be as careful getting out as we were careless getting in. I welcome the genuine reductions of violence that have taken place, although I would point out that much of that violence has been reduced because there was an agreement with tribes in Anbar province — Sunni tribes — who started to see, after the Democrats were elected in 2006, you know what, the Americans may be leaving soon, and we are going to be left very vulnerable to the Shi’as. We should start negotiating now. That’s how you change behavior.
And that’s why I will send a clear signal to the Iraqi government. They will have ample time to get their act together, to actually pass an oil law, which has been — they’ve been talking about now for years.
Oops! I’m sorry, that was his position 6 months ago…before things REALLY quieted down in Iraq to the point where a potential President, his advisors, and all the senior military commanders in the region can walk around w/out body armor.
Question:
Is Senator Obama’s position still the same, or
Did he change it?
Author of “Reparations and America’s 2nd Civil War
Reparations and America’s 2nd Civil War: Malensek, Scott: 9798864028674: Amazon.com: Books
What will his position be tomorow???? No one knows
On his return from Iraq, what will be his message concerning his plan for the immediate withdraw of troops from Iraq? In 16 months as he said before he left for Iraq? Now that the Prime Minister, Maliki, has “retracted” his words to the effect that he agrees with Obama, Mr. Obama is faced with the reality that:
1) Maliki and Bush have agreed NOT to set a timetable for a withdrawal of troops from Iraq because of both Iraq’s inability to defend itself and the need to secure the progress made so far by the surge,
2) the U.S. generals and commanders in Iraq have told or will tell Obama, as they have indicated to the press already, there is still much work to be done, which precludes any kind of withdrawal of troops for perhaps not less than several years.
http://www.nextgenerationcorp.com/nextgenblog/
Doesn’t matter. Bush, Obama, and McCain are all coming to the same Iraq policy for Aug 08+
Three hundred foriegn policy advisors and no one told Obama that there has been an oil revenue distribution process working for more than a year now? 15 out of 18 bechmarks completed—–violence reduced by 80% and this moron attempts to spin the obvious success.
Sounds like a “community leader” to me.
No agreement yet, but they’re headed for a conditions based general time horizon with the aspirational goal of withdrawing the last troops in 2010…
Actually Maliki’s probably going to go with a provisional agreement now anyway. He’ll hold out to negotiate with the next POTUS.
My bet would be that an agreement’s already been reached based on military deployment/withdrawal/replacement/stand-down schedule. Maliki, Coalition commanders, Coalition leaders, and probably w Obama and McCain as well. No one wants US forces en masse in Iraq indefinitely; only as long as it takes to get the job done so Iraq doesn’t have to be invaded a 3rd time.
His advisors have yet another plan for Iraq. It’s my plan (mentioned on this site and elsewhere), which freaked me out. They used my general figure of how many troops should stay (their general number is 50,000), yes stay, in Iraq and the same general reason why they would stay (as advisors and to provide air cover). I insist my name be attached to this plan if implemented.
The story:
news.yahoo.com/s/mcclatchy/20080722/wl_mcclatchy/2998032_1
Me mentioning my plan:
Me mentioning the advisor plan, back with 20,000-26,000 of them, in Dec. 2007:
floppingaces.net/2007/12/28/news-flash-to-osama-your-credi/
I also come up with 50,000 troops in the same link.
Me mentioning the advisor plan in March:
floppingaces.net/2008/03/22/execution-concept-of-the-iraq-war/
Me listing, back in May, 20,000 advisors staying till 2015
floppingaces.net/2008/05/03/the-fight-in-iraq/
Those are just links to this site.
“after the Democrats were elected in 2006, you know what, the Americans may be leaving soon, and we are going to be left very vulnerable to the Shi’as. We should start negotiating now.”
How many times have I said that once the surge was shown to be working Dems would try and claim credit?
Greg sez:
Sorry Gregory… with Obama busy taking credit for everyone else’s tenacity… i.e. the Surge results and Iraq progress… I doubt a President Obama would give you the time of day, let alone a lick of credit!
And speaking of “credit”…. LOL… Mike’s A sez
Too many times to count, my friend. Too many times to count. And when you’re right, your right. Expect if you’re BHO. In his case, when he’s wrong, he still thinks he’s right.
typical…
demorat tactics…
anyone really surprised???
