Possibly one of the best, and most honest overviews of the Iraq SOFA negotiations comes from Unlike most news outlets that state their content with such conviction, Fadhil points out that understanding each of the factions beefs is especially difficult since little about the negotiation specifics are known at this time to *any* one.
Or, as he puts it, the details “are rarely shared beyond the closed circle of the executive branches in Washington and Baghdad, leaving lawmakers in both countries in the dark for now. Personally, I think this is wise because too many voices prior to hammering out a starting point draft is anything but productive.
Despite the lack of details, there are varying levels of acceptance and rejection for what basics they do know. And knowing these objections is valuable for even the first SOFA draft. Oddly enough, there are only two groups with an absolute no-compomise/reject attitude. That would be the Association of Muslim scholars, and Sadr’s clan.
The Muslim scholars are Sunni clerics, formed in April 2003 after the fall of Saddam to unite the Sunni ulema, the highest Iraq sunni authorities. Their historic sympathies lie with Saddam’s old regime and AQ. However the AMSI has found their support by Sunnis significantly diminishing since “the awakening” of tribal leaders, and perhaps had their biggest setback last November when Sheikh Ahmed Abdul Ghafour al Samarrai, the leader of the Sunni Religious Endowments (more clerics…) ordered the closure of the AMSI headquarters in the Umm al Quraa mosque.
As reported by Bill Roggio in the Long War Journal:
The crackdown on the Association of Muslim Scholars is part of the efforts of Sunni scholars to delegitimize the religious support given to al Qaeda in Iraq and other radical Islamic extremist groups in Iraq. The creation of the Council of Iraqi Scholars, or Council of Ulema of Iraq, has led the way in alienating the radical clerics.
The Council of Iraqi Scholars was formed in early April 2007 after over 60 senior Sunni clerics gathered in Amman, Jordan. The religious leaders sought to wrest control of the religious edicts, or fatwas, issued by the radical clerics in the Association of Muslim Scholars. Sheikh Abdul Malik al Saadi, Iraq’s preeminent Sunni scholar, leads the council. Samarrai is also an influential member and acts as the council’s spokesman.
Likewise, Sadr’s having a hard time generating enough protesters against the SOFA negotiations. From Fadhil’s article today:
Earlier crowds are estimated to be in the thousands. The most recent public protest in Karbala was, according to The Associated Press, attended by “hundreds.” Protests in Sadr City, the bastion of the Mahdi Army, drew 1,500 protesters last Friday.
With the two “naysayers” losing support, and basically out of the way, this brings us to the majority who agree a SOFA is necessary in some form. Last week, two Iraqi Assembly members traveled to DC and addressed Congress.
Khalaf Ilayan, a leader of one of the three components of the Accord Front, favors waiting until the new POTUS sits in the Oval Office. His peer, Nadeem Jabiri of the Islamic Fadheela Party, concerns himself with Iraq “sovereignty”, and their practical progress as a bureaucratic body.
“The Iraqi government right now still does not have full rein of its sovereignty because of the thousands of foreign troops now on its land. … And perhaps the Iraqi government does not have yet sufficient tools to run its own internal affairs. Therefore I ask the American government not to embarrass the Iraqi government (by) putting it in a difficult situation with this agreement.”
Both observations, IMHO, have merit. And indeed, despite the ill-timing of the December 2008 expiration of the UN mandate, it may be premature to lock in such long term specifics while the pieces on the chess board are moving. Not only will there be a new POTUS, but even more importantly, Iraq has provincial elections coming up. The Sunni bloc membership is apt to have a significant profile change… and most likely for the better as Sunni leadership from the awakening movement are strong shoe ins.
But I’m not posting to discuss what we don’t know on the negotiations, or their not-so-convenient timing. What I want to do is remind everyone of the common thread here - the very important link between these upcoming SOFAs and our recent SCOTUS opinion.
Or more succinctly put, the agreed to sovereignty of our Iraq bases affects the detention, rights and protections of any combatants the US harbors there. And last, but not least, that agreement will also affect the rights and protections of our US soldiers and support civilian contractors.
Sounds familiar now, don’t it? While we don’t have details, Iraqis discussing yielding sovereignty as a point of contention may infer that US bases in Iraq are demanding sovereignty as a preferred contractual point. If that is the case, as SCOTUS has ruled, Habeas Corpus and combatants with Constitutional rights leers it’s head yet again.
If no sovereignty, what of our own troops? Will they (and the support civilian contractors) will be subject to the many harsh Saddam regime laws still on the books? Will US military and American citizens find themselves in front of Iraq judges for crimes considered un Islamic?
If the Pentagon has got a clue… they’ll demand the sovereignty for our guys, but won’t be holding any of the bad guys (who’ll race for their attorneys upon arrest) at that location. In short, the SCOTUS decision has had the over reaching effect to limit some aspects and useage of these proposed US temporary bases in Iraq. This recent reality may dictate some new concerns in terms for these SOFAs.
Put your imagination in fast forward… landing after the musical chairs of Iraq Assembly and POTUS leadership. Assuming we get a friendlier Sunni bloc after provincial elections, which POTUS will be defining the SOFA demands for US interests? Certainly if McCain wins, he has already said he supports bases there for as long as the Iraqis needs and mission demands. But what are his ideas of terms for these bases? McCain was appalled with this SCOTUS opinion. Does he know how these SOFAs can mirror the same problem if not structured correctly?
And what of Obama, and his ever morphing stance? (see Curt’s “Once Before, and Again and Again” post) Will BHO be taking this SOFA agreement into consideration for soldiers, detainees and contractors? If there is no agreement, and the UN mandate isn’t renewed, what happens then? Does BHO pull us out immediately, saying any Iraq failures are not his fault because the agreement wasn’t hammered out in time?
I’d say it’s about time for some bright lightbulb reporter to begin hounding Obama *and* McCain on some real Iraq specifics… like this SOFA agreement… and their idea of needed terms in a post-Boumediene opinion world. It’s not enough to say “no permanent bases”, because we’re already quite outspoken in the fact the bases are not permanent.
What begs to be asked is how can this SOFA best be constructed to provide protections to our American soldiers and civilians, without giving the same to captured combatants?
This oughta be good… I’m dying to hear their answers because I’m not sure that both can be accomplished. And if one has to be sacrificed, which will it be?
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