Oh….but read this Collins report, right?

lol

All true. Then what’s the fuss? I’d claim the person’s name that is missing above is Bush. If anyone is more singled out in the report, I’d say it was Bush. It may explain why Collins says the study does not “lay much of the blame” on Rumsfeld– ’cause Bush and him have share the blame.

Also, one should note that while Collins’ study is a year old, Collin’s preface is from this month of April ‘08. Strange he waited so long. Anyway, he could have made the changes he wanted to before its publication to tamper some of the “hot-points”. Yet it appears he didn’t: the report is still a hotty!

One should read Collin’s report. It is not simply a stale account of the descriptions that lead up to the war and it’s early parts, it’s a fluid and somewhat unsteady account out to examine what went wrong in the post-war planning by casting and tying description and description together; then, surprisingly, occasionally, wrangles beyond comfortable fact and inflicts pain and judgment! I will argue there is ‘righteous anger’ being expressed in the report.

But perhaps Collins didn’t understand the critical tone of his report, or perhaps he did. Or perhaps he thought it would never make it to the MSM, or perhaps he knew it would and feels he needs to vindicate himself; who really knows. Waiting a year to publish it should tell us something. That length of time in meditation should have informed Collins there would be blow-back. Perhaps it helps explain why the report reads like a objective historian trying to balance detached restrain with an ire of righteous indignation. Let me give just a few examples.

In describing the five flawed assumptions senior officials made in planning for the post-Iraq war Collins thoughtfully and cautiously disassembles assumption two where he describes the failed ‘rapid turnover of power to Iraqis’ where “the United States and its coalition partners became the legal occupiers of Iraq, a fact that became more intolerable to the Iraqis as the days wore on…” Collins then steps away from his methodical discourse, after all his clinical examination and he states:

“The President approved these changes to postwar policy, and he bears direct responsibility for not calling in all hands to create a new, well-balanced policy toward Iraq.

Pages 18-19.

Perhaps it’s not moral judgment in Collin’s mind; perhaps he sees it as fact; perhaps it is how it is represented to him seeing Bush do things. But it doesn’t matter, this example is the tone of the report; he doesn’t appear to respect Bush. It is these critical jags and pieces that stick out of Collins’ expository investigation that have lent it to the appetites of the MSM.

After Collins has explained the five flawed assumptions of the senior officials, he states, “Sadly, much of the post-invasion state of affairs had been predicted.” And explains that planners, analysts, reports and studies had “spoken well and loudly about the dangers of postwar Iraq, but their warnings were not heeded.” … “Why senior decision makers did not fully integrate these warnings into postwar planning is puzzling.” … “Again, many participants have not spoken on this issue.”

These are good questions and many have asked them. If you follow the thread from the questions Collins walks you towards Bush and his senior staff once again and ends the story in a rather “delicate” dissection of their actions this bold, short, documented paragraph that rather noticeably juts out:

Any number of close observers, civilian or former military, told
the President or the Secretary of Defense that the coalition needed more
troops in Iraq. Colin Powell, a former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, told British Prime Minister Tony Blair in November 2004 that “we
don’t have enough troops. We don’t control the terrain.”52 According to
his memoirs, Bremer also told President Bush or his key deputies on a few
occasions that security was poor and more troops were needed. Bremer
concluded that the United States had become the worst of all things: an
ineffective occupier. He asked Rumsfeld in spring 2004 for one or two
more divisions; he did not receive a reply.53 Recent scholarship has also
indicated that the Vice President was among those who were concerned
over our level of effort in creating security in Iraq and wondered whether
DOD and CIA were doing enough for the war effort.54

page 23.

Now, unless I’m taking this out of context– and that’s doubful– it doesn’t matter what Collins said to the SWJ regarding Rumseld; the above is very critical of him — as well as Bush, once more.

As we move along Collins is not done.

Four years after the start of the insurgency, the United States still
does not have the ground troops in its base force to support the kind of
troop rotations and in-country force levels necessary to create an appropriate
level of security that, in turn, could help to move us in the direction of
political success in the insurgency. Did this systematic failure to respond to
an environmental requirement occur because Secretary Rumsfeld vetoed
it to keep the overall force small [...] More historical research is needed to explain this failure to
respond to what most believe was an obvious requirement.

page 23.

A “systematic failure to [...] an obvious requirement”. That’s harsh. Yet it’s not, as Collins’ stated, “lay[ing] much of the blame on Rumsfeld.” Why? Because Collins is not done with Bush yet.

In one of the more fascinating parts of the essay is pages 25-26 where Collins looks into “the actions and psychology of the main actors.” After stating indirectly there was too much in-fighting and bickering resulting in a lack of trust he returns again to Bush and company:

One consistent problem demonstrated by George W. Bush’s administration
has been a failure to partner successfully, and this can be laid
at the feet of the President and the people who dominated the national
security apparatus.

Page 27.

Thus ends Collin’s investigation. The rest of the report is Collins’ prescriptions or recommendations for new policies that can “blunt the effects of ego or hubris and make the whole greater than the sum of its parts.” So the last barb certainly falls on Bush and senior associates.

Now none of this is really new for many of us. Personally I did not learn anything new here. So what is interesting I believe is this is one of the closest accounts of a Iraq war policy insider –with some colorful indignation– confirming again what many of us have been saying regarding post war planning.