I conclude from this (actually I already knew it) that we can expect John McCain not to care about details, events and states in time, as tense, as he sees it, becomes flat, linear and One with all that there is, like Parmenidies’ Universe

Oh man…your a hoot!

“If he had said ‘we’d drawn down,’ he’d be accurate,” Scheunemann said. “If he had said ‘we were drawing down,’ he would be accurate.”

“To get into a debate about a verb tense rather than the real fundamental national security issues … is really a distraction.”"

Strange parse. Using time tenses doesn’t seem helpful to me. McCain was clearly thinking and speaking in the present tense, as his two previous sentences indicate: …”So, I can tell you that it is succeeding. I can look you in the eye and tell you it’s succeeding.”

The first sentence is even a concluding sentence, which, of course, is supposed to reiterate earlier statements resulting in a ‘concluding’ final understanding of the matter: “So, I can tell you that it is succeeding”– Which also explains why McCain continues in the same tense. If he’d have spoken in the past tense or future tense regarding the troops levels, the statement would have been incoherent or awkward with the analytics of the the argument.

One should also note this was a perfect present tense McCain used: “We have drawn down to pre-surge levels.” He expressed an action that has been completed with respect to the present; it’s not simple past, which is less empathetic, as it lacks the auxiliary verb ‘have’.

I conclude from this (actually I already knew it) that we can expect John McCain not to care about details, events and ‘facts’ in time, as tense, as he sees it, since they become flat, linear and One with all that there is, like Parmenidies’ Universe:

—“I said we have drawn down, and we have drawn down,” — “We’ve drawn down three of the five brigades. We’ve drawn down the Marines. The rest of them will be home at the end of July. That’s just the facts and those were the facts I stated.”

Prepositions like ‘to pre-surge levels’ get absorbed into the One also.

I know from teaching hours a day sometimes, like these candidates, that you can wander and say things you wish you hadn’t, but isn’t Iraq McCain’s signature event, isn’t he supposed to be the expert here; isn’t his campaign the measure of his knowledge of military matters and national security– he was off the mark by months and 15,000 troops. …And when you place this statement into the narrative of the ‘troop surge’ —which he practically “authored”—you can’t not know the troop levels aren’t currently at pre-surge numbers, especially when Gen. Petreaus was just discussing the matter just last week.

I know if Obama made this mistake you gentlemen would be laughing your sides sore.

Doug sez: Using conditional statements is required when describing the tentative nature of Iraq’s institutions, politics and general security.

Take, for example, Bush’s 18 benchmarks he hoped the troop surge would complete. Almost a year and a half later, to this day, not even half have been completed: most unmet, some partially met, and some even regressed (as with the Sunni’s suspending talks yesterday).

Therefore, one must use conditional terminology; otherwise, to describe or foretell Iraq in one particular state of affairs ‘may very probably’ result in something like Bush’s Benchmark’s.

First off, Doug. It appears only the negative Americans have a hard time giving the Iraqis well deserved “atta boys” for their persistence. World leaders at the Stockholm Conference do not share your personal harsh assessments.

However why is it that all your “conditional” analyses offer only the negative result? If positive isn’t in your blood, allow me to give you an example with your own sentence…

Some Mahdi Army leaders in Sadr City are already willing to splinter over the above 5 deaths with the core membership — which seems to be a breach of show encourgement for the ceasefire deal— and may mean an end to the truce daily bombings in Baghdad by Sadr forces; if not, then very probably Sadr’s army will continue to break away from him and continue insurgent activities collapse from within, forming small rogue, controllable cells.

Voluminous posting of garbage does not constitute truth.

Just go away somewhere, making sure that your supply of Prozac is adequate.

Bye!

Here’s how I see it:

Benchmark 1: Perform constitutional review. Unmet.

Benchmark 2: Enacting and implementing legislation on de-Baathification–
While the USIP describes this benchmark as met, I don’t. Why? The legislation was passed over the protests of the Sunni Arabs in Parliament, which was supposed to help the Sunni Arabs. The former Shia-Baathists may have been assisted, but the Sunni-Baath’s objected. The benchmark was met in theory, but not in practical terms: Partial.
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4139

Benchmark 3: Oil laws: unmet

Benchmark 4: semi-autonomous regions legislation: Partial

Benchmark 5: Enacting and implementing legislation establishing an Independent High Electoral Commission, provincial elections law, provincial council authorities, and a date for provincial elections— Unmet
This marker is now in question and cannot be described as met:
http://ap.google.com/article/ALeqM5gFrAeDnwRmhu0qNxNT2aZdFr01TAD90TGUC81