He has even caused Ms Couric to admit on camera to being confused as to his position on the Surge. Since I don’t watch CBS, I wonder if that was on their broadcast.
when the dems were elected in 06 it sacred the shia out of the sunni,so they went along w/the program to clean thier act up.just guessin.it scares the hell out me to have them(dems) involed with anything.
What with the presence of its cheerleading fellow travelers in the so-called MSM, the left has carte blanche to make up its own “facts”. That makes politics a pretty easy game. It also makes the future of this nation extremely dicey. Especially when it seems the Amercian people have become too lazy, too stupid, too ignorant or just too uncaring to do anything about it.
Here’s an interesting read on the surge – and what went before…
http://www.americanthinker.com/2008/07/the_complex_success_of_the_sur.html
From Anbar Awakens: The Tipping Point, written by Men who know what went down (emphasis added):
We also took a different IO tack with the sheiks. Instead of telling them that we would leave soon and they must assume responsibility for their own security, we told them that we would stay as long as necessary to defeat the terrorists. That was the message they had been waiting to hear. As long as they perceived us as mere interlopers, they dared not throw in their lot with ours. When they began to think of us as reliable partners, their attitudes began to change. Still, we had to prove that we meant what we were saying.
Clearly, a combination of factors, some of which we may not yet fully understand, contributed to this pivotal success. As mentioned before, the enemy overplayed its hand and the people were tired of Al-Qaeda. A series of assassinations had elevated younger, more aggressive tribal leaders to positions of influence. A growing concern that the U.S. would leave Iraq and leave the Sunnis defenseless against Al-Qaeda and Iranian-supported militias made these younger leaders open to our overtures. Our willingness to adapt our plans based on the advice of the sheiks, our staunch and timely support for them in times of danger and need, and our ability to deliver on our promises convinced them that they could do business with us. Our forward presence kept them reassured. We operated aggressively across all lines of operation, kinetic and non-kinetic, to bring every weapon and asset at our disposal to bear against the enemy. We conducted detailed intelligence fusion and targeting meetings and operated seamlessly with special operations forces, aviation, close air support, and riverine units. We have now seen this model followed by other BCTs in other parts of Iraq, and it has proved effective. Indeed, the level of sophistication has only improved since the Ready First departed in February 2007. Although, perhaps groundbreaking at the time, most of our tactics, techniques, and procedures are now familiar to any unit operating in Iraq today.
The Big 0 was, at most only partially correct in his assessment of the situation … and had his views been implemented as policy, the Awakening would have died in its infancy.
Here are more lessons the Big 0 needs to learn:
The most enduring lessons of Ramadi are ones that are most easily lost in technical and tactical discussions, the least tangible ones. The most important lessons we learned were —
Accept risk in order to achieve results.
(As opposed to leave now?)
Once you gain the initiative, never give the enemy respite or refuge.
(As opposed to leaving before the free people of Iraq can independently carry on in this?)
Never stop looking for another way to attack the enemy.
(Or is that, “withdraw from the enemy”?)
The tribes represent the people of Iraq, and the populace represents the “key terrain” of the conflict. The force that supports the population by taking the moral high ground has as sure an advantage in COIN as a maneuver commander who occupies dominant terrain in a conventional battle. (As opposed to the “non-judgmentalism” that treats dictator and democrat with the same deference, as seen in the UN and much of our own State Department?)
And a lesson for all those who think that “brown people” are incapable of forming a civil society, and therefore tell us that a strongman is necessary for “peace” in Iraq …
No matter how imperfect the tribal system appeared to us, it was capable of providing social order and control through culturally appropriate means where governmental control was weak.
The sad thing about the many, many misspoken statements, outright lies, and “that’s not what I said, meant, suggested, inferred, whispered, garbled, stuttered, muttered” moments, is that many Americans are too lazy to learn the truth about Barak Obama for themselves.
Depressing.
Excellent linked article Rich Casebolt.
Please note that it shows that both BHO and JSM misrepresented the genesis of the Sunni Awakening.
BHO by suggesting the sheiks were motivated by fear of an imminent US withdrawal, when in fact Col McFarland indicates it was just the opposite.
JSM by suggesting the Awakening was a creature of the Surge, when in fact it substantially predated it. [Col McFarland dates the birth of the Awakening in September 2006]
. . .Colonel McFarlane [phonetic] was contacted by one of the major Sunni sheiks. Because of the surge we were able to go out and protect that sheik and others. And *it began the Anbar awakening.* I mean, that’s just a matter of history.