Benchmark 6: Enact and implement legislation addressing amnesty:
MET

Benchmark 7: Enacting and implementing legislation establishing a strong militia disarmament program to ensure that such security forces are accountable only to the central government and loyal to the constitution of Iraq: MET

Benchmark 8: Establishing supporting political, media, economic, and services committees in support of the Baghdad Security Plan— Partial: Why? Google ‘baghdad, water, electricity’ or “baghdad infrastructure”. Further, this could not have been established during the last Maliki sieges in Basra, Sadr City or Mosul as all institutional support structure would have been hampered, cut-off, hand-tied or destroyed: Partial

Benchmark 9: Providing three trained and ready Iraqi brigades to support Baghdad operations:
Partial— Why? See challenges and criticisms here: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraqi_Army
Further, the April assault in Sadr City ended up with very mixed results and significant American troop and air support. Partial

Benchmark 10: Providing Iraqi commanders with all authority to execute this plan and to make tactical and operational decisions, in consultation with U.S commanders, without political intervention, to include the authority to pursue all extremists, including Sunni insurgents and Shiite militias—
Again, this is mixed: Political intervention in the military and police forces still persists along sectarian lines. We saw this in Basra and more so in Sadr City. Further, we are still waiting for Maliki to accept 10 of thousands into the security positions the members of the Sunni Awakening Council militias. Further, “political intervention” is hard to difficult to define. One might say that US forces only act with political intervention. Reasonable minds can differ, so I think it’s difficult to mark this one completely done: Partial.

Benchmark 11: Ensuring that the Iraqi Security Forces are providing even handed enforcement of the law. Unmet: http://www.brijit.com/abstract/24005/Measuring-Iraq’s-Security-Forces

Benchmark 12: Ensuring that the Baghdad security plan will not provide a safe haven for any outlaws of any sectarian or political affiliation— Certainly, Maliki tried in Baghdad; that’s been my argument: the city’s truce is fragile and weak. Sadr city is not safe, nor quiet as McCain says.
Not met.

Benchmark 13: Reduce the level of sectarian violence in Iraq and eliminate militia control of local security– Sectarian violence has dramatically been reduced, so has militia control in Basra and Sadr City. Met.

Benchmark: 14:Establishing all of the planned joint security stations in neighborhoods across Baghdad. Partial. It is in process now.

Benchmark 15: Increasing the number of Iraqi security forces units capable of operating independently. http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2008-04-25-iraqsecurity_N.htm unmet.

Benchmark 16: Ensuring that the rights of minority political parties in the Iraqi legislature are protected— Hardly. The Sunni’s suspended talks in Parliament yesterday. Unmet:
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/28/world/middleeast/28iraq.html?ref=world

17: Allocating and spending $10 billion in Iraqi revenues for reconstruction projects, including delivery of essential services, on an equitable basis. met. Sort of if you don’t count the corruption: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/IB02Ak05.html

18: Ensuring that Iraq’s political authorities are not undermining or making false accusations against members of the Iraqi Security Forces. Unmet.

My tally: 8 unmet, 6 partial, and 4 met.

The USIP and the Weekly standard are simply out of date with the political and military fluctuations that have taken place in Iraq.

Furthermore, the WH has given up on the benchmarks:
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/25/washington/25policy.html?_r=2&ex=1353733200&en=67ba7b472e949a4f&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss&oref=slogin&oref=slogin

“Take, for example, Bush’s 18 benchmarks he hoped the troop surge would complete. Almost a year and a half later, to this day, not even half have been completed: most unmet, some partially met, and some even regressed (as with the Sunni’s suspending talks yesterday).”

That of course is a lie.

http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/014/933bmtiu.asp

The key quote is:

“As the tally below shows, the Government of Iraq has now met 12 out of the original 18 benchmarks set for it, including four out of the six key legislative benchmarks. It has made substantial progress on five more, and only one remains truly stalled.”

Never let the facts get in the way of a good old lib fantasy eh?

First, you and Bill, as I see it, don’t acknowledge the diversity of the enemy; you tend to see them as a homogeneous entity, some singular target, like a bug, that can be killed and be done with. However, JAM itself exists in numerous incarnations, it’s loosely centralized: men determined to confront the occupiers; men loyal to their tribe first, Sadr second; men loyal to Sadr; men wanting a job; men seeking a nationalist thrill; men that hate Maliki; the goal of ‘wiping them out’ is not possible– as ‘them’ only somewhat exists.

Second, you also don’t acknowledge the endless supply of young men that immediately fill the ranks of those killed or arrested. There is an endless river of human resources of here. There are no reports of young and old bodies being in short supply, but, on the contrary, there is evidence of plentifulness.

Third, the same applies for caches, arms, weapons, and vehicles; there is an endless supply of them, too. Fraud, corruption and weapons are ubiquitous now and continue to increase.

Fourth, you don’t acknowledge the degree of the public hostility in Iraqi’s that dislike us. While we have a good percentage that think we are decent and want to help them, still more than half find it acceptable to attack us, and 70-80% want us to leave.

Fifth, and finally, you don’t acknowledge the fragility of the “truce.” And I know you and Bill understand it is very delicate.

Therefore, all the above arguments are not accented significantly by McCain, or Bill, and cannot accurately describe Sadr City or Basra (or Mosul or Baghdad) as “quiet” and that we are consequently “succeeding”.

Mata Harley,

Using conditional statements is required when describing the tentative nature of Iraq’s institutions, politics and general security.

Take, for example, Bush’s 18 benchmarks he hoped the troop surge would complete. Almost a year and a half later, to this day, not even half have been completed: most unmet, some partially met, and some even regressed (as with the Sunni’s suspending talks yesterday).

Therefore, one must use conditional terminology; otherwise, to describe or foretell Iraq in one particular state of affairs ‘may very probably’ result in something like Bush’s Benchmark’s.

which seems to be … snip… and may mean … snip…if not, then very probably …

Like Curt says, you sure hedge your bets for failure. Even when that “seems to be”, “may mean” and “if not, then very probably….” stuff hasn’t happened yet.

Why not just hope they have an easier go at stitching their country together? Would that hurt oh so very badly? And ya know… just like we have crime and thugs here, they’re still going to have their violence in our wake. The trick is not to make Iraq violence free, but to make whatever violence arises controllable by the Iraqis, without foreign aid.

Iraqi and Coalition security forces continue to press operations against the Mahdi Army in Baghdad. Iraqi security forces clashed with the Mahdi Army in eastern Baghdad as raids in search of Mahdi Army weapons caches continue in Sadr city and throughout Baghdad.

Iraqi security forces killed 10 Mahdi Army fighters in eastern Baghdad early today, Multinational Forces Iraq reported in a press release. Another Mahdi Army fighter was wounded and subsequently captured. The exact location of the clash has not been given. The US military said the fight occurred in eastern Baghdad, which could refer to either Sadr City or New Baghdad, which is also a Mahdi Army stronghold.

Iraqi Special Operations Forces also captured three of the Iranian-trained Special Groups operatives during raids in Baghdad. One of the operatives helped purchase, distribute, and employ rockets, mortars, and roadside bombs used against Iraqi and US forces. The two other operatives are behind the “kidnapping, torturing and killing Iraqi citizens and forcing them out of their homes.”

US and Iraqi forces believe they have put a major dent in the manpower of the Special Groups over the past year. “In partnership with Iraqi Security Forces, Multinational Division Baghdad has detained 418 AQI [al Qaeda in Iraq] and 450 SG [Special Groups] operatives,” said Lieutenant Colonel Steven Stover, the chief Public Affairs Officer for Multinational Division Baghdad, in an e-mail to The Long War Journal.

A significant percentage of those captured are high-value targets. “Operatives range from Senior Leaders, to Media Experts to Attack Coordinators, Facilitators and Operators who actively and indiscriminately attack Iraqi Civilians,” Stover said. “Approximately one third of these captured come from the leadership ranks of their respective cells. Approximately two thirds are other operatives that are critical to the day-to-day conduct of extremist attack planning & execution.”

Dismantling the Mahdi Army caches in Sadr City

The Iraqi Army is also continuing its search for Mahdi Army weapons caches inside Sadr City. Fifty-nine of the deadly Iranian-made roadside bombs known as explosively formed projectiles or EFPs have been seized inside Sadr City since May 24.

Twenty-seven EFPs were seized by Iraqi troops in Sadr City on May 27; 17 were in a single cache. Seventeen were seized on May 26, six on May 25, and nine more on May 24.

Multinational Forces Iraq varies the classification of EFPs between medium and heavy weapons, depending on the configuration. “They are the number one killer of our Soldiers. Since December 19, 2007 we have lost 66 American Heroes; 41 to IEDs,” Stover said. “The good news is attack levels have gone down again – a direct tribute to the blood, sweat and sacrifice of the American and Iraqi Soldier.”

The raids are impacting the Mahdi Army’s ability to conduct future operations in Sadr City, Stover stated. The seizure of caches also impacts the Mahdi Army’s ability to resupply and may expose the efforts. “To bring in resupply puts the weapons and munitions transportation, financiers, and criminal leadership networks at risk of being caught by ISF or Coalition Forces,” said Stover.

The Iraqi Army has surged forces into Sadr City since the military moved into the Mahdi Army stronghold on May 20. Elements from eight Iraqi Army brigades have been identified as operating inside Sadr City by The Long War Journal.

Iraqi Army units working inside Sadr City:

1st Battalion, 3rd Brigade, 1st Iraqi Army Division
2nd Battalion, 34th Brigade, 9th Iraqi Army Division
4th Battalion, 34th Brigade, 9th Iraqi Army Division
2nd Battalion, 36th Brigade, 9th Iraqi Army Division
39th Brigade, 10th Iraqi Army Division
38th Brigade, 10th Iraqi Army Division
42nd Brigade, 11th Iraqi Army Division
44th Brigade, 11th Iraqi Army Division
49th Brigade, 11th Iraqi Army Division

Sounds to me like they are getting their asses handed to them…and by Iraqi troops to boot.

Thats called success.

But keep praying for that failure buddy.

(AP) An angry Shiite militia commander complained Wednesday that “we were duped” into accepting a cease-fire in Sadr City — remarks that point to a potentially damaging rift within the movement of radical cleric Muqtada al-Sadr.

[...]

A split among al-Sadr’s followers — between those favoring a more militant path and others seeking compromise with Iraq’s government — could threaten the relative calm in Baghdad and re-ignite Shiite-on-Shiite violence across Iraq’s oil-rich south.

(UPI) Fighting between U.S. troops and militant forces in Baghdad’s Sadr City killed five people and wounded eight, Iraq’s Interior Ministry said Wednesday.

The fighting occurred in Sadr City’s Fadhailiya district, scene of several clashes between U.S.- and Iraqi-led forces and supporters of rebel Shiite cleric Moqtada Sadr, CNN reported.

Sadr City and other major areas in Baghdad have been under siege since late April —and a couple weeks go by and McCain claims there is quiet. Perhaps for the moment, but that hardly warrants social, economic and life-style stability and security.

The above noted fragilities illustrate the thin ice Baghdad is on while all kinds of manic security controlled maneuverers skate about to keep pace with fluid demands of the city. Some Mahdi Army leaders in Sadr City are already willing to splinter over the above 5 deaths— which seems to be a breach of the ceasefire deal— and may mean an end to the truce in Baghdad; if not, then very probably Sadr’s army will continue to break away from him and continue insurgent activities.

While this would increase violence again, it would also give the Iraqi government, now with 10,000 troops and armor in residence, an excuse for a further crackdown and then again, perhaps, a further wave of gorilla warfare.

While this singular incident probably won’t alone won’t end the truce, there is the side of the fragility of the truce: Maliki has far more reason to provoke an end to it than Sadr has.

In the end, Sadr City is not “quiet”, not “succeeding”; to say that is absurd. Further disaffected Mahdi Army groups can simply splinter off from the main movement, return to violence, gorilla warfare and, then again, provoke a massive Iraqi and US military response, ad infinitum– the numbers are there and so is the will.

Maliki wants to stigmatize the Sadr movement with one ugly color while seriously weakening Sadr’s political hold over his own people for the postponed fall elections. Sadr’s best hope in such a situation would be to ‘control with a hammer’ provoking a reaction. This way he may finally get to order the military designs he stated publicly over a month ago.

Basra is no different than Sadr City; both are Shia, have hidden their weapons, and are frantically waiting for the see what the next day brings. Basra’s 30,000 troops did bring stability and security back, but for how long as it sets nested under a pressure-cooker?

Mosul is a bit different as it’s Sunni. There the insurgents simply melted away before there could be a major battle. So, they are now tucked away in parts of the triangle waiting for the next lull in American or IA presence.

The military wack-a-mole is practically symbolic of the political progress too. Yesterday the much touted Sunni political reconciliation took a turn for the worse as

(AP) Iraq’s largest Sunni Arab political bloc said Wednesday it has suspended talks on ending its boycott of the Shiite-led government due to a dispute over which positions it would assume, the head of the bloc said Wednesday.

The decision was a setback to Prime Minster Nouri al-Maliki’s efforts to bring the Sunnis back into the political fold to shore up recent security gains.
…

This kind of activity has been going on for years now where we play inch worm progress soundbites and amplify them to sooth our nationalist conscious. Anyone watching this knew the Sunnis would suspend talks as Maliki must drag his feet on this, or he’d be out of a job at the end of 09.

So, finally, you can’t trust McCain on Iraq; it’s his Achilles heel; it’s his Nov. tolling bell; he’s riddled with inconsistencies, false-statements and exaggerations on this subject.

While you may wish this to be a ‘broadside’ you are getting carry away from the facts.

Great line!